CHAPTER I.
Condition
of the Persians under the Successors of Alexander and under the Arsacids.
“The
Parthians had been barbarians; they had ruled over a nation far more civilized
than themselves, and had oppressed them and their religion”. Niebuhr, Lectures
on Roman History.
When the great Empire of the Persians, founded by Cyrus, collapsed under
the attack of Alexander the Great, the dominant race of Western Asia did not
feel itself at the first reduced to an intolerable condition. It was the
benevolent design of Alexander to fuse into one the two leading peoples of
Europe and Asia, and to establish himself at the head of a Perso-Hellenic
State, the capital of which was to have been Babylon. Had this idea been
carried out, the Persians would, it is evident, have lost but little by their
subjugation. Placed on a par with the Greeks, united with them in marriage
bonds, and equally favored by their common ruler, they could scarcely have
uttered a murmur, or have been seriously discontented with their position. But
when the successors of the great Macedonian, unable to rise to the height of
his grand conception, took lower ground, and, giving up the idea of a fusion,
fell back upon the ordinary status, and proceeded to enact the ordinary role,
of conquerors, the feelings of the late lords of Asia, the countrymen of Cyrus
and Darius, must have undergone a complete change. It had been the intention of
Alexander to conciliate and elevate the leading Asiatics by uniting them with
the Macedonians and the Greeks, by promoting social intercourse between the two
classes of his subjects and encouraging them to intermarry, by opening his
court to Asiatics, by educating then in Greek ideas and in Greek schools, by
promoting them to high employments, and making them feel that they were as much
valued and as well cared for as the people of the conquering race: it was the
plan of the Seleucids to govern wholly by means of European officials, Greek or
Macedonian, and to regard and treat the entire mass of their Asiatic subjects
as mere slaves.
Alexander had placed Persian satraps over most of the provinces,
attaching to them Greek or Macedonian commandants as checks. Seleucus divided
his empire into seventy-two satrapies; but among his satraps not one was an
Asiatic—all were either Macedonians or Greeks. Asiatics, indeed, formed the
bulk of his standing army, and so far were admitted to employment; they might
also, no doubt, be tax-gatherers, couriers, scribes, constables, and officials
of that mean stamp; but they were as carefully excluded from all honorable and
lucrative offices as the natives of Hindustan under the rule of the East India
Company. The standing army of the Seleucids was wholly officered, just as was
that of our own Sepoys, by Europeans; Europeans
thronged the court, and filled every important post under the government.
There cannot be a doubt that such a high-spirited and indeed arrogant
people as the Persians must have fretted and chafed under this treatment, and
have detested the nation and dynasty which had thrust them down from their
pre-eminence and converted them from masters into slaves. It would scarcely
much tend to mitigate the painfulness of their feelings that they could not but
confess their conquerors to be a civilized people—as civilized, perhaps more
civilized than themselves—since the civilization was of a type and character
which did not please them or command their approval. There is an essential
antagonism between European and Asiatic ideas and modes of thought, such as
seemingly to preclude the possibility of Asiatics appreciating a European
civilization.
Moreover, the Seleucid monarchs themselves were occasionally guilty of
acts of tyranny, which must have intensified the dislike wherewith they were
regarded by their Asiatic subjects. The reckless conduct of Antiochus Epiphanes
towards the Jews is well known; but it is not perhaps generally recognized that
intolerance and impious cupidity formed a portion of the system on which he
governed. There seems, however, to be good reason to believe that, having
exhausted his treasury by his wars and his extravagances, Epiphanes formed a general
design of recruiting it by means of the plunder of his subjects. The temples of
the Asiatics had hitherto been for the most part respected by their European
conquerors, and large stores of the precious metals were accumulated in them.
Epiphanes saw in these hoards the means of relieving his own necessities, and
determined to seize and confiscate them. Besides plundering the Temple of
Jehovah at Jerusalem, he made a journey into the southeastern portion of his
empire, about BC 165, for the express purpose of conducting in person the
collection of the sacred treasures. It was while he was engaged in this
unpopular work that a spirit of disaffection showed itself; the East took arms
no less than the West; and in Persia, or upon its borders, the avaricious
monarch was forced to retire before the opposition which his ill-judged
measures had provoked, and to allow one of the doomed temples to escape him.
