VI

 

THE OLYNTHIAN WAR

 

WE have seen that after taking Abdera and Maroneia and granting terms to Cersobleptes, Philip returned homewards. He did so in response to an invitation which he had received from the princes of the ruling dynasty of Larissa to assist them against the princes of Pherae and their allies the Phocians, and so to take part in the Sacred War. In order to understand the situation it is necessary to go back a few years.

The battle of Leuctra in 371 had given Thebes the supremacy over her neighbours the Phocians; but the latter were not content to be subjects of Thebes, and in 362 they had refused to join in the last campaign of Epaminondas in the Peloponnese; for they were still, as they had been before the battle of Leuctra, on friendly terms with Sparta. Before long the Thebans found a pretext for attempting to punish them, which would give to the attempt the colour of religious sanction.

The temple and oracle at Delphi were under the control of the Amphictyonic Council, representing a very ancient confederacy of twelve Greek tribes, which no doubt were originally more or less equal in power, but in the course of history had come to differ widely in importance. The twelve tribes included not only the Thessalians, Boeotians, Dorians, and Ionians, and such tribes of secondary importance as the Achaeans, Phocians, and Locrians, but also the comparatively insignificant Malians, Perrhaebi, Magnetes, Dolopes, and Enianes. Each of these tribes had two votes in the Council. Athens appears to have exercised one of the Ionian votes, Thebes one of the Boeotian, Sparta one of the Dorian. The geographical position of the smaller tribes was such as to make it likely that the Thebans and Thessalians (at any rate if united) could command a majority of votes in the Council; and since the battle of Leuctra the Thebans had begun to use the Council to further their political ends. Thus they caused it to impose a heavy fine upon Sparta for the seizure of the Cadmeia in 383, perhaps treating this act as a violation of the oath which bound the members of the League together; and in 356 the Council was led to mulct the Phocians in a very large sum for some offence, the nature of which is variously reported, but which was probably the encroachment upon land dedicated to Apollo, the god of Delphi. They further proposed to dedicate the Phocians' own territory to the god. At the same time they increased the penalty previously imposed upon the Spartans; for of course it had not been paid. Whether Sparta and Athens, which were both traditionally friendly to the Phocians, were represented at the meeting of the Council is unknown; if they were, they must have been outvoted.

The Phocians, led by Philomelus, refused to pay the fine; and after obtaining some financial aid from Archidamus, King of Sparta, proceeded in 355 to seize the temple of Delphi, and erase the record of the sentence against them. (The temple was in the hands of the Delphians, who were originally a branch of the Phocian race. There was a standing dispute between the Delphians and the Phocians as to the control of the temple, and Philomelus' action was not without some show of justification.) The Phocians also defeated the forces of the Locrians, their neighbours, who attacked them at the instigation of Thebes; and Philomelus secured (though not without threats of violence) the approval of the Pythia, the priestess of the oracle, for his designs. The Thebans and Thessalians (most of whom were traditionally hostile to their restless Phocian neighbours) now induced the Amphictyonic Council to declare a "Sacred War" against the Phocians, and summoned the Greek peoples to join in punishing them for their sacrilege. The response seems to have been fairly general on the part of the tribes situated to the north of Boeotia; Byzantium also, which had for several years been friendly to Thebes, sent supplies of money. The Spartans sent one thousand men to the assistance of the Phocians; and to procure mercenaries, Philomelus made use of part of the treasures of the Delphian temple, probably intending at the time to repay them.

What was the attitude adopted by Athens? It is impossible to give a certain answer. Aristophon and Eubulus were alike disposed towards friendship with Thebes as a general policy, though on the other hand, there was a long history of friendship between Athens and the Phocians, and the People as a whole detested the Thebans. (Demosthenes himself was generally friendly to Thebes.) It is possible that at first the political leaders in Athens took the Theban side, and the record of a treaty between Athens and the Locrians, which seems to fall in the early years of the war, lends some colour to this view. In any case, though they appear to have returned a friendly answer to the Phocian appeal, they at first gave the Phocians no active help; and the popular mind seems to have been divided between a strong disapproval of the sacrilegious acts of the Phocians, and a sentimental anxiety lest they should be exterminated.

The war was waged with great ferocity from the first. Philomelus gained some striking successes, but in 354 was defeated by the Thebans near Neon and killed himself. He was succeeded by Onomarchus, who made an unscrupulous use of the temple-treasures, not only to pay mercenaries, but also to give presents to powerful persons in many cities, no doubt in order to obtain through them the support of their countrymen. Among others who joined him was Lycophron, prince or "tyrant" of Pherae, who was desirous of restoring the domination of his house over the Thessalians; for since the death of Alexander, a few years before, the house of Pherae had lost its supremacy, and the Aleuadae of Larissa had come to the front. In 354 and the greater part of 353 Onomarchus appears to have been in the main successful. He defeated the Locrians, and also restored Orchomenus and liberated it from the power of Thebes. He also obtained command of the all-important pass of Thermopylae; and though he sustained a check from the Thebans at Chaeroneia, this does not seem to have greatly injured his cause. Before the end of 353, the princes of Larissa, Eudicus and Simus, invoked the aid of Philip against the rival house of Pherae; Philip, as we have seen, obeyed the call; and Lycophron thereupon sent in haste for Onomarchus and his army.

Onomarchus first sent his brother Phayllus, who was soon driven off by Philip. He then went to the rescue himself, and defeated Philip severely in two battles. Philip was little daunted; encouraging his downcast troops, he withdrew from Thessaly for a time, but only, as he said, "like a ram, in order to butt the harder next time." For the moment Lycophron was master of Thessaly, and Onomarchus pursued his successes farther south, and captured Coroneia. But early in 352 Philip reappeared, and, crowning his men with laurel to proclaim their championship of the cause of Apollo and so to give them confidence, he obtained a complete victory over Onomarchus and Lycophron near the coast of Magnesia. Onomarchus lost his life, and Philip put to death a very large number of prisoners as guilty of sacrilege; some, however, of the fugitives were picked up by Chares, who happened to be sailing by the Magnesian coast at the time. Philip now besieged and took Pherae, deposed Lycophron and put an end to the despotic regime, and became master of practically the whole of Thessaly.

Whatever had been the attitude of Athens earlier in the war, it was now evident that she could no longer ignore the growing power of Philip. It has been suggested that Chares may have been sent to Magnesia in order to co-operate with Onomarchus; though the only evidence is that of Diodorus, who treats his presence there as accidental. But when, after taking Pherae, Philip proceeded to attack Pagasw, the most important sea­port of Thessaly, the Athenians resolved to send an expedition to the aid of the town. Unfortunately, like the expedition to Methone, it arrived too late, when Philip had already become master of the port. Philip now arranged the affairs of Thessaly, acting on the whole in a lenient and conciliatory fashion, but taking for himself the harbour-dues and retaining Magnesia in his own occupation. Then, before July, 352, he moved towards Thermopylae.

