CONSTANTINE

The Last Emperor of the Greeks

OR

THE CONQUEST OF CONSTANTINOPLE BY THE TURKS

(A.D. 1453)

AFTER THE LATEST HISTORICAL RESEARCHES

by

CHEDOMIL MIJATOVICH

CHAPTER I. MORAL CAUSES OF THE RAPID RISE OF THE OTTOMAN AND THE FALL OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRES 

CHAPTER II. THE SUPERIOR MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE TURKS

CHAPTER III. ON THE EVE OF THE FALL 

CHAPTER IV. DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 

CHAPTER V. MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS OF THE BESIEGERS AND OF THE BESIEGED

CHAPTER VI. THE DIARIES OF THE SIEGE 

CHAPTER VII. THE LAST DAYS

CHAPTER VIII. THE LAST NIGHT

CHAPTER IX. THE LAST HOURS

CHAPTER I

MORAL CAUSES OF THE RAPID RISE OF THE OTTOMAN

AND THE FALL OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRES.

1. Islam and Byzantinism.

1. In the one hundred years from the middle of the fourteenth to the middle of the fifteenth century (1365— 1465) events deeply tragically in their character and of great historical importance occurred on the Balkanic Peninsula. An entire change of social and political conditions was accomplished amidst terrible convulsions, accompanied by fearful bloodshed and unspeakable suffering. A foreign race, a strange religion, and a low culture took possession of the beautiful regions between three seas, where once a highly gifted and comparatively cultured people formed and kept up independent states.

It is one of the most interesting unsolved problems of history how an uncivilized and by no means numerous tribe so speedily succeeded in destroying three Christian kingdoms of a higher degree of culture, and in building up in their stead an extensive, powerful, and enduring Empire. The great fact, however, stands out prominently, assuming the dignity of a general law, that organization of forces, although these may be small in themselves and low in their inspirations, is always victorious over disorganized forces, even though the latter be great, and superior in their individual character.

The Turks were not destitute of certain virtues and natural gifts when they left the Turcoman steppes and came to Armenia to guard the eastern frontier of the Seldjuk Sultans; but after their acceptance of Islam their national character went through an evolutionary change. The sparks of fire thrown out of the volcanic soul of the great Prophet of Arabia inflamed the susceptible sons of the Asiatic deserts, and the metal of their original character was molten and crystallized into a new form of national individuality, capable of the accomplishment of the great, and even more terrible than great, task assigned to them by Providence. As an irresistible avalanche, they moved westward, breaking down and burying all political and national organizations whose elasticity had been weakened and whose strength had been undermined by ages of abuse and mismanagement.

Islam not only impressed upon Ertoghrul and his followers the duty of being upright before God, truthful and charitable amongst men, but gave them political ideas, transforming a tribe of nomads into a body of warriors and statesmen, capable of creating, maintaining, and developing a great empire. Islam filled them to overflowing with genuine religious enthusiasm, and with the belief that to serve God meant to subdue the Infidels, and conquer the world. This, their central idea, was a bond of unity, giving them political purpose and organization. Their faith immeasurably increased the forces inherent in an energetic, hardy, and astute race.

But all the energy of a youthful and hardy race, all their admirable organization, and the high spirit with which Islam inspired the Turks, would not of themselves explain the swift extension of the Turkish rule in Europe. Had the valiant and enthusiastic followers of Mohammed encountered even one really strong, healthy, and well-organized State on this side of the Hellespont, it is doubtful whether the pages of history would have recorded the wonderful growth of the Ottoman Empire. To decipher the secret of that rapid triumphant march we must read the record not only in the lurid glare which conquering Islam gives, but also by the pallid light shed by dying Byzantinism.

It is not easy to describe in a few words what Byzantinism was. It seems as though historic Providence had desired to see the harvest which could be raised, if the seed of Christian civilization should be sown on the peninsula between Asia and Europe, watered by Western rains and warmed by Eastern suns, on fields abandoned by Hellenic culture and somewhat ploughed by Roman institutions. It might have been hoped that the Divine idea of brotherhood would unite the warm heart of New Rome and the practical reason of Old Rome into an admirable har­mony, capable of lifting humanity to heights as yet unattained.

But the experiment was not a success. The great forces, from the combination of which so much might have been expected, proved barren. From the spirit of the East some colours and some forms were accepted, but little of its depth, and warmth, and inherent nobility. From Eastern Philosophy only a few more or less nebulous ideas of mysticism were retained; and what of good was borrowed from Roman institutions took no real root, because Roman institutions presuppose a consciousness of responsibility, and also initiative and civic sentiment. What took the deepest root were the forms and spirit of autocratic government from the worst times of the Roman Imperialism, which made the existence of individual liberty impossible. The Christian religion was too abstract, too sublime to be fully understood; it was pushed backward to let the Church come forward.

And the Church identified itself very speedily with the compactly-organized body of ignorant, superstitious, selfish and ambitious monks and priests, who exalted the position of the Emperor only to use him as their servant, and who made practical Christianity mean adoration of old bones, rags, and mummies, and the buying and selling of prayers for the repose of the souls of the dead. The people, having been led astray from the pure source of evangelical truth, found new power nowhere, nor a new idea capable of moving them to great and glorious action. The Emperors and the Church hierarchy became allies, and remained so to the last.

Before the blast of that powerful alliance the sparks of individual liberty were quickly extinguished. Revolutions only made matters worse, because they gave occasions for the display of brutal force, cruelty, servility, and treason, and ended by strengthening the autocracy. Every generous instinct was crushed out to recompense base selfishness and vile ingratitude. The nation became an inert mass, without initiative and without will. Before the Emperor and the Church prelates it grovelled in the dust; behind them it rose up to spit at them and shake its fist. Tyranny and exploitation above, hatred and cowardice beneath; cruelty often, hypocrisy always and everywhere, in the upper and lower strata. Outward polish and dexterity replaced true culture; phraseology hid lack of ideas.

Both political and social bodies were alike rotten; the spirit of the nation was languid, devoid of all elasticity. Selfishness placed itself on the throne of public interest, and tried to cover its hideousness with the mantle of false patriotism. This political and social system, in which straight­forwardness and manliness were replaced by astuteness, hypocrisy, and cowardice, while, however, there still lingered love for fine forms and refined manners,—this system, in which the State generally appears in the ecclesiastical garb, bore the name of Byzantinism.

It was inevitable that some Byzantinism should enter into the political and social organism of the Slavonic nations of the Balkan Peninsula. Practically they went to the Byzantine Greeks to learn political and social wisdom, just as they went to Constantinople for their religion. It was a slow and exhausting process by which Byzantine notions displaced Slavonic traditions among the Serbians and Bulgarians. And this struggle, not unnaturally, contributed to weaken the Slavonic kingdoms. It was in its own way preparing the paths for the Turkish invasion.

It is especially noteworthy that we find so many Serbian and Bulgarian malcontents in the camp and at the Court of the Ottoman Sultans. The social and political conditions of those Slavonic kingdoms of the Balkans were highly unsatisfactory. The nobles were haughty and exclusive. They jealously watched the kings, and resented bitterly every attempt at reform. They were hard and exacting masters to the tillers of the soil settled on their estates, who had to do much personal service, and to give a large part of the produce of their labor. The power, centred in the kings, was not strong enough to prevent all sorts of abuse on the part of the privileged class. Emperor Stephan Dushan essayed to fix by legal enactments the duties of the peasants towards their feudal lords. At the Parliament held in 1349 at Scopia he obtained the consent of his noblemen and high ecclesiastic dignitaries to such a law, and a certain protection of the central power was extended to the peasantry. But after the death of this most remarkable man in Serbian history, the authority of the Central Government was shattered, and if the landlord acted unjustly there were none to protect the injured tenant. In Bosnia, even so late as in the beginning of the fifteenth century, some of the landlords regularly exported their peasants and sold them as slaves!

