V

THE RISE OF PHILIP

BEFORE some of the events narrated in the last chapter had taken place, the great struggle between Athens and the royal house of Macedonia had begun.

The Macedonians of antiquity were a mixed race, and the degree of kinship between them and the Hellenic peoples is a matter upon which no agreement between scholars has been attained. The Macedonians proper lived on the low lands watered by the Axius and the Haliacmon, between the mountains and the sea, with Pella for theirr capital, though the more ancient centre, and the burial place of their kings, was AEgae or Edessa. They were a more or less settled agricultural people, whose lands provided for them the necessities of life, and who engaged comparatively little in foreign trade. They were the subjects of an absolute monarchy of an almost Homeric pattern, holding their lands at the pleasure of the King, giving him military service at his command, and in every way bound to do his bidding, except that in matters of life and death the assembly of fighting men appears to have had a right to give the final decision, and the will of the same body was at least as influential as the right of birth in determining the succession. But in the upper valleys, and among the mountains, there dwelt a number of tribes—Lyncestae, Orestae, Elimiotae, and others—governed by princes of their own, nominally indeed subordinate to the King of Macedonia, but restless and always liable to rebel. These were probably nearly akin to the Illyrians who lived to the westward of them (between them and the Adriatic), and to the Paeonians on the north of Macedonia. There is also some evidence of the existence of Thracian stocks within Macedonia itself.

That the royal house of Macedonia was at least partly Hellenic by descent had been admitted in the fifth century BC, by the officials of Olympia, who allowed the Macedonian prince, Alexander, to compete in the Olympian games—a privilege strictly confined to Hellenes. But with regard to their subjects there was always a doubt. On the one hand, there was a tradition that they, or some of them, had migrated from Greek lands into Macedonia. On the other, they were often spoken of as barbarians, because they were backward in culture, and their dialect was difficult to understand. (There was the same doubt about the peoples of Epirus and inner Etolia, and for similar reasons.) The remains of the Macedonian dialect are too meagre, and the extent of its borrowings from the vocabulary of the Greeks proper too uncertain, to justify any conclusion as to the nationality of those who spoke it; and we have to be contented at present with the probability that they were in some degree akin to the Hellenes on the one side and the Illyrians on the other, and that the two stocks (and perhaps others with them) were blended in varying proportions in different localities.

In one respect the Macedonians afforded a strong contrast to all but the least advanced Greek peoples, namely, in the fact that their organization was a tribal and quasi-feudal one, and did not, as with the Greeks, centre in city-states. The Macedonians proper, as distinct from the hill-tribes, appear to have been organized primarily for military purposes. The greater number of the able-bodied land-holders made up the infantry or "foot-guards"; and a smaller body of wealthier and more honourable men composed the cavalry, or "Companions" of the King. At the time of Philip's accession the Companions may have numbered some six hundred. Of these a specially selected group—probably under a hundred—were "Companions of the King's person"; and the highest ambition of the Macedonian was to attain a position in this group. But in this organization the hill-tribes had no part.

On the sea-coast the freedom of action of the Macedonians was held in check by the Greek colonies planted there. In the time of the Peloponnesian War the King, Perdiccas II, had failed, in spite of his political ingenuity, to shake off these fetters. His successor, Archelaus, had made efforts to modernize his kingdom, building roads and chains of forts, and probably attempting to unite the unordered elements in his kingdom by combining all in one national army. He was an admirer of Greek culture, and encouraged the literary men of Greece to frequent his Court. Euripides and Agathon ended their days there; Timotheus the lyric poet and Zeuxis the painter also visited Pella; Socrates was invited thither, but declined to go. But the efforts of Archelaus had little permanent success, and in the confusion which followed his death in 399, the advance which had been made towards a higher civilization was neutralized. The coastward towns, Olynthus, Acanthus, and Amphipolis, increased in power, and in spite of a temporary set-back, owing to the intervention of Sparta in 379, the Olynthian League grew powerful and continued to act as a barrier in the way of Macedonian ambition.