On this occasion the Athenians were in time. There can be no doubt that Eubulus, no less than the war-party, now realized the necessity of measures of defence. The only alternative would have been to make peace with Philip and come to a definite arrangement as to territory, both in Greece and in Thrace; but this would certainly have meant the renunciation of Amphipolis by Athens; and to this the majority of the Assembly would not yet have consented. Nothing remained then but to oppose Philip, and the measures taken were proposed by a supporter of Eubulus, Diophantus of Sphettus. The citizens were thoroughly roused and volunteered for service; and five thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry were sent by sea to Thermopylae under Nausicles at a cost of two hundred talents (including the private expenditure of the soldiers). At Thermopylae, Phayllus, the successor of Onomarchus in the command, already waited on land with a powerful army, in which the Phocians, whom he had rallied once more, were supported by large contingents of Spartans and Achaeans, and by the mercenaries who had previously fought for Lycophron. On hearing of the arrival of the Athenian squadron, Philip abandoned the attempt to cross the Pass; and Demosthenes more than once refers to this occasion as one of the few on which, in recent years, the Athenians had acted worthily of their traditions, and so had entirely succeeded in their object. Apart from the danger of an advance, Philip's willingness to retire is not hard to explain. He had already gained immensely in prestige in this campaign, not only by the mere fact of his victory, but by the role he had been able to assume, of champion of the god of Delphi, whose sanctuary had been violated by Onomarchus and the Phocians in a way which shocked the religious sentiments of the Greeks generally, whatever might be the political interests of each State. To create a favourable feeling towards himself in this way was no slight gain; and he may well have been content for the moment to enjoy the advantage of this, without endangering it by attempting to push his conquests further. It is also probable that with Thessaly in his power (though not yet perfectly subdued) to the north of the Pass, and with the Thebans, his allies, farther south, and presumably able to hold the defeated Phocians in check, he saw that less was to be gained by trying  to cross the Pass in face of strong opposition, than by pursuing and consolidating his conquests to the east of Macedonia.

So we find him before the end of 352 once more in Thrace. It has already been narrated that about a year before this, he had taken securities from Cersobleptes and had been opposed by Amadocus, but had refrained from retaliating. On the present occasion, he appears to have aided Amadocus against Cersobleptes. "The peoples of Byzantium and Perinthus," so a scholiast states, "and Amadocus the Thracian, made war upon Cersobleptes, king of a portion of Thrace, on account of some disputed territory. Philip assisted them and defeated Cersobleptes, and forced him to yield the territory to those who claimed it. He further took Cersobleptes' son as a hostage, and carried him off to Macedonia." (Eschines saw Cersobleptes' son at Pella, where he was still kept in captivity, when he went there as ambassador six years afterwards.) Philip seems in fact to have been following the very policy which Demosthenes had recommended to Athens in the Speech against Aristocrates—that of dividing the power over Thrace among a number of persons or States; and his alliance with Byzantium appears natural enough when we remember that the Byzantines, like himself, had supported the Theban side in the Sacred War. He further made alliance with Cardia, and so secured for himself a stronghold overlooking the Chersonese—a very serious menace to the power of Athens. In November of the same year he laid siege to Heron Teichos. The exact position of this fortress is not known, but it was probably so near either to the Chersonese or to the coast along which the Athenian corn-ships passed that the Athenians could not contemplate Philip's action with equanimity; and they were once more roused to a fit of energy. Demosthenes' own words best describe the sequel:

“Amidst all the discussion and the commotion which took place in the Assembly, you passed a resolution that forty warships should be launched, that men under forty-five years of age should embark in person, and that we should pay a war-tax of sixty talents. That was in the month of November. That year came to an end. There followed July, August, September. In September, after the Mysteries, and with reluctance, you despatched Charidemus with ten ships, carrying no soldiers, and five talents of silver. For so soon as news had come that Philip was sick or dead—both reports were brought—you dismissed the armament, men of Athens, thinking that there was no longer any occasion for the expedition. But it was the very occasion; for had we then gone to the scene of action with the same enthusiasm which marked our resolution to do so, Philip would not have been preserved to trouble us today”.

The account which Demosthenes gives can easily be filled out. We can imagine that the militant instincts of the democracy were so keenly aroused by the alarm raised by the war party, that Eubulus thought it necessary to yield so far as to send an expedition to Heron Teichos. Then came the news of Philip's illness, which enabled Eubulus once more to advocate inaction, the wealthier citizens to seek to avoid the expenditure, and the rest to relapse into their customary unwillingness to do their own fighting. (It is noteworthy that we now find Charidemus in the service of Athens. Probably Philip's activity in Thrace had convinced him that the cause of Cersobleptes was destined to be lost, and the Athenians were doubtless better pleased to have him as a supporter than as an opponent.)

We have seen that about this time the proposal of Demosthenes to help the exiled Rhodian democrats was made and defeated,—no doubt by the influence of Eubulus, who in this matter acted wisely, since it would have been very imprudent to risk offending Persia, when there were other enemies to be reckoned with. Artaxerxes was just now engaged in the attempt to reduce his rebellious subjects in Egypt to obedience, and was doubtless anxious to be free from troubles elsewhere. The refusal of Athens to take part in the Rhodian quarrel was therefore convenient to him; and at the same time he apparently tried to secure the inactivity of the Thebans by sending them a large present of money in answer to the appeal which they made to him, when they were hard pressed for funds with which to carry on the Sacred War. For the war was dragging on inconclusively. Phayllus had achieved some successes, but had died before the end of 352, and had been succeeded by Phalcus; but the war continued to be waged in Boeotia and Phocis for some years, without any decisive action taking place; though at times the Phocian territory suffered severely from the incursions of the enemy.

When Philip recovered from the illness which forced him to raise the siege of Heron Teichos, he appears to have turned his thoughts at once to Olynthus. He had suffered that city to remain at the head of the Chalcidic League, and to retain Poteidaea, Anthemus, and other territories; but it must have become more and more plain to all that he was not likely to refrain from requiring the submission of the league, and so consolidating his dominions, so soon as it should be convenient to him. Already in 352 Olynthus had taken advantage of Philip's absence in Thrace to make overtures to Athens, and had thus broken her compact with him, under which peace was only to be made by her with Athens in conjunction with himself; and shortly afterwards Philip's step­brother Arrhidaeus, who had opposed Philip's accession to the throne, took refuge in Olynthus and was welcomed there.'Early in 351—this at least is the probable date—Philip made his appearance within the territory of Olynthus. It may be that he was only led to cross the borders of the Chalcidic League in the course of making good his conquest of the neighbouring territory of the Bisalt, on his way back from Heraeon Teichos; he certainly took no hostile steps against the cities of the League, and even protested his friendship towards them. But it was probably now that, in response to an embassy from the Chalcidic cities, he quoted to them a fable about War and Violence, which he represented as supernatural powers whom they seemed likely to bring down upon themselves.

