VII

THE FIRST EMBASSY TO PHILIP

EVEN before the actual fall of Olynthus it must have become plain to most clear-sighted politicians that Athens was not in a position to carry on the war against Philip with success. She had let slip the opportunity which she might have taken in 349, of throwing herself with vigour into the defence of Olynthus, and in 348, when the Athenians realized somewhat more clearly the gravity of the situation, it was too late; for the movements in Euboea led them to divide their forces, and neither their energy, nor the funds which they chose to consider available, were sufficient for the double task. The successful continuance of the struggle with Philip being thus impossible, the only course which sensible men could take was to come to terms with him.

Philip also was anxious for a suspension of hostilities. Athens was not indeed, from his point of view, so serious a foe as the Athenians liked to believe, and he could well afford to have patience before he proceeded to bring his rivalry with her to an issue. At the same time she was strong enough at sea to make the carrying out of his more immediate objects much more difficult than it would otherwise have been. Her action at Thermopylae in 352, and the determination which she had shown, even under the leadership of Eubulus, to maintain her position on the shore of the Hellespont, were sufficient evidence of this; and it would be easier for him both to advance his power in Greece itself and to confirm and extend his sway in Thrace, if he could come to some such arrangement with Athens as would get rid of, or at least delay and hamper, her interference with his movements. Further, he was suffering from the closing of his ports by Athenian ships, and the raids which Athenian commanders made upon his coasts. Some have even thought that he had already in view the project of uniting all Hellas under his sway, in order to proceed to the conquest of the East; and that for this purpose he desired the co-operation of the Athenian fleet, which was as superior to his own, as his land forces were to those of Athens. However this may be (and there is no evidence upon the point), in the summer of 348, when the envoys from the Eubooean towns went to Athens to discuss the terms of the Peace to be made between Athens and the Euboeans, Philip authorized them to say that he too desired to come to an understanding.'

Shortly afterwards an Athenian named Phrynon was captured by Philip's ships in the course of a raid, during the time (so he asserted) of the Olympian Truce, when, according to Greek custom, hostilities should have been suspended. He was ransomed, and on his return to Athens requested the Athenians to appoint an envoy to go on his behalf to Philip, and to ask for the restoration of the sum paid for his freedom. Ctesiphon was sent, and returned with a message from Philip stating that he had entered upon the war with Athens against his will, and would still be glad if it could be terminated. He added other friendly expressions; the message was welcomed by the People with enthusiasm, and a vote of thanks to Ctesiphon was passed.

Immediately afterwards, Philocrates carried a decree that permission should be given to Philip to send envoys to Athens to discuss terms of peace. Thereupon Lycinus (representing, according to Aschines, certain interested persons, who had stood in the way of a similar proposal of Philocrates before the return of Ctesiphon) impeached Philocrates for the alleged illegality of the decree, and demanded the infliction of a fine of one hundred talents. Philocrates, who was ill at the time of the trial, was defended by Demosthenes, "in a speech which lasted all day," and was acquitted. Lycinus failed to obtain a fifth part of the votes of the jury, and so became himself liable to a heavy penalty.

The action of Demosthenes in defending Philocrates may be explained in one of two ways, according as the trial of Philocrates is supposed to have taken place before or after the fall of Olynthus. If Demosthenes defended the proposer of negotiations for peace even before Olynthus had fallen, we can only suppose that he had already seen the hopelessness of continuing the struggle for the present, and had had the courage to act upon his changed conviction. On the other hand, it is improbable that he would really have consented to abandon Olynthus in the hour of her greatest need; and it is much more likely that the trial of Philocrates did not take place until some time after Olynthus had been taken. For Phrynon can hardly have returned to Athens before the end of July, 348; some time must have elapsed between his return and that of Ctesiphon; and also between the proposal of Philocrates and his trial. It is probable therefore that the trial did not take place until some weeks at least—possibly months—after the fall of Olynthus, and by this time, as we shall see, Demosthenes was certainly convinced of the necessity of peace, and could defend Philocrates without inconsistency.