The consequence of such a state of things was that the peasantry, the great bulk of the population, hating their unjust and exacting masters, became more and more indifferent to the fate of the country. The first Sultans, on their part, systematically, from the very beginning of their settlement in Europe, protected and ostentatiously aimed at satisfying the peasantry, never neglecting any occasion publicly to manifest their desire to do justice to the poor. At the same time they ruthlessly exterminated the national aristocracy. Therefore when the horrors of the invasion had passed away, the peasantry quickly reconciled themselves to the Turkish rule, which in some respects seems to have brought them a change for the better. Numerous proofs might be adduced for this assertion, however paradoxical it may appear today.

In a letter written by Stephan, the last king of Bosnia, in 1463 to Pope Pius II, we find these remarkable words: "The Turks promise to all who side with them freedom, and the rough mind of the peasants does not understand the artfulness of such a promise, and believes that such freedom will last forever; and so it may happen that the misguided common people may turn away from me, unless they see that I am supported by you." And when Sultan Mohammed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, invaded Bosnia in 1464, the peasantry would not move against him, saying: "It is not our business to defend the king; let the nobles do it! "

There still exists a letter reporting a conversation between the envoy of the Duke of Milan and King Alfonso of Naples, in December 1455, in which it is said that the Albanian peasantry preferred the rule of the Turks to that of their own nobles! King Alfonso was anxious lest the Albanians should abandon Skanderbeg, and surrender again to the Turks, because "li homeni de quello paese sono molto affeti al Turcho, el quale gli fa una bona e humana SIGNORIA!". These are the words of the king himself!

I

The Church in Bulgaria and Serbia, in its material relations with the people, was only another form of aristocracy: it demanded labor, service, and a part of the produce of the land. The monks formed a privileged caste, and did not pay taxes to the State, nor did they share any public burden. Their numbers were continually increasing. The thousands of churches and cloisters built by pious kings, queens, and nobles, were not able to contain them. They were living in towns and villages and in private houses, constantly exposed, and frequently succumbing, to worldly temptations. Very few of them were saints, and the majority managed to forfeit the respect of the people, not only for themselves but for the Church. The great Reformer and Lawgiver, Stephan Dushan, by law forbade monks and nuns to live otherwise than cloistered; but the monks proved stronger than the mighty Tzar. The mass of the people believed in the miraculous powers of relics, but did not like the monks.

This dislike explains to some extent the rapid spread of the religious sect of the Bogumils or Partharenes, especially in Bulgaria and Bosnia. The Orthodox Church fiercely opposed these first rude Protestants of Europe. The history of the religious wars which raged in the Balkan Peninsula through two centuries (1250-1450) has not yet been written; but some of the results of that struggle were evident in the deterioration of the religious life, and in the weakening of the political organization of the Bulgarian, Serbian, and Bosnian kingdoms. In Albania, where the conflict between the Orthodox and the Catholic clergy raged most fiercely, and in Bosnia, where the struggle between the Orthodox Church and the Partharenes lasted longest, Islam speedily found converts.

It is characteristic of the dispositions of the people at this period (1360-1460) that the Calabrian monk Barlaam found warm supporters among the Greeks of Constantinople itself, when he denounced the ignorance and indolence of the monks of the "Holy Mountain Athos." Still more characteristic that Gemistos Plethon, the personal friend of the Emperor John Paleologus, one of the great theological and philosophical lights among the Greeks at the Council of Florence, thought it necessary to frame a new religion! He was certainly not the only man whom Christianity, as it was represented by the Orthodox Church of his time, did not satisfy.

In addition to the circumstances of the social and religious life, there were some other influences at work to disorganize the vital forces of the Christian States. There were almost always several pretenders to the imperial throne in Constantinople and the royal thrones in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia, who hoped by Turkish help to satisfy their own ambition. Naturally, these claimants were ever hospitably welcomed by the Sultans. Again and again gifted Serbians, or Bulgarians, or Greeks, who in their own country could not rise from the position in which they were born, found an open way to wealth, honor, and power, a path to the saddle of a Beyler Bey (Commander­in-Chief), or to the carpet of a Vizier, and perhaps to the golden cage of one of the daughters or sisters of the Sultan himself! It seems a paradox to say that the Turks opened new horizons to the people of the Balkan Peninsula. Yet their political system, a combination of absolute despotism with the very broadest democracy, had much in it that was novel and acceptable. To the notions of an average Greek, and especially to the notions of an average Serbian or Bulgarian, that system was not more unnatural or more disagreeable than the feudal system which secured all the good things of the world only to the nobles and the priests.

The presence of Christian malcontents, refugees, pretenders, and adventurers in the Turkish camp and at the Sultan's "Porte," materially aided Turkish policy and Turkish arms to progress from victory to victory. Without them the Turkish Viziers and generals could hardly have obtained that minute and exact knowledge of men and circumstances in Christian countries, which so often astonished their contemporaries. Thus the Porte became promptly informed of the plans of the Christian kings, and was enabled to counteract them. Indeed, the leadership of the new Empire speedily passed into the hands of Christian renegades, and almost all the great statesmen and generals of the Sultans at this period were of Greek, Bulgarian, or Serbian origin.

The last-mentioned circumstance constitutes one of the most tragic characteristics of the history of the Balkan nations. Its sadness is deepened by the fatal entanglement of the Christian nations of the Peninsula, who were skillfully compelled to annihilate each other in furtherance of Turkish aggrandizement. In the Turkish army which destroyed the Serbian kingdom on the field of Kossovo (1389), there were numbers of Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian warriors. Among others, Despot Constantine Dragash (the maternal grandfather of the last Emperor of the Greeks), followed Sultan Murad I with a contingent of auxiliary troops. When in the battle near Nicopolis in 1396, the French knights, aided by the Polish and Hungarian cavalry, routed the Janissaries of Bayazed Ildirim, the Sultan's reserve, consisting of several thousands of Serbian Cuirassiers, under the command of Prince Stephan Lazarevich, came rushing down to snatch the victory from the Christians.

The Turks gave proof of their great astuteness, at this early stage of their history, by their using chiefly Christian money and Christian arms to subdue, and afterwards to destroy, the Christian States of the Balkan. It was a general rule of their policy not to occupy at once the country of the defeated Christian Prince, but to impose a heavy tribute in money, and to exact that a contingent of his best soldiers should be regularly provided to fight against the Sultan's enemies, even if the latter were friendly Christian neighbors of the vassal Prince.

King Marko (the hero of so many Serbian and Bulgarian national songs) has illustrated well the feeling with which comparatively cultured Christian knights fought in the ranks of the Turkish army. At the commencement of the great battle at Rovine between the Turks and the Vallachs (1394), King Marko turned to his relative, Despot Constantine Dragash, and said: "I pray God to give victory to the Christians, though I pay for it with my own life!"

These historic words were only an echo of the pain which many a Christian knight endured when, in the monstrously anomalous position, he had to draw his sword for the Mohammedan Turks against brethren of his own faith. But that anomaly was only one of the bitter, yet inevitable, fruits of Byzantinism.