During the years 351 and 350 Philip left the Olynthians unmolested. It is possible that he suffered from a recurrence of his illness, and that during part of the time he was occupied in the fortification of strongholds in Illyria, and in hostilities against Arybbas, King of the Molossi. But there can be no doubt that he was all this time fostering in Olynthus a party favourable to himself, and secretly intriguing in Euboea, with a view to creating such occupation there for the Athenian forces as would render them unable to come to the aid of Olynthus, when he chose to fall upon it.

It is most probable that it was early in 351 that his ships began to make those raids upon Athenian territory which are mentioned both by Demosthenes and by Eschines. They not only descended upon Lemnos and Imbros, and carried off Athenian citizens as prisoners of war; but they also seized a fleet of Athenian corn-ships off Geraestus (the southernmost point of Euboea), and actually landed troops at Marathon, and carried off the Athenian state-galley, which was conveying a deputation to a religious festival at Delos. The alarm which these acts occasioned is described by Eschines, who says that the special meetings of the Assembly which were called in the midst of the alarm and turmoil caused by the news outnumbered the regular meetings. Yet no active steps were taken, except that of sending Charidemus—probably to the Hellespont—as described in the passage already quoted from the Third Olynthiac, with ten ships and five talents, and leaving him to find mercenaries for himself; and it must have been at one of the meetings of the Assembly in this year (probably in the autumn, after the despatch of Charidemus) that Demosthenes delivered his First Philippic Oration.

It was the first occasion on which Demosthenes had opened the debate, and it required some courage on the part of a man only thirty years of age to rise without waiting for older men (in accordance with the custom of the Assembly) to give their opinions first. "But," he said, "since we find ourselves once more considering a question upon which they have often spoken, I think I may reasonably be pardoned for rising first of all. For if their advice to you in the past had been what it ought to have been, you would have had no occasion for the present debate." He then proceeded at once to the attack. The unfortunate position of affairs was entirely due to the refusal of the Athenians to take a personal part in the defence of their country. It was the reliance upon mercenaries, the failure to support them and their generals with funds, and the intermittent character of their military operations, that placed the interests of Athens at the mercy of Philip. In a few strokes he depicted the Athenian people of his day—their excitability, their love of sensational gossip, their inability to sustain any impulse which they might feel for the moment, and to follow it out into effective action.

“What? [he asked]—do you want to go round asking one another: "Is there any news?" Could there be any stranger news than that a man of Macedonia is defeating Athenians in war, and ordering the affairs of the Hellenes? "Is Philip dead?" "No, but he is sick." And what difference does it make to you? For if anything should happen to him, you will soon raise up for yourselves a second Philip, if it is thus that you attend to your interests. Indeed, Philip himself has not risen to this excessive height through his own strength, so much as through our neglect. I go even further. If anything happened to Philip—if the operation of Fortune, who always cares for us better than we care for ourselves, were to effect this too for us—you could descend upon the general confusion and order everything as you wished; but in your present condition, even if circumstances offered you Amphipolis, you could not take it; for your forces and your minds alike are far away”.

Besides this, the whole military system of Athens was at fault. The delay in organizing a force even when it had been resolved upon was fatal in dealing with an adversary like Philip, and offered a strong contrast to the promptitude with which all arrangements in connection with the popular festivals were carried out. Nor could anything be done by isolated expeditions to the places attacked.

“The method of your warfare is just that of barbarians in a boxing-match. Hit one of them, and he hugs the place; hit him on the other side, and there go his hands; but as for guarding or looking his opponent in the face, he neither can nor will do it. It is the same with you. If you hear that Philip is in the Chersonese, you resolve to make an expedition there; if he is at Thermopylae, you send one there; and wherever else he may be, you run up and down in his steps. It is he that leads your forces”.

It was therefore absolutely necessary, Demosthenes insisted, that there should be a standing force, kept permanently at the seat of war. Moreover, this force should consist in a large measure of citizens, whose presence would at least act as a check upon the independence of the generals, and make them less likely to desert the war to which Athens had sent them and go off upon some more profitable expedition. Further, Demosthenes reminded his hearers, these generals, receiving no support from home, plundered the very allies of Athens, and obtained acquittal when brought to trial, by pleading the difficulties of their position. This could only be remedied by providing both funds and citizen-soldiers liberally.

At the same time, Demosthenes was careful to distinguish his attitude from that of the noisy orators, who clamoured for war and proposed measures of a magnitude which was absurd under existing circumstances—with the result that nothing was done at all. He had thought out carefully what, in his opinion, the situation required, and had worked out the details after his manner. The force ultimately to be created was one of fifty ships, carrying citizen-troops, with transports for half the cavalry of the city; and this was to be kept ready for immediate action in case of any emergency. But since this armament could not be organized at once, he proposed that a smaller force should be prepared for immediate service, consisting of two thousand soldiers, of whom five hundred were to be citizens, and two hundred cavalry, including fifty citizens. The citizens should serve in relays, and ten warships would be required. This force was not to fight any pitched battle, but to harry Philip's coasts, to keep him in check, and, above all, to prevent him from plundering the allies and territory of Athens. It was to receive bare rations—the amount was exactly calculated—and for the rest was to support itself. (Demosthenes accompanied the proposal with a detailed exposition of the sources from which he expected to be able to draw the necessary funds, but the schedule was unfortunately not published with the Speech, and has not come down to us.) The general in command, he said, would determine the particular operations to be undertaken, as circumstances required; the force would winter in the islands subject to Athens, and whenever the opportunity occurred, would lie close to the Macedonian coast, and block the mouths of the ports.

In order to rouse his countrymen to the pitch of enthusiasm which would induce them to take the steps which he urged upon them, Demosthenes appealed to every motive that could influence them—pride in the past, shame at the present, trust in the help given by Heaven to those who help themselves, alarm for the future if the danger were not averted by vigorous action. Beside the eloquence of this Speech the earlier orations—with the exception of parts of the Speech against Aristocrates—seem cold.