Amyntas III, whose reign lasted (though not without interruptions)from 393 to 369, was generally on terms of friendship with Athens, and, as we have seen, acknowledged her title to Amphipolis. He married the Lyncestian princess Eurydice, who bore him three sons—Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, who was born in 382. Alexander, who succeeded Amyntas in 369, was murdered  after a reign of a year; and the young Perdiccas only secured the throne from the pretender Pausanias by the intervention of Iphicrates, who was invoked by Eurydice. At the beginning of the reign of Perdiccas III, Ptolemy of Alorus, the son-in-law and paramour of Eurydice, acted as regent; and when (in 367) the Theban general Pelopidas advanced from Thessaly to Pella, Ptolemy made an agreement with him, and was obliged to give Philip, then fifteen years old, with other hostages as a security for its fulfillment. Philip was taken to Thebes, and lived there in the house of Pammenes until 364, when he was released and returned to Macedonia. Perdiccas, like Archelaus, was inclined towards literature and philosophy, and Euphraeus, a pupil of Plato, was for a time his principal adviser. But in spite of the help given to him by Iphicrates, and of a short-lived alliance with Athens which Timotheus persuaded him to make, he gave his support to Amphipolis in her struggle to hold out against Athens. In 359 he was killed in a rising of the hill-tribes, perhaps instigated by Eurydice herself, in revenge for the murder of Ptolemy by the King's orders.

The Macedonians first proclaimed his infant son King, with Philip as regent; but very soon, in view of the need of a strong hand, they transferred the kingship to Philip himself, who accepted it, we are told, under compulsion.

Philip was still only twenty-three years of age; but his early life had taught him lessons by which he had profited to the full. He had learned that success could only be achieved by a strong hand, and that if he was to reign over Macedonia in security he must not be over-scrupulous as to means. His sojourn in Thebes had given him an opportunity for observing the successes and methods of Epameinondas and Pelopidas—the one a unique embodiment of commanding military genius and high culture, the other the most reckless and daring soldier of his age. He had learned to appreciate the almost unbounded opportunities which lay open to a strong man in the Hellenic world, as it then was; and he had become familiar with the recent improvements upon the traditional organization of Greek armies. He had learned that the leader of a strong army, who could attach his men to himself by sentiment as well as by interest, and could not only hold his force together by discipline, but could develop methods of fighting which would give it an immediate advantage over those who followed more conventional lines, was practically certain of success.

Moreover he was the man for his task. Fearless and resolute; not to be turned aside by a defeat here and there, or by any misfortune to his own person; discerning and clever in dealing with different kinds of men and States; never eager to secure in haste what might be better secured by patience, or to use force where fraud would serve, he was entirely fitted for the execution of an ambitious and far-reaching policy in that age. Besides this, he was personally attractive, not only to the rough Macedonian soldiers, with whom he mingled freely on familiar terms, but also to the cultured representatives of the Greek States, who were sent to treat with him. He had learned at Thebes, among other lessons, to appreciate Hellenic literature and refinement; he encouraged dramatic artists to visit his Court at Pella; and, when the time came, he engaged Aristotle himself as the tutor of his young son Alexander. He was an able and persuasive speaker, and the orators of Athens themselves felt the power of his adroit eloquence. Though he indulged freely in the coarser vices, he confined his indulgence for the most part to seasons when it could not interfere with his plans; and it in no way affected either his own hardiness—his constitution was of iron—or his requirement of similar hardiness from his soldiers. He used money no less skillfully than other means of persuasion to effect his purposes; his generosity was lavish, and it was believed by later generations that his victories were won with gold as often as arms. That he employed deception to achieve his ends cannot be doubted, though his faithlessness on certain occasions was certainly exaggerated by Demosthenes. The rectitude of ancient and modern critics may deplore some of the methods which Philip used, and the licenses which he permitted himself in his private life. But deceit and corruption are not so entirely unknown in modern political warfare that we can afford, on account of his use of them, to refuse all admiration to a strong man, who, with every instrument thoroughly at his command, played his great game with skill, precision, and courage, and seldom mistook either the men with whom he had to deal, or the surest method of dealing with them.