2. East and West.

Byzantinism prepared the way for the Turkish invasion. It enfeebled the Balkan nations, destroyed their mental elasticity, and engendered a selfishness, which ripened into all sorts of wickedness. Byzantinism on one side and the youthful energy of a religiously disposed tribe of born warriors on the other explain much, but do not explain all; the relations of the Byzantine Empire with the West of Europe must also be considered.

When the Eastern and Western Churches separated (A.D. 1053), they did not part with sorrowing hearts, but with mutual anger and great bitterness. Yet the separation of the Churches was not the beginning of the estrangement; it was rather the result of deeper under-lying differences of sentiments and opinions. Old Rome and New Rome were not of the same temper, nor of similar nerve and fibre. Separation only deepened their mutual aversion. The priests and monks had done their best to concentrate the latent antipathies and to set them ablaze. The people, when they kissed the hands of their priests, seemed to have received from these, who should have been preachers of peace and charity, only new incentives to hatred and intolerance.

The source of bitterness, opened by ecclesiastical hands even at the foot of the Altar, grew to be a deep river, running in the channels digged by political events.

The Normans occupying the south of Italy found it easy to cross over to Albania, a province of the Byzantine Empire. With the benediction of Pope Gregory VII, Robert Guiscar, "Duke by the grace of God and St Peter," besieged Durazzo (Dyrachium) in 1081. This strong place on the Albanian coast of the Adriatic was the key of the famous old Roman road Via Egnatia, which, crossing Albania and Macedonia diagonally, led to Salonica, joining there another military road to Constantinople. It might almost be said that Durazzo was the western gate of the Byzantine Empire.

It is worthy of note that even at the occasion of this first attempt by a foreign power to obtain a firm footing in the Balkanic Peninsula, antagonistic interests came into play. While Robert Guiscar and Pope Gregory combined to effect the conquest of the Byzantine Empire, Venice sent her fleet to assist the Emperor in repulsing their attack. And though the Normans defeated the Byzantine army, took Durazzo, and conquered a number of towns and castles in Epirus and Thessaly, yet in the end they had to relinquish their conquests because the German Emperor, Henry IV, invaded Italy.

But the Normans returned to the charge. For nearly a century the Greek Empire had to defend itself against their attacks. Guiscar's expedition was followed by that of Bohemund (A.D. 1107), of King Roger (in 1146), and the great invasion of Tancred (1185). The latter not only took Durazzo and Salonica, but marched into Thracia on his way to Constantinople.

The Norman successes had indirectly important results. They helped to destroy the prestige of the Byzantine arms in the eyes of the Serbians, Bulgarians, and Albanians. They shook the weakened Empire, and started its slow dismemberment. They demonstrated to Western Catholic Europe that the conquest of the Eastern Empire was not impossible. And this demonstration fired the ambition of the Popes to convert the East, by arms if not by arguments, and to compel it to bow to Rome. It is significant that this very Pope Gregory, in a letter written in 1073 to Ebouly de Rossi, declared "that it is far better for a country to remain under the rule of Islam, than be governed by Christians who refuse to acknowledge the rights of the Catholic Church." The Orient's answer to this we shall learn from the excited Greeks in the days preceding the great catastrophe.

The lesson which the Norman warfare in Albania and Epirus taught began to bear fruit already towards the end of the twelfth century. The Serbians, vassals of the Greek emperors, sought alliances in the West, with the evident intention of establishing a strong and independent State of their own on the ruins of the Byzantine Empire. Stephan Nemanya, the founder of the Serbian royal dynasty of Nemanyich, endeavored by special embassies to approach the German Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, and in 1189 received him and his Crusaders with great hospitality at Nish. The Memoirs of Ansbertus, the Emperor's secretary, state that the Serbian Prince urged the Emperor to make himself master of the Byzantine Empire, promising him assistance. From another chronicler in the suite of Barbarossa we learn that Nemanya made these proposals in the names of his allies, Peter and Ivan Assen, the chiefs of the Bulgarian nation, as well as in his own name. Frederic was not prepared to enter into the vast projects of the Serbian rider. Notwithstanding this, they parted as sincere friends. Ansbertus never mentions Nemanya without adding, "our friend, the great Count of Serbia."

The passing of the great and generally undisciplined armies of the Crusaders through Byzantine countries did not improve old feelings or remove old prejudices. On the contrary, it enabled the Western warriors (or, as the Greeks called them, "the Latins") to perceive at once the weakness of the Empire and the unfriendliness of the people. On the other hand, the roughness and rudeness of the Crusaders confirmed the contempt which the Greeks felt for such "Western barbarians."

The bitterness of the Greeks was naturally largely increased by the sudden appearance of the Crusaders under the walls of Constantinople, and by their subsequent conquest of that capital (A.D. 1204). For fifty-seven years (1204-1261) the Latins retained possession of Constantinople and the best European provinces of the Empire. For fifty-seven years the Catholic priests read masses at the altar of St Sophia, to the inexpressible sorrow and humiliation of the patriotic and bigoted orthodox Greeks. During these long, dark years the Greeks, especially the more narrow-minded populace of the capital, were storing up hatred of the Latins, which, even two hundred years later, prevented them finding anything more bitter to endure.

Michael Paleologus succeeded in 1261 in driving out the Latins from Constantinople. But he was unable to reconquer the islands, the fortified towns in Thessaly and Morea. Instead of despots and princes bearing the names of the old Greek families, we find a Guy de la Tremouille, Baron de Chilandritza, a Guillaume de la Roche, Duc d'Athenes, a Nicholas de Saint-Omer, Seigneur de Thebes, Richard Comte de Cephalonie, Guillaume Allman Baron de Patras, Villain d' Annoy Baron d' Arcadie, Bertrand de Baux, "Mareschalcus Achaiae," &c. &c. This combination of French names and feudal titles with the classical names of Athens, Patras, Thebes, Arcadia, Achaia, &c., sounds even in our day strange and almost grotesque. But it must have inspired the patriotic Greeks of those days with frantic hatred and despair. And the highest, the most cultured class in Constantinople, those who under the new dynasty of Paleologus ruled the Empire, could not but feel great humiliation at the thought of the French baronies in the classical territories of the Peloponnesus. Nor could the Greeks be without anxiety whilst the energetic and clever Anjous, the French dynasty of the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, were asserting their pretensions to the Imperial throne of Constantinople. Catherine de Valois, the wife of Philip II of Anjou, bore proudly the titles of "Empress of Constantinople, Despotissa of Romania, Duchess of Durazzo, Princess of Achaia," &c. &c.

The diplomatic and military preparations of Charles I to reconquer the Byzantine Empire, which Baldwin II (of Courtenay) had ceded to his house, were so extensive and so menacing that Michael Paleologus thought there was only one course to pursue in order to avert the danger. He accepted the invitation addressed to him by Pope Gregory X, and sent representatives of the Greek Church to the Council of Lyons. There, on the 29th of June 1279, amidst much enthusiasm, the reconciliation of the Eastern and Western Churches was solemnly proclaimed.

This really did help to avert the danger and counteract the preparations of the ambitious King of Naples. The Greek diplomatists were highly pleased with the success of their move; the monks and the people of Constantinople only laughed at the performances of the Council; but in the end this insincere attempt at reconciliation produced greater estrangement, increasing among the Latins their disgust against what they called the hypocrisy and duplicity of the Greeks.