The proposals of Demosthenes have often been criticized. Of their practicability in detail we have no means of judging. But it is perfectly clear that if Philip was to be opposed at all—and it is really upon that fundamental question that his critics differ from Demosthenes—it could only be by neutralizing the advantages which Philip possessed, through a change in Athenian methods of warfare, of the kind which Demosthenes proposed. Whether the Athenians would face the necessity of personal service and of a standing army was (just as he represented it) a question of character and resolution; and he believed in them enough to think them capable of the necessary sacrifices. That he was mistaken is perhaps small blame to him. The suggestion (which, of all that he makes in the Speech, sounds most strange to modern readers), that the presence of citizen-soldiers in the army was required in order to be a check upon the generals' independence, was probably sensible enough in the circumstances of the time. If, as it was, a general was to a great extent in the hands of his mercenaries, and had to lead them where they wanted to go, their influence would at least be partially counteracted by the presence of a large body of citizens, whose claim to the general's services on their country's behalf could make itself felt on the spot.

But so far as we know, Demosthenes' Speech bore no fruit. At least we know of no operations against Philip which can be assigned to the year 350. Instead of this we hear of trivial quarrels of the Athenians with their nearer neighbours, the Megareans and Corinthians. The Megareans appear to have trespassed upon land sacred to the two goddesses of Eleusis, Demeter and Persephone, whom the Athenians held in the deepest veneration; and an Athenian force, led by the general Ephialtes, invaded Megara, and forced the Megareans to recognize a delimitation of the sacred territory by the officials of the Eleusinian mysteries. An armed force was also sent into the territory of Corinth to attend the Isthmian Games, because the Corinthians, for some reason unknown to us, had omitted to send the Athenians the customary official invitation to the Games. To these quarrels Demosthenes not unjustifiably refers with contempt, since in pursuing them the People was neglecting its more vital interests.

It is probably to the same year that we must refer the friendly communications between Athens and Orontas, satrap of Mysia, who was in revolt against the King of Persia, and had helped the Athenian generals with supplies of corn. These communications showed a different attitude on the part of the Athenians towards Persia from that which had led them in 356 to recall Chares when he was helping Artabazus. Moreover, the rebellious subjects of the King in Egypt were being assisted by the Athenian Diophantus, and owed much of their success to his generalship. (On the other hand, Phocion, of whom much more will be said in the sequel, is found in 350 helping the King's forces at the siege of Salamis, where Euagoras had revolted. Perhaps by this time Orontas had been subdued, and the King may have threatened the supporters of the rebel satrap, and caused them to veer round once more.) There is much that is obscure in the relations of Athens to the King at this time, but the hostile attitude which she appears to have adopted for a time may possibly be explained by recent communications between Philip and Artaxerxes. It is at least probable that Philip had thought it well, before turning his attention to conquests nearer home, to come to a temporary understanding with Artaxerxes which would secure him against Persian interference with his own recently acquired power in Thrace and on the Hellespont.

In the meantime Philip was encouraging the party favourable to himself in Olynthus, the leaders of which were Euthycrates and Lasthenes, assuring them that he meant their city no harm, and inducing them to persuade their fellow-citizens to dismiss his opponents from their confidence.

Thus persuaded, the Olynthians exiled Apollonides, the leader of the anti-Macedonian party, and before long took what proved to be the fatal step of appointing Lasthenes to command their cavalry.

“And so - says Demosthenes-, when some of them began to take bribes, and the People as a whole were foolish enough, or rather, unfortunate enough, to repose greater confidence in these men than in those who spoke for their own good; when Lasthenes roofed his house with the timber which came from Macedonia, and Euthycrates was keeping a large herd of cattle for which he had paid no one anything, when a third returned with sheep, and a fourth with horses; while the People, to whose detriment all this was being done, so far from showing any anger or any disposition to chastise men who acted thus, actually gazed on them with envy, and paid them honour, and regarded them as heroes—when, I say, such practices were thus gaining ground, and corruption had been victorious, then, though they possessed one thousand cavalry, and numbered more than ten thousand men, though all the surrounding peoples were their allies, though you went to their assistance with ten thousand mercenaries and fifty ships, and with four thousand citizen-soldiers as well, none of these things could save them. Before a year of the war had expired they had lost all the cities in Chalcidice, while Philip could no longer keep pace with the invitations of the traitors, and did not know which place to occupy first.

The history of the years 349 and 348 affords a striking proof of the demoralization of the political leaders in these cities, and of the ruthlessness with which Philip removed out of the way, by foul means no less than by fair, any obstacle that barred his progress. He virtually declared war on Olynthus, despite his renewed professions of good-will, early in 349, when he demanded the surrender of his step-brother. This demand the Olynthians refused. Probably they recognized that they would now in any case have to fight to the death; and they renewed their appeal to Athens, asking once more for the alliance which had been talked of three years earlier, and for practical assistance against Philip. In the meantime they declined to make any agreement with him, though he appears to have made proposals to them.

The First Olynthiac Oration of Demosthenes formed part of the debate upon the Olynthian request. It has indeed been disputed whether it was actually the first of the three Olynthiacs to be delivered, but expressions used in it leave no doubt that the alliance, or at least the nature of the help to be given to the Olynthians, had not yet been determined upon, and that at the time of its delivery Olynthus itself had not been attacked, and none of the Chalcidic cities had been actually taken; nor can Philip's expedition to Thessaly (which occurred later in 349) have taken place. The traditional order of the Speeches is in fact the most probable, and the character of the several Speeches, in this order, admits of easy explanation.

Demosthenes began by congratulating his hearers on the happy fortune which had offered so desirable an alliance to Athens, and by laying stress upon the certainty (as he regarded it) that Philip, unless checked at a distance, would make his way to Attica itself; and that if he did this, the country, and above all the farmers, would be ruined. He entreated his countrymen to fling aside their short­sighted indifference, and to exchange their love of ease for a strenuous activity on behalf of the Olynthians and of their own interests. He reminded them of Philip's restless energy, and his skill in using his opportunities, and contrasted it with the dilatoriness of the Athenians, who were always too late to effect their object. He further urged that the present moment was a peculiarly opportune one; for not only had Philip been disappointed at not carrying all before him without having to strike a blow, but the Thessalians were growing restive and were likely to revolt against his supremacy.

The Speech was not confined to generalities. Demosthenes had, as usual, a definite plan of action in view, and did not shrink from the responsibility and the risk of proposing it. One force must go to Chalcidice to save the towns of the League; another to the Macedonian coast, to inflict damage upon Philip's own country. As regards funds, he hinted, not obscurely, that the only right course was to divert the festival-money to military uses; but as it was obvious that the People were not prepared for this, he suggested a general war-tax as the best means of raising money.

The proposals of Demosthenes were strongly opposed, and among others, Demades (a brilliant extempore orator who afterwards played a considerable part in the history of Athens) spoke against them. But the alliance with Olynthus was made; Chares was sent with two thousand mercenaries and the thirty ships which were already under his command; and in addition, eight ships were to be sent when they could be got ready. The mission of Chares, however, proved fruitless—for what reasons we do not know. His enemies in Athens (the party adverse to war) renewed their campaign of accusations against him, and apparently he was inadequately supplied with funds; for it seems most likely that at the time when the Second Olynthiac was delivered, no war-tax had yet been levied; and it is not improbable that the People, in deciding upon an expedition, had abstained from voting money to maintain it. Besides this, the same orators appear to have represented Philip in the most formidable light, as a power with whom it was useless to contend.