The capture of Olynthus and Philip's treatment of the inhabitants and (together with them) of the Athenians whom he found in the city, caused a momentary revulsion of feeling in Athens against the proposed arrangement with Philip; and even Eubulus himself and his supporters were carried away by it. Eubulus addressed the Assembly in very strong terms in regard to Philip, praying (Demosthenes tells us) that perdition might seize him, and proposed to send embassies throughout the Greek world and "almost to the Red Sea," with the object of uniting all the Hellenes in opposition to Philip, and of summoning a congress for the purpose. These proposals were supported in speeches of a highly patriotic tone, and among those who spoke in their favour was Eschines—a man of somewhat humble birth, who had been first a schoolmaster, then an actor, and then a clerk in government offices, until he came into prominence as a supporter of Eubulus. He was a man of great talent, and a ready extempore speaker; and the magnificent voice with which nature had endowed him gave him a great advantage when addressing a people so impressionable as the Athenians. On the present occasion, Demosthenes tells us, Eschines quoted the decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles—the heroes of the Persian wars—and the oath of allegiance taken by the young Athenian soldier on assuming his armour. He doubtless pictured Athens as once more taking the leadership of a Panhellenic confederacy, as she had done in the Persian wars.

The embassies were sent. Eschines himself went to Arcadia, where Philip had been intriguing with some of the leading politicians, and had evidently found favour; for the Athenian party among the Arcadians had already sent representatives to Athens through Ischander. On his return, Demosthenes says, Eschines reported to the Assembly the long and noble speeches, which, he said, he had delivered on your behalf before the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis, in reply to Philip's spokesman, Hieronymus; and he described at length the criminal wrong that was done not only to their own several countries, but to all Hellas, by men who took bribes and received money from Philip. Many a time in the course of his speech he called Philip barbarian and devil and he reported the delight of the Arcadians at the thought that Athens was now waking up and attending to affairs.

He also gave an indignant account of the fate of the captured Olynthians, illustrating it by that of the women and children carried off to Arcadia by Atrestidas, and narrating how he had been moved to tears by the sight, and by the thought of the unhappy condition of the Greek world, in which such cruelties could go unpunished.

The embassies, however, entirely failed to secure their object. None of the southern Greek States seem to have imagined at present that Philip's growing power involved any danger to themselves; and none of them had reason to be so much interested in the welfare of Athens as to join in a league for her benefit. It has indeed been suggested that Eubulus did not expect any result from these missions to the Greek States; that they were only sent in order to convince the People, who were momentarily in a militant mood, of the hopelessness of continuing the war, by demonstrating the isolation of Athens; and that the speeches of himself and Eschines (both at Athens; and at Megalopolis) were nothing but a piece of elaborate acting. Fortunately it is not necessary to ascribe such motives in order to explain their action. It is far more probable that the state of public feeling immediately after the fall of Olynthus was such that Eubulus resolved to make a desperate effort to bring about the Panhellenic coalition, which alone could offer to Athens the least chance of defeating Philip at that time. When this attempt failed, all parties alike must have seen the inevitableness of a Peace; and Demosthenes himself acted in concert with Philocrates in forwarding the negotiations, though, in the light of his subsequent conduct, we can have little doubt that he regarded the Peace only as an armistice, during which Athens might recover her strength and prepare herself to return to the struggle with renewed vigour.

Among the Athenians who had been taken prisoners in Olynthus were Iatrocles and Eucratus. (The latter is otherwise unknown; the former appears again as an ambassador to Philip.) The relatives of these men supplicated the Assembly in solemn form, laying an olive-branch upon the altar and beseeching the People to take steps to obtain the liberation of the captives; and they were supported by Philocrates and Demosthenes. In answer to their appeal, with which many others whose friends had been captured must have sympathized, the actor Aristodemus, who was on familiar terms with Philip in consequence of his professional visits to the Macedonian court, was sent to negotiate for their release. Another actor, Neoptolemus, appears to have accompanied him, or at least to have travelled to Macedonia about the same time. Iatrocles was set at liberty without ransom, and, on arriving at Athens, spoke of Philip's good-will towards the city. Aristodemus did not return for some time, owing (as Eschines tells us) to some matter of business, though others have supposed (less probably) that he was detained by Philip as a kind of hostage, when he heard of the embassies sent from Athens to the other Greek States. The Athenians became impatient at his absence, and at last—probably late in the summer of 347—the Council passed a resolution ordering him to return. He obeyed, and in his report to the Assembly again declared Philip's good-will to Athens, and added that Philip would gladly form an alliance with her. Demosthenes, who was a member of the Council for the year 347-6, and apparently an influential member, proposed that the Council should not only pass the vote of thanks which was customarily given by the Council to a returning ambassador, but should also award him a crown.