But that which the embarrassed and short-sighted Byzantine leaders at the close of the thirteenth century considered only as a clever stroke of policy became an unavoidable necessity from the middle of the fourteenth century. John Cantacuzene, who, with all his short­comings and vanities, was an able statesman, recognised at once that the Turks were a far more formidable danger to the Greek Empire than either the Latins or the neighbouring Slavs. He was the first to declare openly that an alliance with the warlike nations of the West could alone save the Greek Empire from the Turks. From his time onwards the alliance with the Latins became the standing policy of the Byzantine statesmen. It was a policy imposed by force of circumstances. The orthodox kings of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia, were by the same circumstances led to seek for alliances with the Catholic kings of Hungary and Poland.

Some Greek, and especially some Russian historians cannot sufficiently blame Rome for its utilizing the danger that threatened the Eastern Empire to impose the Papal authority on it. But it was only natural that the Popes should seize the opportunity to bring about the union of the Churches. It was impossible for them to act differently. It was for them a simple and unavoidable compliance with a sacred and self-evident duty. From their point of view, it was manifest that Providence had chosen to use the arms of the Infidels to break the stubbornness of the stiff-necked Greeks, and to compel them to bow before the successors of St Peter. In perfect good faith, the Popes thought it clearly their duty to co-operate with Providence for so good a purpose. Rome doing its duty added much to the melancholy character of this great tragedy.

But it was also quite natural that the masses of the orthodox people in Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, should not be able to comprehend the motives which produced the apparent inconsistency of their own rulers and statesmen. They had grown up and been systematically educated in the belief that the Roman Church was the enemy of their own national and truly orthodox Church, and that the Pope was an incarnate Anti-Christ; they had been accustomed to give the name of "Rim-papa" to their dogs; they had been taught that the Latins were cheats, liars, and thieves, faithless and effeminate weaklings, who ate frogs, rats, and cats. And now, suddenly, their rulers came and declared to them that in consequence of a (probably exaggerated) danger from the Turks, they must unite their "Orthodox" Church with the "heretical" Church of Rome, acknowledge "antichrist" as "Christ's Vicar" on earth, and embrace as brothers the impure and barbarous Latins!

It was not an easy task for the Emperors of Byzantium and for their statesmen to suppress their own personal feelings, conquer their own prejudices, and accept with a good grace what seemed to be inevitable. Yet they did it. The Council of Florence in A.D. 1438 bears evidence of the readiness of some Greeks to sacrifice their dearest and deepest personal affections and convictions to the political interest of their country. But no earthly power was able to change the heart of the masses of the people, and to dispel the clouds of prejudices accumulated through so many generations. The populace execrated the union subscribed to by their Emperor and his great secular and ecclesiastic dignitaries. To the axiom of Gregory VII, "Better Islam than schism" the Greeks of Constantinople now answered, "Better Islam than the Pope!" And Islam, turning towards Mecca, praised the only one and true God, who did not permit the Giaours to unite against the faithful !

To the wide-awake and wary Turkish Sultans it was quite clear that the real and practical alliance of the Balkanic with the Western nations would be the death-warrant of Turkish ambitions. Therefore to prevent such an alliance by every means became to the Porte a matter of immense importance.

Sometimes they succeeded in doing this by prompt military action. When it was reported to Murad I that King Shishman of Bulgaria had entered into negotiations for an offensive and defensive alliance with King Lazar of Serbia and King Sigismund of Hungary, the Turks unexpectedly invaded Bulgaria, and destroyed her army, capturing Shishman and all the royal family in Nicopolis (A.D. 1386). There is no doubt that the great battle on the field of Kossovo (15th June 1389) was fought with the intention of paralyzing Serbia before her ally, the King of Hungary, could come to her assistance. When, a few years later, Vuk Brankovich, prince of the country lying between Bosnia and Macedonia (now Kossovo-Eyalet), reopened negotiations with Hungary, the Turks prevented the accomplishment of his projects by suddenly seizing and poisoning him (1395). When, shortly afterwards, the young Prince of Serbia, Stephan, the son of Lazar, went personally to do homage to Bayazed Ilderim, the Sultan warned him against leaning toward Hungary, "because," he said impressively, "no good can come to those who lean that way; think what became of King Shishman, and the other princes who sought alliances with Hungary!" These words are quoted by Constantine, the Court chaplain of Prince Stephan Lazarevich, who had heard them probably from Stephan's, if not from the Sultan's own lips.

That the Turks sought to prevent a Christian confederacy by diplomatic moderation and conciliation is shown by the counsels given to his sons by the Emperor John V on his deathbed:

"Whenever the Turks begin to be troublesome, send embassies to the West at once, offer to accept union, and protract negotiations to great length; the Turks so greatly fear such union that they will become reasonable; and still the union will not be accomplished because of the vanity of the Latin nations!"

It will be seen that the much-abused Chalil-Pasha, Grand Vizier to Mohammed the Conqueror, acted in the spirit of the traditional diplomacy of his predecessors.

8. But from the death of John V (1391) to the death of John VII (1448) the Turks had become much stronger, better organized, and more fully informed. They had had opportunities of measuring themselves successfully against Hungarian, Polish, German, and French knights. They had been witnesses of the decay of the remaining strength of the old Empire; and they began to suspect that the threats of uniting the Western nations against them were vain vapourings. They were shrewd enough to perceive that the task of uniting all the Christian nations for a great and earnest effort was almost hopeless. While the Greeks were not learning anything, the Turks became stronger in offensive power and richer in practical knowledge of the true state of political circumstances in Europe.

And in truth, the very act by which the wisest amongst the Greek statesmen thought to guard their country against danger—the acceptance at the Council of Florence of the union of the Churches­proved only a source of weakness. It brought no help from the West; yet it divided and paralyzed what little strength remained at home. About the year 1450 Constantinople was in reality a "house divided against itself," which it is declared must fall.

The Christians of the East ought to have been assisted by the Christians of the West. But a strange fatality seems to have beset Christendom between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries. The Byzantine and the Latin worlds were in friction throughout those ages. The separation of Churches, the Crusades, the Latin conquest of Constantinople, the ambition of the Popes and of the Sicilian Kings, even the attempts at the reconciliation of Churches—all these contributed to disorganize the vital forces of the Byzantine Em­pire. Not merely did the Western Christians fail to come to the rescue of their Oriental brethren in the hour of need, but the Papal policy sapped the vigour of the ancient Empire of the East, and, unintentionally, yet not the less effectually, it laid the foundations of a secure establishment of a Mohammedan power in Europe.

CHAPTER II.

THE SUPERIOR MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE TURKS.

MORAL and political causes contributed to the remarkable quickness with which the Christian states of the Balkan Peninsula were subdued by the Turks. But the instrument which chiefly wrought Turkish victories and Christian defeats was undoubtedly the superior military organization of the Turks.

Not one of the Christian kingdoms of the Balkan Peninsula had a regular standing army. The sovereigns of Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece usually surrounded themselves with a more or less numerous body of guards, mostly professional soldiers hired abroad,—Germans, Italians, Normans, and sometimes (especially in thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) even Turks. The fidelity of these mercenaries could only be secured by the high rate of their pay, and this precluded the possibility of large numbers being permanently employed. An emperor's or a king's bodyguard rarely exceeded 3000 men. These house­hold troops, being constantly under arms, were the nearest approach to a standing army amongst the Christian nations prior to the middle of the fifteenth century, when King Charles VII of France enrolled his "Franc-Archers," the first regular army in a Christian country (A.D. 1449).