Under some such circumstances the Second Olynthiac was delivered, not long after the First. Demosthenes insists briefly upon the shamefulness of his countrymen's inaction, and then devotes a large section of the Speech to the argument that Philip's power, being based upon selfishness and treachery, could not last, and that there were already signs of its approaching collapse. The argument does more credit perhaps to the orator's faith in moral principles than to his insight into the situation of the moment. Possibly it was adopted merely as a convenient method of persuading the multitude that Philip was not so formidable as he was said to be. Yet there is a ring of sincerity about it, which perhaps justifies us in thinking that Demosthenes' experience had not yet been long enough to show him that the triumph of righteousness in mundane affairs is often long postponed, and cannot be reckoned upon at any given moment.

“When power [he says] is cemented by good-will, and the interest of all who join in a war is the same, then men are willing to share the labour, to endure the misfortunes, and to stand fast. But when a man has become strong, as Philip has done, by a grasping and wicked policy, the first excuse, the least stumble, throws him from his seat and dissolves the alliance. It is impossible, men of Athens, utterly impossible, to acquire power that will last, by unrighteousness, by perjury, and by falsehood. Such power holds out for a moment or for a brief hour; it blossoms brightly, perhaps, with fair hopes; but time detects the fraud, and the flower falls withered about its stem. In a house or a ship or any other structure it is the foundations that must be strongest; and no less, I believe, must the principles which are the foundation of men's actions be those of truth and righteousness. Such qualities are not to be seen in the acts of Philip today”.

In the later speeches against Philip we find little remaining of this fine faith.

But the orator's application of these principles was not a happy one. For the picture which follows of the disaffection of Philip's followers, and of the incompetence of the warriors who surrounded him (if not of their dissoluteness), must be greatly overdrawn, even though it purports to be based on first-hand evidence. There can also be little doubt that the representation which he gave of Philip's condition was ill-judged, for it is never wise to set too low a value on an enemy, and Demosthenes may even have contributed to the failure of his own object, by encouraging the People (contrary to his custom) to think too lightly of their danger. They were not at all unlikely to seize on this part of his Speech and neglect the rest.

Demosthenes next turns upon the Athenians themselves the blame for the misconduct of their generals, whom they would not supply with the means to carry on the war, and who therefore resorted to actions which roused the virtuous indignation of the citizens who sat at home at ease. He demands once more (as the only solution of the difficulty) that the citizens shall go on active service in person, and shall contribute funds in proportion to their wealth; and further that they shall reform their behaviour in the Assembly and listen impartially to the various counsels given to them, in order that they may choose the best. "You used, men of Athens, to pay taxes by Boards; today you conduct your politics by Boards. On either side there is an orator as leader, and a general under him,"—the reference is probably to Chares and Charidemus, who were respectively patronized by rival groups, —"and for the Three Hundred, there are those who come to shout. This system you must give up; you must even now become your own masters; you must give to all their share in discussion, in speech and action." The Second Olynthiac goes beyond the First in the hint which it contains of a reform of the taxation-system, by which all, without exception, should be obliged to contribute in proportion to their income; in the proposal (repeated from the First Philippic) that the citizens should serve in the army in relays, until all had served; and in the suggestion that an embassy should be sent to make common cause with the discontented Thessalians. But none of these suggestions was carried out; there was little or no improvement in the attitude either of the dominant party or of the People towards the war; and about  this time Chares was recalled to take his trial upon the charges preferred by his enemies, and was not, it would seem, immediately replaced.

Philip now began a series of attacks upon the towns of the Chalcidic League. Among the first to suffer was Stageira, the birthplace of Aristotle, which was razed to the ground. (Its restoration was permitted many years later upon the intercession of the philosopher.) His operations, however, seem to have been interrupted by the necessity of reducing the Thessalians to order. They had grown restive, as we have already seen. Peitholaus, one of the dynasty expelled from Pherae had returned; the fortification of Magnesia by Philip's generals had been interfered with; and the Pheraeans had resolved to demand from Philip the restoration of Pagasae, and to refuse him the enjoyment for the future of their harbour and market dues. In consequence of this, Philip once more expelled Peitholaus, and took steps to quell any tendency to insubordination, whether by force or by those friendly assurances which he knew so well how to give and to break.

In the course of the summer, probably as soon as Philip's operations in Chalcidice began, the Olynthians again appealed to Athens for help. In response to the appeal Charidemus was transferred from the Hellespont to Chalcidice, with eighteen ships and a mercenary force consisting of four thousand light infantry and 150 cavalry. At first his conduct of the war appeared to promise success. He overran Pallene (one of the three promontories of the Chalcidic peninsula, already invaded by Philip), and devastated Bottiaea, a district of Macedonia south of the river Ly­ias. But the promise came to nothing, through Charidemus' own fault; for instead of prosecuting the campaign further he gave himself up to the grossest debauchery, and even demanded from the Olynthian Council the means to satisfy his lusts.

Nevertheless the temporary success of Charidemus may have caused some elation in Athens, and in the debate in which Demosthenes' Third Olynthiac oration was delivered most of the speakers appear to have talked light-heartedly of wreaking vengeance upon Philip. It is probable that the special subject of the debate was the financial provision to be made for the operations in aid of Olynthus; the date which seems most likely is the autumn of 349. Though the orator repeats briefly some of the points of the earlier Speeches (emphasizing the discredit attaching to Athens, and the danger of allowing the war to be carried into Attica), his main object is now to urge the necessity of setting free the money which at present passed into the festival-fund, and of using it for the purposes of the war. The probable nature of the difficulty has already been explained. Demosthenes' words leave no doubt that Eubulus and his party had succeeded, by means of a comparatively recent law, in giving fresh security to the distributions of festival-money. No motion to use that money for the war would be legal, until the law in question had been repealed; and the repeal of the law could only be effected by the Nomothetae, the Legislative Commission appointed out of the jurors for the year, to which the making and unmaking of laws was entrusted.

The danger of attempting to secure the desired end by any more direct means was illustrated by the fate of Apollodorus, who about this time proposed a resolution in the Council (and subsequently brought it before the Assembly) that the Assembly should decide whether the surplus funds at the disposal of the administration should go to the festival-fund or to the military chest. According to the account given in the Speech against Neaera (the work of an unknown contemporary of Demosthenes), no one in the Assembly voted against the proposal; and though this is probably an exaggeration, the Assembly doubtless approved warmly of the proposal. But Apollodorus was indicted by Stephanus for the illegality of his decree, and was fined a talent. We do not know what the precise relations between Demosthenes and Apollodorus at this time were. It is clear, however, that their policy in regard to the festival-money was identical, but that Demosthenes was more careful than Apollodorus to go to work in a legal manner.