When he soon afterwards sickened and died, the natives of this part of Asia saw
in his death a judgment upon him for his attempted sacrilege.
It was within twenty years of this unfortunate attempt that the dominion
of the Seleucids over Persia and the adjacent countries came to an end. The
Parthian Empire had for nearly a century been gradually growing in power and
extending itself at the expense of the Syro-Macedonian;
and, about 163 BC, an energetic
prince, Mithridates I, commenced a series of conquests towards the West, which
terminated (about 150 BC) in the
transference from the Syro-Macedonian to the Parthian
rule of Media Magna, Susiana, Persia, Babylonia, and Assyria Proper. It would
seem that the Persians offered no resistance to the progress of the new
conqueror.
 |
The Seleucids had not tried to conciliate their attachment, and it was
impossible that they should dislike the rupture of ties which had only galled
hitherto. Perhaps their feeling, in prospect of the change, was one of simple
indifference. Perhaps it was not without some stir of satisfaction and
complacency that they saw the pride of the hated Europeans abased, and a race,
which, however much it might differ from their own, was at least Asiatic,
installed in power. The Parthia system, moreover, was one which allowed greater
liberty to the subject races than the Macedonian, as it had been understood and
carried out by the Seleucids; and so far some real gain was to be expected from
the change. Religious motives must also have conspired to make the Persians
sympathize with the new power, rather than with that which for centuries had
despised their faith and had recently insulted it.
The treatment of the Persians by their Parthian lords seems, on the
whole, to have been marked by moderation. Mithridates indeed, the original
conqueror, is accused of having alienated his new subjects by the harshness of
his rule; and in the struggle which occurred between him and the Seleucid king,
Demetrius II, Persians, as well as Elymaeans and
Bactrians, are said to have fought on the side of the Syro-Macedonian.
But this is the only occasion in Parthian history, between the submission of
Persia and the great revolt under Artaxerxes, where
there is any appearance of the Persians regarding their masters with hostile
feelings. In general they show themselves submissive and contented with their
position, which was certainly, on the whole, a less irksome one than they had
occupied under the Seleucids.
It was a principle of the Parthian governmental system to allow the
subject peoples, to a large extent, to govern themselves. These peoples
generally, and notably the Persians, were ruled by native kings, who succeeded
to the throne by hereditary right, had the full power of life and death, and
ruled very much as they pleased, so long as they paid regularly the tribute
imposed upon them by the ‘King of Kings’, and sent him a respectable contingent
when he was about to engage in a military expedition. Such a system implies
that the conquered peoples have the enjoyment of their own laws and
institutions, are exempt from troublesome interference, and possess a sort of semi-independence.
Oriental nations, having once assumed this position, are usually contented with
it, and rarely make any effort to better themselves. It would seem that, thus
far at any rate, the Persians could not complain of the Parthian rule, but must
have been fairly satisfied with their condition.
Again, the Greco-Macedonians had tolerated, but they had not viewed with
much respect, the religion which they had found established in Persia.
Alexander, indeed, with the enlightened curiosity which characterized him, had
made inquiries concerning, the tenets of the Magi, and endeavored to collect in
one the writings of Zoroaster. But the later monarchs, and still more their
subjects, had held the system in contempt, and, as we have seen, Epiphanes had
openly insulted the religious feelings of his Asiatic subjects. The Parthians,
on the other hand, began at any rate with a treatment of the Persian religion
which was respectful and gratifying. Though perhaps at no time very sincere
Zoroastrians, they had conformed to the State religion under the Achaemenian kings; and when the period came that they had
themselves to establish a system of government, they gave to the Magian hierarchy a distinct and important place in their
governmental machinery. The council, which advised the monarch, and which
helped to elect and (if need were) depose him, was composed of two elements—the Sophi, or wise men, who were civilians; and the Magi,
or priests of the Zoroastrian religion. The Magi had thus an important
political status in Parthia, during the early period of the Empire; but they
seem gradually to have declined in favor, and ultimately to have fallen into
disrepute. The Zoroastrian creed was, little by little, superseded among the
Parthians by a complex idolatry, which, beginning with an image-worship of the
Sun and Moon, proceeded to an association with those deities of the deceased
kings of the nation, and finally added to both a worship of ancestral idols,
which formed the most cherished possession of each family, and practically
monopolized the religious sentiment. All the old Zoroastrian practices were by
degrees laid aside. In Armenia the Arsacid monarchs
allowed the sacred fire of Ormuz to become extinguished; and in their own
territories the Parthian Arsacids introduced the
practice, hateful to Zoroastrians, of burning the dead. The ultimate religion
of these monarchs seems in fact to have been a syncretism wherein Sabaism, Confucianism, Greco-Macedonian notions, and an
inveterate primitive idolatry were mixed together. It is not impossible that
the very names of Ormuz and Ahriman had ceased to be
known at the Parthian Court, or were regarded as those of exploded deities,
whose dominion over men's minds had passed away.