When a Christian king had to defend his own country, or to carry war into that of an enemy, he called his nobles to his aid, with as many men as they could collect and arm amongst their own tenants and retainers. This irregular soldiery might have had much personal courage, but they were generally badly armed, and certainly undisciplined. In fact, the more numerous they were, the more incongruous and incomplete was their equipment, and the less their willingness to submit to orders from head-quarters. The political disorders prevailing throughout the peninsula on the eve of the Turkish invasion had weakened this feudal military organization, which was already inherently weak. Tzar Lazar of Serbia felt it necessary to add to his war manifesto a long and terrible curse against all those who should not respond by joining him at the field of Kossovo.

The Turks had retained this feudal military system, defining more precisely the number of armed followers each feudal lord was bound to produce when called to the standard of the Sultan, (Ziyamet and Timar Beys). Independently of this feudal army, the Turks possessed from 1326 a regular standing army. Orkhan and his brother Vezir Ala-ud-din inaugurated a system remarkable for its completeness and success, a system which testified to the great psychological insight and political foresight of its organizers. They not only converted military service into a permanent profession for life, but made it one for which men must be strictly trained from their boyhood. More than this, with an ingenuity which would be most admirable were it not almost satanic, these organizers did not dream of drawing the materials for their standing army from the ranks of the Turks. They decided that the force which was to conquer the Christian kingdoms and empires should be supplied by the foes of Islam!

From amongst the Christian children captured in war or in never-ceasing raids across the frontiers, the most healthy, handsome, and intelligent were selected and sent to special colleges.' There they were trained to be zealous Mussulmen and intrepid soldiers, and when sufficiently prepared were enrolled in the regiments of the famous Janissaries.

Should the required number of physically and mentally qualified cadets not be recruited from among those captured and brought as slaves, special Imperial Commissioners levied the most cruel of tributes from the Christian Rayahs,—that of their most promising sons from seven to twelve years old. Thus the principle of selection was applied in a hitherto unheard-of manner, to refresh and strengthen the Turkish Empire by the best blood of the Christians.

The Janissaries (or more exactly "Yeni-Cheri," the" new troops") were instituted as a standing regular army by Orkhan in 1326. They were reorganized by his son, Murad I, who, on that account, was believed by many early writers to be their original founder. How thoroughly and soundly based was this organization can be seen from the summary of rules prescribed by Murad, and thus set forth by Ahmed Djevad Bey:­

1. The first duty of every Janissary is absolute obedience to the orders of his officers, even if these officers were freed slaves.

2. Amongst the men belonging to the "Odjak" (the Turkish name for the corps of Janissaries, meaning "chimney" or "hearth"), perfect union and concord must prevail, and therefore they should always dwell together.

3. As truly brave and gallant men, they must always abstain from every luxury, avoid every unbecoming deed, and be simple in everything.

4. They must never disregard the teachings of the Holy Hadji Bektash as to their prayers, and they must always scrupulously fulfill the duties of true Mussulmen.

5. The chiefs must exercise the greatest viligance that no one be admitted to the Odjak who has not been taken and brought up according to the law of "Devchirmé" (law on the tribute in children).

6. Advancement in the Odjak must always follow the order of seniority.

7. A Janissary should only be punished or even reprimanded by his superior officer.

8. Janissaries incapacitated by illness or age are to receive pensions from the Odjak.

9. Janissaries must not wear beards, and shall not be allowed to marry.

10. They ought never to be far distant from their ortas (barracks).

11. No Janissary should be allowed to learn a trade, or to work as an artisan. His exclusive occupation ought to be exercise in the art of war.

Many peculiar privileges were given them in order to enhance their esprit de corps. One of these was that, when on campaign, their tents should be placed immediately in front of the Sultan's tent, so that the Padishah necessarily passed through their tents in leaving or returning to his own. Another privilege was that the capital punishment of a Janissary should never be executed in the day-time, or in public, but always at midnight, in the presence of a few officers, a cannon shot fired in the central barrack at the same time announcing to the Odjak that one who belonged to it had been removed from this world by the hands of Justice.

During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the corps of Janissaries never numbered more than 12,000 men.

But in physical condition, training, discipline and bravery, no troops in Europe could be compared with them. They were all foot soldiers, their principal arm being a bow. Some of them had in addition a scimitar, others a lance.

Besides this regular infantry, the Sultans had from an early date a body of regular cavalry called "Spahees," who were recruited in the same way as the Janissaries. In the fifteenth century they were armed with a scimitar, an iron mace (20 to 25 pounds in weight), and a bow.

The greatest attention was given to the sword exer­cise of both Janissaries and Spahees. Their scimitars were made of metal much superior to any then gener­ally used in Europe, and by constant practice the Jan­issaries and Spahees learned to use these with marvelous dexterity. The Turkish saying that they won their Empire "by the sword" was literally true.

The Greeks were superior to the Turks only in naval manoeuvres and in the use of "Greek fire"; the secret of this composition was jealously kept. There are two Christian contemporaries who speak with authority on the Turkish army in the middle of the fifteenth century. One is the Italian Francesco Philelpho, the other is a Frenchman—Bertrandon de la Brocquiere.

Philelpho, himself a knight and statesman, sojourned some time at the Sultan's "Porte" as Greek Envoy. He certainly enjoyed good opportunities of knowing the true condition of the Turkish military forces, and he describes them in his memoranda to the King of France (dated 14th November 1461) and to the Doge of Venice (10th February 1464). According to him, the Sultan's army was composed of 12,000 Janissaries, 8,000 Assabs (who were in his regular pay), 25,000 feudal troops levied in Europe and 15,000 levied in Asia,—altogether 60,000. The Janissaries were all archers; they also carried a all shield, and some of them had long lances. The feudal troops were all horse­men, armed with scimitars, maces, and small shields; some of their number had bows. "But," he adds, "this regular army of the Sultans was always preceded and followed in war by innumerable bands of irregular troops, composed mostly of shepherds from Thracia, Thessaly, and Moesia, who, being under no restraint, proved the most cruel scourge in the Turkish invasions. Their arms were only crooked Turkish sabres. They carried with them plenty of ropes to bind the inhabitants of towns and villages, and then drove them to the slave-markets; the villages and towns they pillaged and burnt down before the regular army of the Sultan made its appearance."

George Castriot Scanderbeg (+ 1468) indirectly confirms Philelpho's statement about the usual strength of the Turkish army. According to his biographers, he often stated "that the whole army of the Albanian league hardly equals in numbers the fourth, part of the Sultan's forces." As the Albanians were able in a few instances to muster 15,000 men, but generally had not more than 12,000, it may be concluded that Scanderbeg estimated the Turkish army at about 60,000 men.

But the true expert in military matters was Bertra don de la Brocquiere, Seigneur de Vieux Château, Councillor and First Equerry to the Duke of Burgundy, Philippe le Bon. He went in 1432 to visit the holy places of Palestine, and returned in 1433 overland, passing through Constantinople, Adrianople, Bulgaria, and Serbia. He wrote for his Duke a description of his journey, with a memorandum about ways and means for driving the Turks out of Europe. His observations are generally shrewd and apparently true, and his judgment bears the stamp of impartiality. We will quote some of his statements concerning the Turks and their army.