How soon Philip conceived the policy which it was his life's work to carry out, we do not know. Doubtless the necessity of reorganizing the army and improving its methods of fighting presented itself first. Before long he may have determined upon the conquest of the Hellenic world; and in any case he must have been aware from the first that Macedonia could not be perfectly independent, so long as she was hemmed in by Hellenic colonies out of his control, and by warlike and restless tribes, not yet subdued. The idea of the conquest of the Nearer East probably grew in his mind later, when his army had reached its full efficiency, and his lordship over Greece was as good as achieved. It may even have been suggested by Isocrates.

However this may be, the organization of the army was his first task. By the formation of regiments on a territorial basis, bound together by a local patriotism which was to lead to a more comprehensive national spirit; by offering new prospects of promotion from one rank in the army to another, and so appealing to the ambition of the individual soldier; by attaching the higher ranks above all, but all ranks in ascending degrees, to his own person; he created a united national force, which he drilled into efficiency by relentless practice as well as by experience in actual warfare. The introduction of a longer spear for the use of the infantry gave his phalanx a great advantage when meeting the enemy: his cavalry, brought to the highest pitch of mobility, were frequently so employed, under his skilful generalship, as to determine the issue of battle by their action at critical moments, and were given an importance which cavalry had seldom possessed in Greek warfare; he further availed himself of the great improvements in siege-instruments which the engineers of the day devised; and his cavalry and infantry were supplemented by archers and light troops of other descriptions, so as to be prepared for every contingency.

Above all, Philip's army was kept together as a standing force. At first this may well–have caused some discontent, and there maybe some truth in the account which Demosthenes gives in the Second Olynthiac of the state of feeling.in Macedonia.

“You must not imagine [he says], men of Athens, that Philip and his subjects delight in the same things. Philip has a passion for glory—that is his ambition; and he has deliberately chosen to risk the consequences of a life of action and danger, preferring the glory of achieving more than any King of Macedonia before him to a life of security. But his subjects have no share in the honour and glory. Constantly battered about by all these expeditions, up and down, they are vexed with incessant hardships; they are not suffered to pursue their occupations or attend to their own affairs; and for the little that they produce, as best they can, they can find no market, because the trading stations are closed on account of the war”.

In the same Speech, Demosthenes speaks of Philip's jealousy of any credit ascribed to his subordinates; and Polyaenus relates that Philip professed to prefer victories won by diplomatic conversations to those secured by arms, because the glory of the latter had to be shared with others, while that of the former was all his own. But we know that Philip in fact recognized to the full the qualities of Antipater and Parmenio, his principal generals; there is no other evidence, apart from Demosthenes' statements, to suggest any disunion of spirit between Philip and his men; and it would seem to be one of Philip's greatest distinctions, that before long he did make his subjects feel that they had a share in the honour and glory, and that their interest was not at strife with their loyalty to himself. In any case, the possible inconveniences of a standing army, equipped with every kind of force, were more than counterbalanced by the immense advantage which it gave him over his enemies. "It is not," says Demosthenes, "as commander of a column of heavy infantry that Philip can march wherever he chooses, but because he has attached to himself a force of light infantry, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and a miscellaneous camp ... Summer and winter are alike to him, and there is no close season during which he suspends operations." And again, "with a standing force always about him, and knowing beforehand what he intends to do, he suddenly falls upon whomsoever he pleases; while we wait until we learn that something is happening, and only then, in a turmoil, make our preparations." His own position of absolute command was an even greater element in his success; and upon this also Demosthenes lays some stress. In short, it must soon have been plain, both to his admirers and to those who dreaded him, that any who would resist him had to deal with a man of extraordinary genius, who had won for himself a position of extraordinary advantage.