On the other hand, in Persia itself, and to some extent doubtless among
the neighboring countries, Zoroastrianism (or what went by the name) had a firm
hold on the religious sentiments of the multitude, who viewed with disfavor the
tolerant and eclectic spirit which animated the Court of Ctesiphon. The
perpetual fire, kindled, as it was, from heaven, was carefully tended and
preserved on the fire-altars of the Persian holy places; the Magian hierarchy was held in the highest repute, the kings
themselves (as it would seem) not disdaining to be Magi; the ideas—even perhaps
the forms—of Ormuz and Ahriman were familiar to all;
image-worship was abhorred the sacred writings in the Zend or most ancient Iranian language were diligently preserved and multiplied; a
pompous ritual was kept up; the old national religion, the religion of the Achaemenians, of the glorious period of Persian ascendency
in Asia, was with the utmost strictness maintained, probably the more zealously
as it fell more and more into disfavor with the Parthians.
The consequence of this divergence of religious opinion between the
Persians and their feudal lords must undoubtedly have been a certain amount of
alienation and discontent. The Persian Magi must have been especially
dissatisfied with the position of their brethren at Court; and they would
doubtless use their influence to arouse the indignation of their countrymen
generally. But it is scarcely probable that this cause alone would have
produced any striking result. Religious sympathy rarely leads men to engage in
important wars, unless it has the support of other concurrent motives. To
account for the revolt of the Persians against their Parthian lords under Artaxerxes, something more is needed than the consideration
of the religious differences which separated the two peoples.
First, then, it should be borne in mind that the Parthian rule must have
been from the beginning distasteful to the Persians, owing to the rude and
coarse character of the people. At the moment of Mithridates’s successes, the Persians might experience a sentiment of satisfaction that the
European invader was at last thrust back, and that Asia had re-asserted
herself; but a very little experience of Parthian rule was sufficient to call
forth different feelings. There can be no doubt that the Parthians, whether
they were actually Turanians or no, were, in comparison
with the Persians, unpolished and uncivilized. They showed their own sense of
this inferiority by an affectation of Persian manners. But this affectation was
not very successful. It is evident that in art, in architecture, in manners, in
habits of life, the Parthian race reached only a low standard; they stood to
their Hellenic and Iranian subjects in much the same relation that the Turks of
the present day stand to the modern Greeks; they made themselves respected by
their strength and their talent for organization; but in all that adorns and
beautifies life they were deficient. The Persians must, during the whole time
of their subjection to Parthia, have been sensible of a feeling of shame at the
want of refinement and of a high type of civilization in their masters.
Again, the later sovereigns of the Arsacid dynasty were for the most part of weak and contemptible character. From the
time of Volagases I to that of Artabanus IV, the last king, the military reputation of Parthia had declined. Foreign
enemies ravaged the territories of Parthian vassal kings, and retired when they
chose, unpunished. Provinces revolted and established their independence. Rome
was entreated to lend assistance to her distressed and afflicted rival, and met
the entreaties with a refusal. In the wars which still from time to time were
waged between the two empires Parthia was almost uniformly worsted. Three times
her capital was occupied, and once her monarch's summer palace was burned.