"The conversation" (which he held at Belgrade with some German officers) "greatly astonished me, and caused me to Make some reflections on the strange subjection in which the Turk keeps Macedonia, Bulgaria, the Emperor of Constantinople, the Greeks, the Despot of Serbia, and his subjects. Such a dependence appeared to me a lamentable thing for Christendom; and as I lived with the Turks, and became acquainted with their manner of living and fighting, and have frequented the company of sensible persons who have observed them narrowly in their great enterprises, I am emboldened to write something concerning them, according to the best of my ability. 

"I shall begin with what regards their persons, and say they are a tolerably handsome race, with long beards, but of moderate size and strength. I know well that it is a common expression to say 'as strong as a Turk'; nevertheless I have seen an infinity of Christians excel them when strength was necessary, and I myself, who am not of the strongest make, have, when circumstances required labor, found very many Turks weaker than I.

"They are diligent, willingly rise early, and live on little, being satisfied with bread badly baked, raw meat dried in the sun, milk curdled or not, honey, cheese, grapes, fruit, herbs, and even a handful of flour, with which they make a soup sufficient to feed six or eight for a day. Should they have a horse or a camel sick without hopes of recovery, they cut its throat and eat it. I have witnessed this many and many a time. They are indifferent as to where they sleep, and usually lie on the ground. Their dress consists of two or three cotton garments, thrown one over the other, which fall to their feet. Over these, again, they wear a mantle of felt, called 'a capinat'. This, though light, resists rain, and some capinats are very fine and handsome. Their boots come up to the knees, and they wear wide drawers, some of crimson velvet, others of silk or fustian and common stuffs. In war, or when travelling, to avoid being embarrassed by their gowns, they tuck the ends into their drawers, that they may move with greater freedom.

"Their horses are good, cost little in food, gallop well and for a long time. They keep them on short allowances, never feeding them but at night, and then giving them only five or six handfuls of barley with double the quantity of chopped straw, the whole put into a bag which hangs from the horse's ears. At break of day, they bridle, clean, and curry the horses, but never allow them to drink before midday. In the afternoon they drink whenever they find water, and also in the evening when they lodge or encamp: for they always halt early, and near a river if possible. During the night they are covered with felt or other stuffs. The horses are saddled and bridled à la genette. Their saddles are commonly very rich, but hollow, having pummels before and behind, with short stirrup-leathers and wide stirrups. The men sit deeply sunk in their saddles as in an arm-chair, their knees very high, a position in which they cannot resist a blow from a lance without being unhorsed. The arms of those who have any fortune are a bow, a small wooden shield, a sword, a heavy mace with a short handle and the thick end cut into many angles. This is a dangerous weapon when struck on the shoulders, or on an unguarded arm. Several use small wooden bucklers when they draw the bow.

"Their obedience to superiors is boundless. None dare disobey, even when their lives are at stake. And it is chiefly owing to this steady submission that such great exploits have been performed, and such vast conquest achieved.

"I have been assured that whenever the Christian powers have taken up arms against the tribes, the latter have always had timely information. In this case the Sultan has their march watched by men assigned for this purpose, and he lays wait for them with his army two or three days' march from the spot where he proposes to fight them. Should he think the opportunity favorable, he falls suddenly on them. For these occasions they have a particular kind of march, beaten on a large drum. When this signal is given, those who are to lead march quietly off, followed by the others with the same silence, without the file ever being interrupted, the horses and men having been so trained. Ten thousand Turks on such an occasion will make less noise than 100 men in the Christian armies. In their ordinary marches they always walk, but in these they always gallop; and as they are lightly armed, they will thus advance further from evening to daybreak than in three other days. They choose also no horses but such as walk fast and gallop for a long time, while we select only those that gallop well and with ease. It is by these forced marches that they have succeeded in surprising and completely defeating the Christians in their different wars.

"Their manner of fighting varies according to circumstances. When they find a favorable opportunity, they divide themselves into different detachments, and thus attack many parts of an army at the same time. This mode is particularly adapted when they are among woods or mountains, from the great facility they have for uniting together again. At other times they form ambuscades, and send out well-mounted scouts to observe the enemy. If their report be that he is not on his guard, they instantly form their plan and take advantage of the circumstance. Should they find the army well drawn up, they curvet round it within bow-shot, and, while thus prancing, shoot at the men and horses, and continue this manoeuvre so long that they at last throw the enemy into disorder. If the opposing army attempt to pursue them, they fly, and disperse separately, even should only a fourth part of their own number be ordered against them; but it is in their flight that they are formidable, and it has been almost always then that they have defeated the Christians. In flying they have the adroitness to shoot their arrows so unerringly that they scarcely ever fail to hit man or horse. Each horseman has also on the pummel of his saddle a tabolcan. When the chief, or any one of his officers, perceives the pursuing enemy to be in disorder, he gives three strokes on this instrument; the others, on hearing it, do the same, and they are instantly formed round their chief, like so many hogs round the old one; and then, according to circumstances, they either receive the charge of the assailants, or fall on them by detachments and attack them simultaneously in different places. In pitched battles they employ a stratagem which consists of throwing fireworks among the cavalry to frighten the horses. They often place in their front a great body of dromedaries and camels, which are bold and vicious; these they drive before them on the enemy's line of horse and throw it into confusion. 

"It is the policy of the Turks to have their armies twice as numerous as those of the Christians. This superiority of numbers augments their courage, and allows them to form different corps, and to make their attack on various parts at the same time. Should they once force an opening, they rush through in incredible crowds, and it is then a miracle if all be not lost. The Turkish lances are worth nothing; their archers are the best troops they have, and these do not shoot so strongly or so far as ours. They have a more numerous cavalry; and their horses, though inferior in strength to ours and incapable of carrying such heavy weights, gallop better, and skirmish for a longer time without losing their wind.

"I must own that in my various experiences I have always found the Turks frank and loyal, and when it was necessary to show courage, they have never failed. Their armies, I know, commonly consist of 200,000 men, but the greater part are on foot, and destitute of wooden shields, helmets, mallets, or swords; few, indeed, being completely equipped. They have, besides, amongst them a great number of Christians, who are forced to serve—Greeks, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Albanians, Slavonians, Wallachians, Servians, and other subjects of the despots of that country. All these people detest the Turk, because he holds them in a severe subjection; and should they see the Christians, and above all the French, march in force against the Sultan, I have not the slightest doubt but they would turn against him and do him great mischief."

There is an interesting version of the life of George Castriot Scanderbeg in an old Serbian manuscript not yet printed. It follows, on the whole, the lines of Marinus Barletius' work on Scanderbeg, but has some modifications and additions, which do not only enrich our stores of historical knowledge but impart to the whole local and national colour. In both works it is recorded that on a certain occasion Sultan Mohammed, desiring to dispel the anxiety of his Viziers and Pashas in consequence of rumors of a great European coalition against the Turks, made a speech comparing the Christians and the Turks. Very probably Mohammed never delivered the address attributed to him, but the comparison was certainly made as early as when Barletius' work was written (towards the end of the fifteenth century), and by a person who evidently knew well the circumstances of which he spoke.

"You have heard," the Sultan is made to say, "that the Christians have united against us. But fear not! Your heroism will be above theirs! You know well the unwashed Gyaours, and their ways and manners, which certainly are not fine. They are indolent, sleepy, easily shocked, inactive; they like to drink much and to eat much; in misfortunes they are impatient, and in times of good fortune proud and overbearing. They are lovers of repose, and do not like to sleep without soft feather-beds; when they have no women with them they are sad and gloomy; and without plenty of good wine they are unable to keep counsel among themselves. They are ignorant of any military stratagems. They keep horses only to ride while hunting with their dogs; if one of them wishes to have a good war-horse, he sends to buy it from us. They are unable to bear hunger, or cold, or heat, effort and menial work. They let women follow them in the campaigns, and at their dinners give them the upper places, and they want always to have warm dishes. In short, there is no good in them.