It was about this time that a fresh crisis occurred in the Sacred War, in consequence of which a serious complication was introduced into the relations between Athens and Philip. The war had been dragging on indecisively. The Phocians retained possession of the important Boeotian towns of Orchomenus, Coroneia, and Corsiae, as well as of the places which gave them command of the Pass of Thermopylae—Alponus, Thronium, and Nicaea. But the Delphian treasury was exhausted by the expenses of the war; and it was found that some of the Phocian leaders had been enriching themselves out of the temple treasures. Phalaecus was deprived of his command, and replaced by Democrates, Callias, and Sophanes; but since his deposition only divided the forces, and the mercenaries still remained faithful to him, he was restored to the generalship, though the strife of the factions was not healed. At this point the Thebans and Thessalians, still unable to conquer their enemy, applied for help to Philip, in the name of the Amphictyonic Council. Philip appears either to have postponed giving an answer, or at most to have sent a few soldiers, wishing to reduce the Thebans to a lower depth of humiliation before coming to terms with them—so at least Diodorus says. The Phocians appealed to Athens, and the Athenians promised to help them. (The promise must have been made before Philip had definitely given his adhesion to the Thebans; it would hardly have been possible to give it afterwards without breaking off the negotiations for peace with Philip.) The Phocian envoys offered to place the strongholds commanding Thermopylae in the hands of the Athenians, if they would send a force to take them over; and Proxenus, the Athenian admiral, was ordered to proceed to Thermopylae at once. At the same time it was resolved to equip a fleet of fifty ships, and to call upon all citizens under thirty years of age, who were liable to service, to join the expedition.

But when Proxenus appeared at Thermopylae, Phalaecus dismissed him in an insulting manner; and Archidamus, who came from Sparta in response to an appeal from the Phocian authorities, was similarly treated. For so strong was the dissension in the Phocian ranks that Phalaecus refused to acknowledge the acts of the rival faction (by which, it seems, the messages to Athens and Sparta had been sent); and he also insulted the heralds who came from Athens, in accordance with custom, to announce the religious truce at the season of the Eleusinian mysteries (September, 347), and imprisoned the envoys who had carried the appeal for help to Athens. Proxenus appears to have returned to his former station at Oreus, and the fifty ships which had been voted were of course not sent, though they lay ready in harbour in case of need. For the Phocian people as a whole, the conduct of Phalaecus proved fatal, as will appear hereafter.

Philip seems not to have committed himself for some time to any definite step; for as late as the spring of the next year, all the parties interested appear to have been quite uncertain of his intentions. He did, however, send his general Parmenio into Thessaly, to intervene in a dispute between the towns of Pharsalus and Halus in the interest of the former; and the treatment of Halus, as well as that of the Phocians, became a disputed question in connection with the peace-negotiations, to which we may now return.

Not long after the beginning of 346, Philocrates proposed a decree in the Assembly, that ten ambassadors should be sent to Philip to discuss the question of peace, as well as other matters that were of interest to both parties, and to request him to send plenipotentiaries to Athens, with whom peace might be finally concluded. Demosthenes was nominated one of the ten by Philocrates, Eschines by Nausicles; and as the assistance of Aristodemus upon the embassy was desirable, owing to his previous friendly relations with Philip, Demosthenes moved a resolution in the Council that messengers should be sent to the towns in which Aristodemus had professional engagements, asking that he might be excused from fulfilling them. The other members of the embassy were Tatrocles, Ctesiphon, and Phrynon (all of whom had, like Aristodemus, experienced Philip's favour), Philocrates himself, Nausicles, Dercylus, and Cimon. With them went Aglaocreon of Tenedos, as the representative of the allies of Athens.

Up to this point there is no serious doubt as to the facts (for although within a year or two, when the Peace had come to be regarded with disgust at Athens, both Demosthenes and Eschines were eager to disclaim all connection with the inception of the negotiations, there can be no question that both were in fact prominently concerned in it). But from this point onwards the two orators—and they are virtually our only authorities—give quite different accounts of the facts at every stage; and neither of them scrupled to distort the truth when it suited their purpose, each being anxious to appear to have had nothing to do with Philocrates or with the steps which led to results so unwelcome to the Athenians as those which followed the Peace proved to be. Much therefore remains uncertain.