In the Third Olynthiac he demands the appointment of a Legislative Commission, and further requests that the first step shall be taken by those who were responsible for the mischievous law. He also demands the repeal of certain laws with regard to military service, which gave encouragement to malingerers, and took the heart out of patriotic citizens. He goes on to insist with greater emphasis than ever upon the need of personal service, and of such a reorganization of the financial system as would require every citizen to render his duty to the State, according to his age and capacity, before becoming entitled to any share in the public funds. We do not know if this proposal was embodied in any formal motion; if it was, it was not carried; and certainly no Legislative Commission was appointed. But the words in which Demosthenes outlines the kind of reorganization which he has in view are sufficiently remarkable.

"What?" some one will ask, "do you suggest that we should work for our money?" I do, men of Athens; and I propose a system, for immediate enforcement, which will embrace all alike; so that each, while receiving his share of the public funds, may supply whatever service the State requires of him. If we can remain at peace, then a man will do better to stay at home, free from the necessity of doing anything discreditable through poverty. But if a situation like the present occurs, then, supported by these same sums, he will serve loyally in person, in defence of his country. If he is beyond the age for military service, then let him take, in his place among the rest, that which he now receives irregularly and without doing any service, and let him act as an overseer and manager of business that must be done. In short, without adding or subtracting more than a small sum, and only removing the want of system, my plan reduces the State to order, making your receipt of payment, your service in the army or the courts, and your performance of any duty which the age of each of you allows, and the occasion requires, all part of one and the same system. But it has been no part of my proposal that we should assign the due of those who act to those who do nothing; that we should be idle ourselves and enjoy our leisure helplessly, listening to tales of victories won by somebody's mercenaries; for that is what happens now. Not that I blame one who is doing some part of your duty for you; but I require you to do for yourselves the things for which you honour others, and not to abandon the position which your fathers won through many a glorious peril, and bequeathed to you”.

It may be that such a proposal had no chance of success; and modern critics have spoken contemptuously of Demosthenes' unpractical and fanciful schemes of reform. Yet we cannot but feel that the history of Athens would have been the poorer, if no one had set forth a policy worthy of the great traditions of the city. It is true that idealism is easier for the Opposition than for those who are responsible for the detailed working out of practical measures. Yet it is plain that it required no small courage in Demosthenes to speak in this tone. Those who associate him with vulgar demagogues need to remember that on this occasion Demosthenes was opposing not merely the dominant party, but the whole force of popular desire; for, so far as the festival-money was concerned, Eubulus and the People were entirely at one. Consequently, he tried to make the People realize the wrong done to them by the politicians who spoke to please them, and effected their own ends by flattering the desires of the multitude; and he repeats with little alteration some of the passages which he had already used in composing the Speech against Aristocrates. The contrast between the spirit of the great statesmen of Athens in old days and that of his own opponents is drawn in a passage which is too long for quotation, but is one of the most impressive in all his speeches.

 

In 348 Philip made his appearance again in Chalcidice with a large army, and continued the work of conquest. One after another the towns fell into his hands; corruption and treachery did his work even more effectively than force. Mecyberna, the port of Olynthus itself, distant less than three miles from the city, and Torone, the chief town of the Sithonian peninsula, were betrayed, and he took them without having to strike a blow. At last he threw off all pretence. Hitherto he had continued to profess friendly intentions towards Olynthus; but when he was within five miles of the city, he suddenly told the Olynthians that there were only two alternatives—either they must cease to live in Olynthus, or he to live in Macedonia. Once more the Olynthians appealed to Athens, begging for a force, not of mercenaries, but of citizens. The Athenians were at last roused; but they were in great difficulties; for, owing to the intrigues of Philip in Euboea, they found themselves involved in hostilities with their former allies in that island. It was, however, determined that Chares should go to the relief of Olynthus with a citizen force of two thousand heavy infantry and three hundred cavalry. But Chares had not yet passed the public examination of his conduct in his former expedition to Olynthus, in reference to which a trial upon charges brought by Cephisodotus hung over his head; and he demanded that the matter should be settled before he went. Cephisodotus complained that Chares was making the demand with his hand on the throat of the People; but it may be taken as certain that no accusation was allowed to stand in the way of his departure, and he sailed. Unhappily he was hindered by the stormy wind which blows for some  weeks in the summer from the north over the Aegean; and before he could arrive at Olynthus, the city had fallen by treachery. It had held out bravely against repeated assaults by Philip's army, and had inflicted heavy losses upon it. But in the end Lasthenes, who had been given the command of the Olynthian cavalry, betrayed them on the field, in conjunction with Euthycrates; and with their betrayal all was lost.

About the month of August, 348, Philip entered Olynthus. By his orders the inhabitants (among whom a number of Athenian citizens were captured) were sold as slaves; and with cruel cynicism the traitor Euthycrates was appointed to determine the price to be paid for each. Philip's step­brothers Arrhidaeus and Menelaus were taken and put to death. The conqueror made large presents of captives and spoil to his friends and supporters; and not long afterwards Eschines described how he had met the Arcadian Atrestidas travelling home from Macedonia with a large body of women and children given to him by Philip. The Olynthian territory was given principally to Macedonian chieftains, and large parts of Chalcidice were probably worked by their former inhabitants, sold as slaves, for the benefit of Philip. Among the friends of Philip who profited by his distribution of the lands taken from the allies of Athens were (according to Demosthenes) both Eschines and Philocrates, of whom much more will be heard shortly. By the time that Philip's work was finished, thirty-two Chalcidic towns had been annihilated, and that (Demosthenes tells us) with such savagery that a few years afterwards no one could have told that their sites had ever been inhabited. Most of them were never restored; and Appian, writing in the second century after Christ, says that no trace remained of them except the foundations of the temples. Even if, as some modern writers assert, Demosthenes somewhat exaggerated the calamity for rhetorical effect, there can still be no real doubt of the sweeping nature of the destruction inflicted by the conqueror upon this unhappy region. Those who could derived some satisfaction from the fact that when the traitors had done their work, they were cast aside by Philip, who knew them too well to trust them.

The Athenians gave a home and the privileges of citizenship to those fugitives from Olynthus who made good their escape, and tried to quiet their consciences by passing resolutions of strong condemnation against the traitors. But the prospect of the final loss of all hope of recovering Amphipolis (for this was a necessary consequence of Philip's victory) cannot have been easy to face. Philip, on the other hand, celebrated his victory by holding a festival in honour of the Olympian Zeus, with dramatic performances to which he summoned all the most celebrated actors of Greece, feasting his friends and making presents to them with lavish generosity.