"But you, my glorious fellows, you can show a great many good qualities. You do not think much of your life or your food. You sleep little, and for that you do not want beds; the earth is your dining-table and any board your bed; there is nothing you consider a hardship; there is nothing you think it impossible to do!

"And then, the Christians fight constantly among themselves, because everyone desires to be a king, or a prince, or the first amongst them. One says to another: 'Brother, help thou me today against this Prince, and tomorrow I will help thee against that one'. Fear them not; there is no concord amongst them. Everyone takes care of himself only; no one thinks of the common interest. They are quarrelsome, unruly, self-willed, and disobedient. Obedience to their superiors and discipline they have none, and yet everything depends on that!

"When they lose a battle they always say: We were not well prepared! or This or that traitor has betrayed us! or We were too few in number, and the Turks were far more numerous! or The Turks came upon us without previous declaration of war, by misleading representations and treachery They have occupied our country by turning our internal difficulties to their own advantage!'

"Well, that is what they say, being not willing to confess truly and rightly: God is on the side of the Turks! It is God who helps them, and therefore they conquer us!"

CHAPTER III.

ON THE EVE OF THE FALL.

WHEN history raises the curtain to show us one of the most stirring tragedies in the life of nations—the conquest of a higher civilization by a lower one—our interest is naturally absorbed by the personalities who are working out the decrees of Fate. But the great historical tableaux—in which Constantine Paleologus so nobly personified an ancient and highly cultured Empire falling with dignity and honor, and a great conqueror, like Mohammed II, typified his wild and rough, yet energetic and deeply religious Asiatic race—can only gain in interest when we bear in mind that they are displayed amid surroundings of such extraordinary natural beauties as those of the Bosphorus.

We would like if we could present to our readers that wonderful picture of hill and valley, sunny glades and shadowed bays, of sea and sky, which has excited the admiration of all who have looked on it. Still more we should have liked to place before their eyes a true picture of Constantinople, and of the social and political life within its walls, on the eve of its heroic defence and final fall. But though the beauties of the Bosphorus are an inexhaustible source of inspiration for artists in modern times, the drawings and descriptions of the life and surroundings of Constantinople in the middle of the fifteenth century are extremely rare.

Still, we have a bird's-eye view of the city of Constantinople from the year 1422, and a plan of the city from the year 1493.

The bird's-eye view of Constantinople was made in the above-mentioned year by the Florentine engineer and artist, Christophore Buondelmonti. There are only three copies extant—one, in the Vatican, has as yet not been published; one in Venice, edited by Mr Sathas, and the third in Paris, which was printed by Banduri as early as 1711.

It appears, according to G. Critobulos, the Greek biographer of Mohammed II, that the Sultan, sometime after the conquest of Constantinople, ordered the celebrated Greek geographer, Georgios Amyroutzes of Trebizonde, to prepare for him maps of the different countries of the world. It is believed that Amyroutzes made at the same time a great map of the city of Constantinople, and that it was this map which was shown to Dr Dickson in the library of the Seraglio. It is further believed that Gentile Bellini, who spent some time in the Seraglio painting a portrait of Sultan Suleyman, carried with him back to Venice a copy of the same plan. From this copy several other copies were made and published in numerous editions during the sixteenth century.

It is very probable that between the city of Constantinople at the time of its conquest by the Turks in 1453 and the city such as it is depicted on the plan of 1422 there could be hardly any material difference. The resources of the Byzantine Emperors between 1420 and 1453 were used principally in repairing and strengthening the city walls. On some stones, which have been taken when the Charsias Gate was pulled down, and which are now preserved in the Arsenal of Constantinople, there are inscriptions which state that the Emperor John Paleologus renovated the whole fortification of the town. This work was undertaken after the last siege by Murad II in 1432. On one of the stones there is beneath the name of the Emperor the name of Manuel Jagaris (a Paleologue himself), which is believed to be that of the chief engineer who had charge of the restoration. George Brankovich, the Prince of Serbia, the friend and ally of the Greek Emperors, reconstructed in the year 1448 at his own expense two towers in the walls of Constantinople; one in the wall along the Marmara Sea at the gate called at present Koum-Capou, and the other in the wall along the Golden Horn. All these works, however, did not involve any material change in the principal lines and general character of the fortifications and the town itself such as it was when Buondelmonti sketched his plan, and such as it most probably was when the siege of 1453 took place.

It would be not less desirable to obtain an insight into the inner life of the old Greek capital on the eve of its fall. Fortunately we can satisfy this desire, at least in a certain measure. Chevalier Bertrandon de la Brocquiere spent some time in Constantinople in 1433, and wrote for his master an interesting report of what he saw there. Brocquiere was one of the sharpest and most intelligent observers who travelled over that route in the Middle Ages; and as he was a soldier by profession, and a gentleman by birth and education, his observations are invaluable for the history of the Balkan Peninsula in the first half of the fifteenth century. He had the pluck and enterprising energy of a modern American reporter, and a decided talent to give most graphic description of all he saw. This is his picture of Constantinople as he saw it, January 1433:

"We arrived at Scutari on the Straits and opposite to Pera. The Turks guard this passage, and receive a toll from all who cross it. My companions and I crossed in two Greek vessels. The owners of my boat took me for a Turk and paid me great honours; but when they saw me after landing leave my horse at the gate of Pera to be taken care of, and inquire after a Genoese merchant named Christopher Parvesin, to whom I had letters, they suspected I was a Christian. Two of them waited for me at the gate, and when I returned for my horse they demanded more than I had agreed on for my passage. I believe they would have even struck me if they had dared to do so: but I had my sword and my good tarquais, and a Genoese shoe­maker, who lived hard by, coming to my assistance, they were forced to retreat. I mention this as a warning to travellers who, like myself, may have anything to do with the Greeks. All those with whom I have had any business have only made me more suspicious, and I have found more probity in the Turks. These Greeks do not love the Christians of the Roman Church, and the submission which they have since made to this Church was more through self-interest than sincerity.

"Pera is a large town, inhabited by Greeks, Jews, and Genoese. The last are masters of it under the Duke of Milan, who styles himself 'Lord of Pera.' It has a Podestà and other officers, who govern it after their manner. Great commerce is carried on with the Turks. The latter have a singular privilege, namely, that should any of their slaves run away and seek an asylum in Pera, they must be given back. The port is the handsomest I have seen, and I believe I may add of any in the possession of the Christians, for the largest Genoese vessels can lie alongside the quays. However, it seems to me that on the land side and near the church, in the vicinity of the gate at the extremity of the haven, the place is weak.

"I met at Pera an ambassador from the Duke of Milan, named Sir Benedicto de Furlino. The Duke, wanting the support of the Emperor Sigismund against the Venetians, and seeing Sigismund embarrassed with the defence of his kingdom of Hungary against the Turks, had sent an embassy to Amurath, to negotiate a peace between the two princes. Sir Benedicto, in honour of my Lord of Burgundy, gave me a gracious reception. He even told me that, to do mischief to the Venetians, he had contributed to make them lose Salonica, taken from them by the Turks; and certainly in this he acted so much the worse, for I have seen the inhabitants of that town deny Jesus Christ and embrace the Mohammedan religion.