The discrepancy between the two accounts of the embassies begins even before the departure of the ambassadors from Athens. According to Demosthenes' story—told in 343, when he wished to convict Eschines of corruption, by proving that, having once been opposed to Philocrates, he had inexplicably altered his mind—Eschines came to him and suggested that they should act in concert during their mission, and should particularly keep an eye upon "that abominable and shameless man, Philocrates." To this story Eschines replied, with justice, that such a proposal would have been absurd and even impossible, when he knew that Demosthenes had been supporting Philocrates from the outset and had been nominated a member of the embassy by him. Eschines adds that Demosthenes (who especially associated with Aglaocreon and Iatrocles) made himself intolerable to his colleagues on the journey; and that when the ambassadors were discussing what they should say to Philip, and Cimon expressed his apprehension lest Philip should get the better of them in argument, Demosthenes boasted that he had an inexhaustible stream of arguments; and that what he had to say about the Athenian claim to Amphipolis and the origin of the war was so convincing that he would be able to "sew up Philip's mouth with an unsoaked rush,"—to persuade Philip to restore Amphipolis, and to induce the Athenians to permit the return of Leosthenes, who had been banished from Athens for his misconduct of the war.

Whether this tale was true or not, the ambassadors lost no time on the journey. They did not even wait at Oreus for the herald who had been sent in advance to procure a safe-conduct, and who should have returned to meet them there; instead of doing so, they sailed at once and came to Halus, which was being besieged by Parmenio, Philip's general; passing thence through the Macedonian camp, they came to Pagas, and did not meet the herald till they reached Larissa. On their arrival at Pella, they were granted an interview by Philip, and addressed him in order of age, the last place being assigned to Demosthenes, as the youngest member of the mission.

Eschines (from whom we get our only report of the interview) describes his own speech at length, and tells how he recounted the services rendered by Athens in the past to Philip's house and to Philip himself, the earlier history of the struggle for Amphipolis, the legendary grounds for the Athenian claim to that town, and the acknowledgment of that claim by Philip's father Amyntas. If, he concluded, Philip based his own claim upon his capture of the town in war, it could be justified only if the war was a war against Athens—which Philip had never admitted; for if it was not, he had taken from the Amphipolitans a town which belonged not to them, but to Athens. We can imagine that Philip must have smiled inwardly at this academic harangue, which Eschines retails without any consciousness of the futility of addressing legendary and historical arguments to one so little likely to be swayed by such considerations. We do not know what the other envoys said; but at last it came to the turn of Demosthenes, and his colleagues, Eschines tells us, expected a grand fulfillment of his boasted intentions. But instead of rewarding their expectations, he broke down hopelessly from nervousness, forgot his notes, and lost the thread of his argument; and in spite of the kindly encouragement of Philip, who bade him not take his misfortune to heart as though he had broken down on the stage, he was utterly unable to proceed, and the interview was suspended.

When the ambassadors had retired, Demosthenes attacked Eschines angrily—we have still only Eschines' word for the story—and declared that he had mined the city and her allies; and, when he was asked for an explanation, demanded if Eschines had forgotten the exhaustion of the People and their intense desire for peace. "Or is it," he asked, "those fifty ships which have been voted, but will never be manned, that have made you so confident? For you have irritated Philip to such an extent by what you have said, that the result of the embassy is likely to be, not peace, but an interminable war." The meaning of this scene, if it ever took place, must be that Demosthenes was himself intensely anxious for peace, in view of the helpless condition of Athens at the moment, and thought that, by opening the question of Amphipolis, Eschines had spoiled all chance of it. (It may even have been this fear which led him to break down before Philip.) Eschines had no time to answer this attack before the herald recalled them to Philip's presence to hear his decision. Philip proceeded to reply to each of the ambassadors in order, referring with special emphasis to the arguments of Eschines. Eschines himself tells the story—but making no allusion to anything that had been said by Demosthenes. His friendly tone disproved the truth of Demosthenes' apprehensions, and Demosthenes was so mortified at being proved in the wrong that he lost control of himself, and even behaved badly at the complimentary feast to which Philip had invited the ambassadors. As to the substance of Philip's answer, we learn that Philip undertook not to attack the Chersonese before the Athenians had come to a decision in regard to the Peace; and the ambassadors took with them a letter from him, promising in general terms to confer great benefits on Athens if he were granted alliance as well as peace.