At the beginning of his reign it was necessary for him to move with caution. His claim to the throne was disputed by more than one pretender. But he had the support of the Macedonian army, which he had won over by eloquent language, and he rid himself of his rivals without serious difficulty. One of them, Argaeus, had been assisted by Athenian troops. It was not, however, a convenient moment for Philip to enter upon a quarrel with Athens. His own forces were not yet in order—the Athenians had shown signs of reviving strength in this very year, in the recovery of their supremacy over the Chersonese, and he himself had to face an immediate struggle with the hill-tribes of Paeonia and Illyria. He therefore assumed an attitude of generosity, and sent back to Athens, without demanding any ransom, the Athenian citizens whom he had taken among the defeated supporters of Argaeus. At the same time he sent an embassy to Athens, asking for peace; and since the Athenians had given their aid to Argus on the understanding that Argus would restore Amphipolis to them, he found it convenient to recognize the Athenian claim to the town, in order to obtain for the moment a Peace which he had no intention of keeping. It was fortunate for him that the Athenians failed to take the obvious step of garrisoning Amphipolis without delay, and that within a few months they became involved in war with their allies, and so had little opportunity for attending to their interests elsewhere.

Accordingly, after a campaign against the Paeonians and Illyrians, in which the new tactics were employed with complete success, and a large district was added to his kingdom, Philip returned to the coast (late in 358), appeared before Amphipolis, which had given him some provocation, and demanded its surrender. The Amphipolitans at once despatched Hierax and Stratocles to Athens to ask for help. To counteract their appeal, Philip wrote a letter to Athens, explaining that he was attacking the town with the intention of placing it in the hands of Athens. In reply to this the Athenians sent Antiphon and Charidemus to negotiate with him; and it was arranged that if he gave up Amphipolis to Athens, he should receive Pydna from Athens in its stead. This arrangement was very discreditable to the Athenian representatives. Pydna, though it had been a Macedonian possession until Timotheus won it over for Athens about the year 364, was an ally of Athens, and might well claim to be consulted before being surrendered to Philip; and so the nature of the bargain was kept secret, lest it should become known at Pydna; the Athenian People were only informed in vague terms that an understanding had been arrived at. Philip had now secured the support of a party in Amphipolis; and it was by their treachery, as well as by means of his engines, that he took the town, probably in the autumn of 357. A scholiast says that after its capture he at once put the traitors to death, on the ground that they were not likely to be more faithful to him than they had been to their own fellow-citizens. He then banished all who were hostile to him in the town.

So confidently did the Athenians expect to receive Amphipolis, that when the Olynthians, alarmed at Philip's success, appealed to them for aid against him, they would not listen. In consequence of this, the Olynthians tried to secure themselves by making an agreement with Philip himself; and it was quite in accordance with his plans to accede to their overtures, and to make a Peace which was destined to last until it should be convenient to him to crush them in their turn. It was provided in the agreement that_the_Olynthians should not make terms with Athens apart from himself.

How the Athenians expected to be able to give Pydna to Philip was never disclosed; for Philip, instead of waiting for the fulfillment of their promise, himself took possession of Pydna by force (assisted by treachery from within) and refused to give up Amphipolis. He next joined the Olynthians in an attack upon Poteidaea. This was one of the most important towns of the Chalcidic peninsula; it had long been a rival of Olynthus; and a large body of Athenian colonists was established there. Its capture was rendered easy by treachery from within; and the Olynthians received from Philip both it and also Anthemus, and profited greatly by the cultivation of the territory which he added to their own, and by the increase in their trade.

The Athenians had, in spite of the Social War, resolved to send an expedition to relieve Poteidaea, but it did not start in time. Philip, nevertheless, allowed the Athenians whom he captured in the town to depart without ransom. He was not yet ready to take measures which might exasperate Athens; even in besieging Poteidaea he was nominally acting as the ally of the Olynthians; and, as we have seen, he gave up the town to them. It was just at this time that he received three messengers with good tidings. The first told him of a victory of his general Parmenio over the Illyrians; the second of the success of his force in the Olympian games; the third of the birth of his son Alexander.