We must now recur to the unexpected crisis in Euboea, which was at least a partial cause of the failure of the Athenians to render effective aid to Olynthus. We saw that the influence of Athens in Euboea had been restored by the brilliant campaign of Timotheus about the year 357, when the Athenians liberated the people of Euboea at their own request from the domination of Thebes; and in 352 Demosthenes mentioned Menestratus of Eretria as a ruler friendly to Athens. But very soon after this Philip had begun to feel his way in the island. In the First Philippic Demosthenes quoted a letter which Philip had sent to the Euboeans, though its purport has not come down to us. It appears probable, however, that he went to work by encouraging the establishment of tyrants in the important cities of the island, and by supporting them with money and men. In Eretria, in 348, the ruler, who was favourable to Athens, was Plutarchus; and a rising against him was led by Cleitarchus, who was probably now (as he was later) in close touch with Philip. Plutarchus accordingly sent to Athens to ask for aid. Demosthenes strongly opposed the granting of this request, desiring doubtless that the undivided forces of the city should be employed to save Olynthus from Philip. His action in so doing has been much criticized, on the ground that Euboea was far nearer to Athens than Olynthus, and that a hostile power there could be a very dangerous foe. But it is quite possible that he was right. The only chance of defeating Philip was to strain every nerve, and to let no other call stand in the way. Experience had shown that a short and sharp campaign might suffice to reduce Euboea; and this might, without inordinate risk, be postponed until the Olynthian crisis was over.

However this may be, Plutarchus had a powerful helper in Athens in the wealthy Meidias, the friend of Eubulus and the enemy of Demosthenes, whom he actually accused of fomenting trouble in Euboea in order to injure Plutarchus, the friend of Athens. Owing to the influence of Eubulus and Meidias, it was resolved to send assistance to Plutarchus; Phocion, a brave soldier and a member of Eubulus' party, but trusted by all alike for his blunt and outspoken honesty, crossed with a force of infantry and cavalry about the month of February, 348, and Meidias went with him as a cavalry officer.

The detailed history of the expedition is not very certain. But it appears that some of the cavalry were transferred to Olynthus, and that Phocion unwisely sent home the rest of them, thinking that they were not wanted. With the remainder of the force Phocion took up a disadvantageous position near Tamynae, while Plutarchus encamped in the neighborhood. Here Phocion was beleaguered by Callias and Taurosthenes, two brothers who held sway over Chalcis, and of whom the former had obtained aid from Philip (probably in the form of troops serving under Philip's generals in Thessaly), and the latter had hired mercenaries who had previously been engaged in Phocis. Phocion was hardly pressed, and though he affected to think little of the desertions of the more frivolous of his soldiers, he sent to Athens for reinforcements. The Council at once ordered back the cavalry who had been sent home, and called for rich men to volunteer to be trierarchs, so heavy was the expenditure demanded at this time. Among the volunteers was Meidias himself. Before the reinforcements could leave Athens, an engagement had been forced upon Phocion at Tamynae by the action of Plutarchus, who marched out of camp to meet an attack of the enemy without waiting for Phocion. The Athenian cavalry, also too impatient to wait for Phocion, followed Plutarchus in some disorder. After very little fighting Plutarchus fled; and it was only by hard fighting that Phocion, having appeared on the field of battle, was able to win the day. Among those who were specially distinguished in the fight was Eschines, who was sent to take home the news of the victory. The conduct of Plutarchus was set down to treachery, and Phocion proceeded to expel him from Eretria, and to occupy the commanding fortress of Zaretra, while Callias took refuge with Philip.

On hearing of Phocion's victory, the Athenians had countermanded the reinforcements which they had voted; and Phocion was obliged to send a second message to ask that they should be despatched. Before they could leave Athens, the Dionysiac festival took place (in March, 348), and Demosthenes acted as choregus on behalf of the Pandionid tribe, having volunteered to undertake the expenditure and returned from the army in Euboea, where he had been serving, in order to fulfill the duties of his office. In the midst of the festival, to which a certain religious sanctity was attached, Meidias entered the theatre in a violent manner, and struck him a number of blows on the head with his fist. This outrageous act was only the last of a series of attempts to interfere with Demosthenes in the discharge of his duties. For Meidias had already tried to prevent the members of the chorus which Demosthenes furnished from obtaining the usual exemption from military service; he had broken into the house of the goldsmith whom Demosthenes employed, and had damaged the gold crowns and gold-embroidered robes which were being made for the chorus; he had corrupted the chorus-trainer and even the archon who presided at the Dionysia; he had tried to induce the judges at the festival to promise to vote against Demosthenes' chorus; and he had blocked up the entrances by which the chorus was to march into the theatre. It is not surprising that though Demosthenes had secured the services of the best flute-player in Athens, Telephanes by name, and Telephanes had done his best to replace the chorus-trainer, the prize went to another.

On the day following the Dionysia, the Assembly met in the theatre, to consider (as was customary) any matters that arose out of the festival. Demosthenes laid a formal complaint against Meidias, and the Assembly passed a vote condemning the latter's act, and so strengthened Demosthenes' hands with a view to his intended prosecution of Meidias before a law-court. We shall see later on what the issue of this affair was. The prosecution of Demosthenes by Euctemon, the friend of Meidias, for desertion in returning from Euboea was not persisted in. It was indeed too absurd to have a chance of success.

After the Dionysia the troops which Phocion had asked for were sent, and the cavalry encamped (as before) at Argura. (Meidias however stayed with his ship.) In the course of the summer Phocion was succeeded in the command by Molossus. The recall of Phocion is possibly explained by the fact which Plutarch mentions immediately before it, that Phocion, after occupying Zaretra, had set free all the prisoners who were of Hellenic nationality, fearing the orators at Athens, lest they should force the People in anger to take some cruel action against the prisoners—an action at once creditable to Phocion's good feel­ng, and significant of his well-known contempt for the People and their leaders. However this may be, his successor mismanaged the war, and was himself taken prisoner. Before the summer was over, peace was made upon terms disadvantageous to Athens. The Euboean towns obtained their independence, and the Athenians cherished some ill-feeling against them for several years. Carystus alone remained a member of the Athenian alliance. A particular cause of annoyance lay in the fact that Plutarchus, when pressed for payment by some of his mercenaries, had given them some Athenian soldiers as security, and these the Athenians had actually been obliged to ransom at heavy cost.

The Euboean war may temporarily have cast a shadow over the popularity of Eubulus. His cousin Hegesileos, who had been second in command to Phocion and was accused of abetting the proceedings of Plutarchus, was tried and condemned, and Eubulus did not venture to appear in his defence.