Demosthenes, according to Eschines' story, appears soon to have regretted his unfortunate conduct; and lest it should become known at Athens, he did his best on the way home to ingratiate himself with his colleagues, promising to assist them individually in their private needs and their public career, and lavishing fulsome praises upon the address of Eschines to Philip; and while they were all dining together at Larissa, he even laughed at himself for his breakdown, and spoke with admiration of Philip's ability. Eschines expressed his agreement, and Ctesiphon went so far as to say that he had never seen so charming a man as Philip. "Ah!" cried Demosthenes," neither of you would dare to speak of Philip in such terms to the People!" They declared that they would do so; and Demosthenes in turn declared that he would hold them to their promise, while at the same time he entreated Eschines to tell the People that "Demosthenes also had spoken in defence of the claim of Athens to Amphipolis." (It is clear that the People had not yet realized that the recovery of Amphipolis, however nearly it might touch their pride, was not practically possible; and though the ambassadors must have known it well enough, none of them was anxious to admit it publicly.)

The ambassadors must have re-entered Athens about the end of March, 346. They first announced the result of their mission to the Council; and the Council, on the motion of Demosthenes, who spoke in laudatory terms of his colleagues, and of Eschines in particular, decided to propose to the People that a crown of olive should be awarded to each of them, and that they should be invited (in accordance with custom) to a complimentary banquet in the Prytaneum—the Guildhall of Athens.

They next came before the Assembly, and spoke as had been arranged. Eschines and Ctesiphon used the language which Demosthenes had declared they would not dare to use, in praise of Philip's charm, his good memory, and his talents as a speaker; and Eschines described Philip as a thorough Hellene, and anything but a barbarian, as some called him. Eschines also tells us that he remembered Demosthenes' request, and told the Assembly that he had left it to Demosthenes to say anything that might have been passed over in regard to Amphipolis. But when last of all Demosthenes rose, he turned upon his colleagues (says Eschines), and rubbing his head and making his usual fantastic gestures, rallied them upon their garrulity and their compliments to Philip. "I will show you," he said, "how to report the result of an embassy. Read the resolution under which we were sent." The clerk read it. "Well," he said, "these were our instructions, and we have fulfilled them. Here is Philip's answer, and it is for you to discuss it." This businesslike brevity met with some applause, though some (Eschines says) exclaimed at its maliciousness. Demosthenes proceeded:

“Eschines thought Philip an able speaker; I did not. Any one else in the same position could have done nearly as well. Ctesiphon thought he had a glorious face; to me Aristodemus the actor is just as handsome. He was, they say, a good companion to drink wine with. Our colleague Philocrates was better. It is stated that an opportunity was left me of speaking about Amphipolis; but Eschines would rather have given me a share in his life-blood than in his argument. All this, in fact, is beside the point, and I propose simply that a safe-conduct be given to the herald who has come from Philip, and to the envoys who are about to proceed hither; that, when they have arrived, meetings of the Assembly be summoned for two days, to discuss the question of alliance as well as that of peace; and that, if you think we deserve it, a vote of thanks be passed to us for our services, and that we be invited to a banquet in the Prytaneum tomorrow”.

Demosthenes' mockery of his colleagues, if the scene really took place, was very unworthy of him; but he can hardly be blamed for proposing to carry out the ordinary formalities of Greek diplomacy, or for asking for the conventional expressions of approval from the Assembly; and his further motion, to give Philip's envoys seats of honour at the forth­coming Dionysiac festival was (like the banquet which he gave them) a natural civility, which his enemies afterwards misconstrued as evidence of disloyalty to his country.