At about the same time Philip was enabled to satisfy the want of money which was pressing heavily upon him. His occupation of Amphipolis opened the way to the gold-mines of Mount Pangaeus, east of the Strymon, which were being worked at the time by settlers from Thasos: and he took advantage of an appeal made to him by these settlers, when hard pressed by Thracian assailants, to occupy their town, Crenides, and to enlarge it into a city which he named, after himself, Philippi. He at once began to work the mines, and from this time onward they provided him with a large and steady income, which before long amounted to as much as one thousand talents a year. The Athenians, hampered by the Social War, were unable to take any active steps to check his advance. They made an alliance, indeed, in 356, with the Paeonian Lyppeius, the Illyrian Grabus, and the Odrysian prince Cetriporis, the eldest son of Berisades, to whom (in the division of his father's share of the Odrysian kingdom which took place on his father's death) there fell the western portion, including the district in which Amphipolis and Crenides lay. But Cetriporis could not retain the district against Philip, and in 355 Philip made a victorious campaign against the Paeonians and Illyrians. Moreover, his conquest of the district east of the Strymon enabled him to take advantage of its luxuriant forests to provide himself with timber, with which to build a fleet—an absolute necessity if he was to maintain his hold on the coast, and to resist the Athenians on their own element. His occupation of the coast-town Datum, which Callistratus had refounded (in conjunction with settlers from Thasos) when he was expelled from Athens, gave him a convenient naval station. He was now able to interfere with Athenian trade, and also to occupy convenient islands, which had hitherto been infested by pirates. Before the end of 355 he had rid himself for the time of all danger from the newly-made allies of Athens, and was in a position to renew direct operations against Athenian interests on the coast of the Thermaic gulf; and he could now dispense with the pretence of acting as the ally of Olynthus.

He accordingly laid siege to Methone, which was the last important Athenian town on the gulf, and was used by the Athenians as a naval base. (It had been brought within the Athenian alliance by Timotheus about ten years before.) The siege probably began in the last months of 355. The town made a brave resistance, but was at last forced to surrender. In the course of the siege an arrow deprived Philip of the sight of his right eye. The citizens were allowed to depart free, but with only one garment apiece, and their territory was divided among Philip's followers.

Philip was now master of the whole coastline of the Thermaic gulf, as well as of the seaboard from the east side of the Chalcidic peninsula to a point perhaps fifty miles or so beyond Amphipolis. He had ample supplies of money and ships; and his army had so far proved irresistible. Athens, on the other hand, had lost all the stations which she had possessed on the coasts of Macedonia and Chalcidice, and had been unable to give any effective help to her allies in those regions. Even Methone had been suffered to fall unaided; and the policy of Eubulus was to avoid so far as possible all active measures of hostility. In the period which we have now to consider, we shall see Philip pushing his conquests far along the Thracian coast, and also securing a foothold in Thessaly; until finally, there being no longer any reason for allowing the Olynthian confederacy to interrupt the continuity of his empire, he turns upon Olynthus itself. The chronology of the years 354-351 has been the subject of prolonged controversy, and the precise order of some of the events remains uncertain; but there is no doubt about the course of events as a whole.

It was probably in 353 that Philip made his next move along the Thracian coast. We have seen how in 359 the Thracian kingdom had been divided between Cersobleptes, Berisades, and Amadocus, and how, not long afterwards the Chersonese, with the exception of Cardia, had been definitely handed over to Athens by Cersobleptes, in consequence of the activity of Chares. Soon after this Berisades had died, and his share of the kingdom had been divided between his sons, of whom Cetriporis, as has been narrated, had made alliance with Athens, but had not succeeded in keeping Philip out of the western part of his dominions. Amadocus and the sons of Berisades seem to have remained on friendly terms with Athens, but Cersobleptes was naturally anxious to get rid of them, and to reign once more over the whole Odrysian kingdom. Hostilities had, it seems, already begun, the sons of Berisades entrusting their cause to the generals Simon, Bianor, and Athenodorus.