The events of the year 348 were thus disastrous for Athens. Not only was Philip's power now consolidated down to the southern borders of Thessaly, but Athens herself was practically isolated. The Euboeans, her most powerful allies, were lost to her; her settlers in Lemnos, Imbros, and other islands were exposed to the attacks of Philip's captains; and if Philip made his way to the Hellespont, it was doubtful whether she could oppose him with any chance of success.

To assign the responsibility for the course which events had been allowed to take is no easy task. There can be little doubt that Demosthenes was right in seeing signs of grave moral decay in the Athenian People as a whole. Their love of pleasure and their indifference (except in sentiment) to the national honour, so long as the festival-money was not interfered with, did not exist only in his imagination; and when all allowance is made for the excuse—it was hardly more—afforded by the religious character of the festivals, we cannot but feel that the People had primarily themselves to thank for their disasters. It was the same moral causes, reinforced by the unwillingness of many to leave their business, that accounted in a great measure for the refusal of personal service in the army. The professional soldier might be a more efficient fighter, but professional soldiers were ruinously expensive; and the better morale of the citizen-soldier fighting for his own country probably went some way towards compensating for his technical deficiencies; the hard-won success of Phocion's citizen-hoplites at Tamynae showed that such a force was not to be despised. Now and then, in a moment of excitement, the citizens would rise and take the field; but their enthusiasm was short-lived, and they would not face a fully-considered system of regular service in relays, such as Demos­thenes advocated.

It is not worthwhile to attempt to apportion the blame more precisely between the People and their leaders. Eubulus' policy came to shipwreck over foreign and military affairs, largely because funds were not forthcoming for active warfare, however well he had provided for defensive measures; and funds were not forthcoming because he either would not or dared not curtail the festival-fund, nor would he draw, as he might have done by means of a war-tax, upon the wealth of the richer classes who were his principal supporters. A few volunteer trierarchs were a poor substitute for the contributions which the considerable private wealth of the citizens of Athens might have provided. But the measures of a political leader necessarily depend to a great extent upon what he can expect his followers to consent to; and the defects of the policy of Eubulus largely arose out of those of both the richer and the poorer classes; for the one would not make great sacrifices, and the other would not give up the distributions; and it was doubtless his misfortune that he was given no time to carry out his policy of retrenchment and the gradual building up of a navy, but was confronted by a combination of circumstances which proved too strong for him and for Athens. The conjunction of the Euboean difficulty with the Olynthian crisis was cunningly contrived by_Philip, and rendered the efforts of the Athenians ineffectual just at the moment when they were preparing to throw some real energy into the assistance which they gave to the beleaguered-town. The strain upon them was great; and though it might probably have been met by means which they did not see fit to adopt, neither politicians nor people proved equal to dealing with the situation. It is to the credit of Demosthenes that throughout these years he represented fearlessly the higher side of the national spirit as he understood it, and attempted to revive in his countrymen what, in spite of themselves, he believed to be their true character.

Before closing this account of the first period of the war with Philip, it will be convenient to narrate the sequel to an incident which has already been described, the assault of Meidias upon Demosthenes at the Dionysia of 348. Demosthenes, as we have seen, encouraged by the vote which the Assembly passed in condemnation of Meidias' misconduct, gave notice that he would prosecute him before a jury. Even after this, Meidias proceeded to commit further acts of annoyance against Demosthenes, and opposed (though unsuccessfully) his selection as a Councillor for the year 347-6, by bringing false accusations against him at the scrutiny to which, like all other candidates for office, Demosthenes had to submit. At the meeting of the Assembly at which Meidias' conduct at the Dionysia had been considered, Eubulus, in spite of Meidias' entreaties, had refused to rise and speak in his defence. But it became known later that he intended to support Meidias at the trial; and it also became apparent that no public speaker would give his aid to Demosthenes. That the influence of Eubulus with an Athenian jury was very great is proved by the pains which Demosthenes took to counteract it both in the Speech against Meidias and in his prosecution of Eschines. Meidias himself was also a person of no small influence, and held a number of offices which carried with them some importance and dignity, however reprehensible he might have been in his performance of the duties attached to them. Demosthenes therefore may have felt that his chances of winning his case, in the existing condition of public feeling, were small, for the popular indignation at the insult to a choregus had doubtless soon worn off; and Meidias' friends appear to have intimated that Meidias was ready to pay adequate compensation, if the prosecution were dropped. Accordingly, before the case was actually brought into court, Demosthenes, after repeatedly rejecting all overtures, at last came to terms with Meidias (probably late in the year 347), and accepted half a talent from him in settlement of his grievance. It is possible that he was partly influenced by political considerations; for we shall see shortly that in the year 347-6 Demosthenes acted in harmony with Eubulus and his party in forwarding the negotiations for the Peace with Philip, which had now become necessary; and he may have been glad, by abandoning his suit against Meidias, to avoid creating difficulties, and also, it might be, imperiling his own position in Athens.

The speech which Demosthenes composed for the prosecution of Meidias survives, though there are indications that it did not receive a final revision, and it was probably not published by Demosthenes himself. It is a vigorous attack upon the whole life and career of Meidias (including unhappily some of those fictions about the parentage of the accused which seem to have appealed to Athenian juries). The orator repeatedly insists that the insult was less to himself than to the People (who had already expressed their indignation), and recalls, one after another, the acts of violence and outrage of which he alleges Meidias to have been guilty. He deals with parallel cases in the past—both those from which Meidias might hope to draw some arguments in his defence, and those which formed precedents for his condemnation. He disparages the vaunted public services of Meidias, and compares them with his own. After employing every argument which can blacken the guilt of Meidias himself, he attacks Eubulus and the other supporters of the accused, and calls upon the jury to vindicate the laws, and to make Meidias an example to all other offenders.

The Speech follows the obvious lines, but is powerfully written in a tone of warm indignation, varied here and there by pathos, when he recounts the calamities of Meidias' former victims, and even by a touch of something like humour, as when he imitates Meidias' own manner of addressing the People, or when he sums up his consideration of the services of Meidias to the State.

“Where then is his brilliant record? What do his services to the State and his magnificent outlay amount to? I cannot see, unless we are to think of the house that he has built at Eleusis—so tall that it darkens the whole neighborhood; or the pair of white horses from Sicyon which takes his wife to the Mysteries or wherever she pleases; or the three or four footmen who accompany him as he sweeps through the market-place, talking about his bowls and drinking-horns and wine-cups in a loud voice, so that the passers-by may hear”.

The attitude which Demosthenes takes up—that of a champion of the rights of the democracy against the vulgar and insolent rich—is perhaps a little overdone; but the portrait of Meidias is vigorously drawn, and takes its place worthily beside those of other villains depicted in Greek and Roman oratory.