"Two days after my arrival at Pera I crossed the haven to Constantinople, to visit that city. It is large and spacious, having the form of a triangle; one side is bounded by the straits of St George, another towards the south by the bay, which extends as far as Gallipoli, and at the north side is the port. There are, it is said, three large cities on the earth, each enclosing seven hills—Rome, Constantinople, and Antioch. Rome is, I think, larger and more compact than Constantinople.

"They estimate the circuit of the city of Constantinople at eighteen miles, a third of which is on the land side towards the west. It is well enclosed with walls, particularly on the land side. This extent, estimated at six miles from one angle to the other, has likewise a deep ditch, excepting for about two hundred paces at one of its extremities near the palace called Blaquerne. I was assured that the Turks had failed in their attempt to take the town at this weak point. Fifteen or twenty feet in front of this ditch there is a good and high wall. At the two extremities of this line were formerly handsome palaces, which, if we may judge from their present ruins, were also very strong 

"Constantinople is formed of many separate parts, so that it contains several open spaces of greater extent than those built on. The largest vessels can anchor under its walls, as at Pera. It has, beside, a small harbour in the interior, capable of containing three or four galleys. This is situated to the southward near a gate, where a hillock is pointed out composed of bones of the Christians, who, after the conquests of Jerusalem and Acre by Godfrey de Bouillon, were returning by this strait. When the Greeks had ferried them over, they conducted them to this place, which is remote and secret, and there the Crusaders were murdered ... But as this is an old story, I know of it no more than what was told me.

"The city has many handsome churches, but the most remarkable and the principal church is that of St Sophia, where the Patriarch resides, with others of the rank of Canons. It is of a circular shape, situated near the eastern point, and formed of three different parts: one subterranean, another above the ground, and a third over that. Formerly it was surrounded by cloisters, and had, it is said, three miles in circumference. It is now of smaller extent, and only three cloisters remain, all paved and inlaid with squares of white marble, and ornamented with large columns of various colours. The gates are remarkable for their breadth and height, and are of brass. This church, I was told, possesses one of the robes of our Lord, the end of the lance that pierced His side, the sponge that was offered Him to drink from, and the reed that was put into His hand. I can only say that behind the choir I was shown the gridiron on which St Laurence was broiled, and a large stone in the shape of a wash­stand, on which they say Abraham gave the angels food when they were going to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah.

"I was curious to witness the manner of the Greeks when performing divine service, and went to St Sophia on a day when the Patriarch officiated. The Emperor was present, accompanied by his consort, his mother, and his brother the Despot of Morea. (The Emperor was John Paleologus, the Despot of Morea his brother Demetrius, his mother the Empress Irene, the daughter of the Serbian Prince Constantine Dragash, and the Emperor's consort was Maria Comnena, daughter of Alexis Comnena, Emperor of Trebizonde. She died on the 17th December 1439). A mystery was represented, the subject of which was the three youths whom Nebuchadnezzar had ordered to be thrown into the fiery furnace. The Empress, daughter to the Emperor of Trebizonde, seemed very handsome; but as I was at a distance, I wished to have a nearer view. And I was also desirous to see how she mounted her horse, for it was thus she had come to the church, attended only by two ladies, three elderly men, ministers of state, and three of that species of men to whose guard the Turks entrust their wives. On coming out of St Sophia, the Empress went into an adjoining house to dine, which obliged me to wait until she returned to her palace, and consequently to pass the whole day without eating or drinking.

"At length she appeared. A bench was brought forth and placed near her horse, which was superb, and had a magnificent saddle. When she had mounted the bench, one of the old men took the long mantle she wore, passed to the opposite side of the horse, and held it in his hand extended as high as he could; during this she put her foot in the stirrup, and bestrode the horse like a man. When she was in her seat, the old man cast the mantle over her shoulders; after which one of those long hats with a point, so common in Greece, was given to her; at one of the ends it was ornamented with three golden plumes, and was very becoming. I was so near that I was ordered to fall back, and consequently had a full view of her. She wore in her ears broad and flat earrings, set with precious stones, especially rubies. She looked young and fair and handsomer than when in church. In one word, I should not have had a fault to find with her, had she not been painted, and assuredly she had no need of it. The two ladies also mounted their horses; they were both handsome, and wore mantles and hats like the Empress. The company returned to the palace of Blaquerne.

"In the front of St Sophia is a large and fine square, surrounded with walls like a palace, where in ancient times games were performed. I saw the brother of the Emperor, the Despot of Morea, exercising himself there with a score of other horsemen. Each had a bow, and they galloped along the inclosure, throwing their hats before them, which, when they had passed, they shot at; and he who pierced his hat with an arrow, or was nearest to it, was esteemed the most expert. This exercise they have adopted from the Turks, and it was one in which they were endeavoring to make themselves efficient.

"On this side, near the point of the angle, is the beautiful church of St George, which has, facing Turkey in Asia, a tower at the narrowest part of the straits. On the other side, to the westward, is a very high square column with characters traced on it, and an equestrian statue of Constantine in bronze on the summit. He holds a sceptre in his left hand, and holds his right extended towards Turkey in Asia and the road to Jerusalem, as if to denote that the whole of that country was under his rule. Near this column there are three others placed in a line, and each of one block. Here stood once three gilt horses, now at Venice.

"In the pretty church of Pantheocrator, occupied by Greek monks, who are what we should call in France Gray Franciscan Friars, I was shown a stone or table of divers colours, which Nicodemus had caused to be cut for his own tomb, and on which he laid out the body of our Lord, when he took Him down from the cross. During this operation the Virgin was weeping over the body, but her tears, instead of remaining on it, fell on the stone, and they are all now to be seen upon it. At first I took them for drops of wax, and touched them with my hand, and then bent down to look at them horizontally and against the light, when they seemed to me like drops of congealed water. This is a thing that may have been seen by many persons as well as by myself. In the same church are the tombs of Constantine and of St Helena his mother, each raised about 8 feet high on a column, having their summit terminated in a point, cut into four sides, in the fashion of a diamond. It is said that the Venetians, while in power at Constantinople, took the body of St Helena from its tomb and carried it to Venice, where, they say, it is still preserved. It is further said that they attempted the same thing in regard to the body of Constantine, but could not succeed ; and this is probable enough, for to this day two broken parts of the tomb are to be seen, where they made the attempt. The tombs are of red jasper.

"In the church of St Apostles is shown the broken shaft of the column to which our Savior was fastened when He was beaten with rods by order of Pilate. This shaft, above the height of a man, is of the same stone as the two others that I have seen at Rome and at Jerusalem; but this one exceeds in height the others put together. There are likewise in the same church many holy relics in wooden coffins, and anyone who chooses may see them. One of the saints had his head cut off, and to his skeleton the head of another saint has been placed. The Greeks, however, have not the like devotion that we have for such relics. It is the same with respect to the stone of Nicodemus and the pillar of our Lord, which last is simply enclosed by planks, and placed upright near one of the columns on the right hand of the great entrance at the front of the church.

"Among several beautiful churches I will mention only yet one as remarkable, namely, that which is called Blaquerna from being near the imperial palace, which, although small and badly roofed, has paintings, and a pavement inlaid with marble. I doubt not that there may be others worthy of notice, but I was un­able to visit them all. The Latin merchants have one situated opposite to the passage to Pera, where mass is daily read after the Roman manner.

"Ther