At the same time Cersobleptes desired to effect his end without opposition from the Athenians, who just about this time (in 353), to confirm their occupation of the Chersonese, had sent a body of colonists to Sestos. It is possible that at this time Cersobleptes thought of an alliance with Athens as his best resource against the probable advance of Philip. Accordingly (probably in 353) he sent Aristomachus as his representative to Athens, to emphasize the friendly sentiments of himself and his general Charidemus towards the city. Aristomachus further asserted that Charidemus and no one else would be able to recover Amphipolis from Philip, and urged the Athenians to elect him general. The suggestion was taken up by one Aristocrates, who further proposed that the person of Charidemus should be declared inviolable, and that any one who killed him should be liable to summary arrest in any territory belonging to Athens or her allies. The proposal was cleverly contrived in the interests of Cersobleptes; for had it been passed, its effect would have been that Simon, Bianor, and Athenodorus would be afraid to act against Cersobleptes' forces, commanded by Charidemus, for fear of incurring the ill-will of Athens. The decree, however, was at once indicted as illegal by Euthycles, who engaged Demosthenes to compose his speech for him. But the trial did not take place until the summer of 352; and before that time Philip had once more made his appearance on the Thracian coast, and had seized the towns of Abdera and Maroneia.

Upon this, Cersobleptes, instead of looking any more (if he had done so previously) to Athens to help him against Philip, appears to have thought it better to come to terms with Philip himself, and so to resume his former attitude of hostility towards Athens. Accordingly he sent Apollonides of Cardia, a town which had remained hostile to Athens, to negotiate for him with Philip at Maroneia, and gave Philip securities for his fidelity. At the same time he probably hoped that Philip would espouse his cause against Amadocus; but in this he was disappointed; for Philip, finding that Amadocus intended to offer resistance, appears to have thought it better not to lose time in conquering an enemy who could be conquered at any time, but to return to Greece, where a great opportunity for extending his influence was now opened to him, in the form of an invitation to interfere in the Sacred War. (Demosthenes says that, had it not been for the resistance of Amadocus, there would have been nothing to save the Athenians from having to fight without delay against the Cardians and Cersobleptes. But it is difficult to think that Philip regarded the resistance of Amadocus as important, except in so far as time would have been required to crush it.)

In the negotiations between Philip and Cersobleptes at Maroneia the Theban general Pammenes also appears to have taken some part; for Cersobleptes (so Demosthenes tells us) gave pledges "to Philip and Pammenes." Pammenes had been sent by the Thebans to support Artabazus in his revolt against the Persian King, at some time after the Athenians had compelled Chares to withdraw his assistance from him. On his way either to or from Asia Minor, Pammenes met Philip at Maroneia. They were old friends, for Philip had lived in Pammenes' house while a hostage in Thebes; and perhaps Pammenes with his army gave Philip his support during the negotiations, at least so far as to increase the formidable appearance of Philip's host.

Philip now began to return homewards; but on his way back he had to pass Neapolis, where Chares was waiting with twenty ships. (Neapolis was a member of the Athenian confederacy, situated on the coast not far from Datum, in the district already conquered by Philip; but the town seems so far to have remained independent of him. In 355 it had appealed to Athens for help, and Chares may have been sent in answer to this appeal.) Philip contrived to get past by a clever ruse. He sent four of his swiftest vessels in advance; Chares went in pursuit of them into the open sea, and while he was thus employed, Philip got past Neapolis in safety with the rest of his force. The four ships also escaped. (It was possibly about this time that Chares defeated the mercenaries of Philip under the command of Adaeus, a general who was surnamed "the Cock." Theopompus tells us that in celebration of this victory Chares feasted the Athenians with funds given him out of the temple treasures of Delphi by Onomarchus, the Phocian general in the Sacred War, of whom more is to be said hereafter. The event must therefore be placed between Onomarchus' seizure of the treasures in 354 and his death in 352.)