Province after province had to be ceded to Rome. The golden throne which
symbolized her glory and magnificence was carried off. Meanwhile feuds raged
between the different branches of the Arsacid family;
civil wars were frequent; two or three monarchs at a time claimed the throne,
or actually ruled in different portions of the Empire. It is not surprising
that under these circumstances the bonds were loosened between Parthia and her
vassal kingdoms, or that the Persian tributary monarchs began to despise their
suzerains, and to contemplate without alarm the prospect of a rebellion which
should place them in an independent position.
While the general weakness of the Arsacid monarchs was thus a cause naturally leading to a renunciation of their
allegiance on the part of the Persians, a special influence upon the decision
taken by Artaxerxes is probably to be assigned to
one, in particular, of the results of that weakness. When provinces long
subject to Parthian rule revolted, and revolted successfully, as seems to have
been the case with Hyrcania, and partially with
Bactria, Persia could scarcely for very shame continue submissive. Of all the
races subject to Parthia, the Persians were the one which had held the most
brilliant position in the past, and which retained the liveliest remembrance of
its ancient glories. This is evidenced not only by the grand claims which Artaxerxes put forward in his early negotiations with the
Romans, but by the whole course of Persian literature, which has fundamentally
an historic character, and exhibits the people as attached, almost more than
any other Oriental nation, to the memory of its great men and of their noble
achievements. The countrymen of Cyrus, of Darius, of Xerxes, of Ochus, of the conquerors of Media, Bactria, Babylon, Syria,
Asia Minor, Egypt, of the invaders of Scythia and Greece, aware that they had
once borne sway over the whole region between Tunis and the Indian Desert,
between the Caucasus and the Cataracts, when they saw a petty mountain clan,
like the Hyrcanians, establish and maintain their independence
despite the efforts of Parthia to coerce them, could not very well remain
quiet. If so weak and small a race could defy the power of the Arsacid monarchs, much more might the far more numerous and
at least equally courageous Persians expect to succeed, if they made a resolute
attempt to recover their freedom.
It is probable that Artaxerxes, in his
capacity of vassal, served personally in the army with which the Parthian
monarch Artabanus carried on the struggle against
Rome, and thus acquired the power of estimating correctly the military strength
still possessed by the Arsacids, and of measuring it
against that which he knew to belong to his nation. It is not unlikely that he
formed his plans during the earlier period of Artabanus’s reign, when that monarch allowed himself to be imposed upon by Caracallus, and suffered calamities and indignities in
consequence of his folly. When the Parthian monarch atoned for his indiscretion
and wiped out the memory of his disgraces by the brilliant victory of Nisibis
and the glorious peace which he made with Macrinus, Artaxerxes may have found that he had gone too far to
recede; or, undazzled by the splendor of these
successes, he may still have judged that he might with prudence persevere in
his enterprise. Artabanus had suffered great losses
in his two campaigns against Rome, and especially in the three days' battle of
Nisibis. He was at variance with several princes of his family, one of whom
certainly maintained himself during his whole reign with the State and title of
"King of Parthia." Though he had fought well at Nisibis, he had not
given any indications of remarkable military talent. Artaxerxes,
having taken the measure of his antagonist during the course of the Roman war,
having estimated his resources and formed a decided opinion on the relative
strength of Persia and Parthia, deliberately resolved, a few years after the
Roman war had come to an end, to revolt and accept the consequences. He was no
doubt convinced that his nation would throw itself enthusiastically into the
struggle, and he believed that he could conduct it to a successful issue. He
felt himself the champion of a depressed, if not an oppressed, nationality, and
had faith in his power to raise it into a lofty position. Iran, at any rate,
should no longer, he resolved, submit patiently to be the slave of Turan; the
keen, intelligent, art-loving Aryan people should no longer bear submissively
the yoke of the rude, coarse, clumsy Scyths. An
effort after freedom should be made. He had little doubt of the result. The
Persians, by the strength of their own right arms and the blessing of Ahuramazda, the ‘All-bounteous’, would triumph over their
impious masters, and become once more a great and independent people. At the
worst, if he had miscalculated, there would be the alternative of a glorious
death upon the battlefield in one of the noblest of all causes, the assertion
of a nation’s freedom.