The trial of Aristocrates took place in 352, and the speech which Demosthenes composed against him is by far the most remarkable which we have yet considered. Apart from the exhaustive treatment of the Athenian law of homicide, which displays the thoroughness generally characteristic of Demosthenes' legal arguments, and proves conclusively the illegality of Aristocrates' decree, the manner in which he handles the question of Athenian policy in regard to Thracian affairs as most masterly. Demosthenes argues strongly that the right policy for Athens is to prevent the absorption of power over the whole of Thrace by one man—in other words, to keep Cersobleptes in check by strengthening the rival princes and confirming them in their reliance upon Athens; while the effect of such a decree as Aristocrates had proposed would be to make these princes believe that Athens was veering round to the side of Cersobleptes, if she could accord such unparalleled honours to his chief minister and general. He shows also by a spirited narrative of Charidemus' career that the man himself was quite unworthy of such an honour, and that his allegiance could not be counted upon, whatever Athens might do for him. Towards the end of the Speech, he makes an onslaught upon the statesmen who were influential at the time, the party of Eubulus, denouncing them for enriching themselves while impoverishing the State, and for degrading the democracy by accustoming it to obey their own dictates in a servile and unworthy manner. The Speech has a trenchant vigour and a breadth of outlook which are far in advance of the qualities displayed in Demosthenes' earlier work; and its nobility of tone and the absence from it of all personal rancour have been generally recognized.

It has, however, been doubted whether the policy recommended by Demosthenes was the best under the circumstances. There seem to have been two alternatives open to the Athenian people at this time. The one, upheld by Eubulus and his party, was to preserve peace for the present at all costs, or at least to take no more active steps against Philip than were absolutely necessitated either by imminent danger or by the imperialistic tendency of the multitude, who were likely to insist upon some kind of retaliation against Philip's aggressions. (It was probably in view of some such pressure that Chares had been sent to Neapolis.) The possibility of avoiding war, and at the same time of holding Philip in check, might seem to be offered by an alliance with Cersobleptes. If that prince were permitted to unite all Thrace under his own sway, he would be a powerful buffer between Philip and the Chersonese, the retention of which was essential to Athens, since without it her corn-supply was menaced; and there was the chance that Cersobleptes would do the main part of the fighting, with the able general Charidemus to lead his forces, while Athens could continue to recruit her strength, sending only a small squadron to his support. From this point of view, the policy advocated by Demosthenes—that of rejecting the overtures of Cersobleptes—must have seemed a mistaken one.

But the alternative policy which evidently was in Demosthenes' mind had at least as much to recommend it,—the policy of keeping Cersobleptes weak by maintaining rival princes by his side in Thrace, and of preventing Philip from extending his influence in that direction, by taking such active measures against him as would keep him fully occupied nearer home. The difficulty of Eubulus' policy lay in the fact, which Demosthenes emphasizes strongly, that past experience had shown that Cersobleptes and Charidemus were not to be relied upon, and that no alliance with them would be certain to fulfill its object. Moreover, Athens already had engagements with the other princes. The weakness of Demosthenes' policy was that (in all probability) Athens was not yet in a condition to prosecute war against Philip with sufficient vigour to ensure success. In fact, Athens was in a position of danger, whichever plan she followed; and the difference between Demosthenes and his opponents was a phase of the more fundamental difference in regard to the policy to be pursued towards Philip, the one side appealing to national traditions and ideals, the other to motives of prudence and to the unwillingness of the People to go out and fight in person, however excited the crowd might be at each new aggression of their enemy.

Neither policy was free from danger; neither could be certain of success; and whether we sympathies more with Demosthenes or with Eubulus, each of whom viewed the situation from one point of view, and neither of whom, perhaps, saw it whole, is a question of temperament rather than a matter to be settled by argument. The same problem recurs repeatedly in the history of the next few years.

We do not know whether Aristocrates was condemned for the illegality of his proposal. The decree itself, having been brought before the Council only, and not before the Assembly, would have ceased to have any force (even apart from the suspensory effect of Euthycles' indictment) at the end of the archonship in which it was passed, in other words, even before the trial took place. But in 351 we find Charidemus among the generals of Athens, and (either late in 353, or in 352) alliance was made between Athens and Cersobleptes.