The two meetings of the Assembly were fixed, on Demosthenes' motion, for the 18th and i9th of Elaphebolion—April 15th and 16th; and it was necessary, before any treaty could be made, that the situation should be discussed by the Synod representative of the allies of Athens, which was then meeting in the city. The Synod, according to Eschines, resolved to agree to peace upon such terms as the Assembly should decide; they said nothing of an alliance with Philip; but added a proposal that it should be lawful for any Greek State to become a party to the Peace within three months. The effect of the acceptance of this proposal would clearly have been to give the Phocians a chance of securing themselves against Philip and the Thebans, by joining in the Peace. They also suggested that the decision of the Assembly should be postponed until the envoys sent in the winter by Athens to the Greek States had returned; probably because they wished to discover whether the other States would be likely to favour such a general Peace; and at a later time Eschines accused Demosthenes of having hurried on the meetings of the Assembly, without waiting for the return of those envoys, and so having ruined the chance of a universal Peace. It is very probable that Demosthenes did not desire to risk the chance of any change of feeling in Athens, and that, seeing peace to be necessary, he thought it best to conclude it as soon as possible.

It appears to have been resolved on the motion of Demosthenes that the discussion in the Assembly should take place on the 18th of Elaphebolion, and the voting on the proposals made (but no speeches) on the 19th. At the first meeting, Philocrates proposed that alliance as well as peace should be made with Philip, but that the Phocians and Halus should be excluded from it. (The envoys sent by Philip—Antipater, Parmenio, and, probably, Eurylochus—may already have made it plain to Philocrates that Philip would not admit the Phocians, and no doubt the terms proposed were virtually dictated by Philip.) This proposal Eschines denounced in very vigorous language, declaring that he could not support it so long as a single Athenian remained alive. Instead of it, he upheld the proposal of the Synod of the allies, which would have given the Phocians and the people of Halus an opportunity of participating in the Peace, since it allowed three months during which any State might declare its adhesion to the treaty. Demosthenes also supported the allies' proposal, and the Assembly broke up under the impression that peace would certainly be made, but that for the alliance it would be better to wait for three months or so, in case a general arrangement should then seem desirable. On the next day, despite the motion which Demosthenes had carried in regard to the procedure, there was clearly considerable discussion as well as voting. But the two accounts of the proceedings are entirely different. Demosthenes claims to have spoken in favour of the resolution of the allies, and implies that he was opposed to the making of an alliance with Philip; he declares that the People would not even listen to Philocrates, who had proposed alliance as well as peace; but that Eschines rose and supported Philocrates, denouncing those who reminded the Athenians of the deeds of their forefathers in ancient days, and expressing his intention of proposing a law that the Athenians should assist no Hellenic people by whom they had not previously been assisted—meaning that in the present case they should not support the Phocians. Eschines, on the contrary, declares that he did not speak on the second day at all; and that the sentiments imputed to him by Demosthenes were a distortion of those which he uttered on the first day, in reply to inflammatory speeches by certain orators, who tried to prevent the making of peace at all, and pointed to the Propylaea and the Acropolis, and appealed to the memory of Salamis and the tombs and trophies of the Athenians of old. In answer to such fire­brands, Eschines declared, he had urged that while it was well to bear these great traditions in mind, it would also be well if the People were to imitate the wisdom of their forefathers, without falling into their errors and their unseasonable passion for strife; he had held up to them as a warning the disasters brought about by the rash policy of Cleophon in the latter part of the Peloponnesian War, and as an example the battles of Platae, Salamis, and Marathon. But as to the second day, he states that Demosthenes himself supported Philocrates, and showed to a certain Amyntor (who was ready to give evidence of the fact) a resolution to the same effect as that of Philocrates —proposing alliance as well as peace with Philip—which he had himself drafted and was ready, if necessary, to hand in to the chairman. In the Speech against Ctesiphon he goes farther, and declares that Demosthenes rose without leaving time for any one to anticipate him, and said that the proposals of the previous day were idle, unless Philip's ambassadors agreed to them; that it was wrong, however much they disliked the mover and the name of an alliance, to "snap off the alliance from the peace"; and that instead of waiting for the tardy adhesion of the other States before making the alliance, they should settle the question of peace or war for themselves. Demosthenes then (so Eschines says) called Antipater and asked him directly whether he would accept the Peace without the alliance, and received a negative answer. This of course meant that any one who desired the Peace must give way on the question of the alliance.

Thus Eschines and Demosthenes each accused the other of supporting the resolution of Philocrates as against the proposal of the allies, and of thus becoming responsible for the exclusion and subsequent overthrow of the Phocians. (It must be borne in mind that the accusations were made at a time when they had become declared enemies, when the overthrow of the Phocians had caused the Athenians to regard the Peace with detestation, and when each of the orators desired to prove to the jury that he had supported the side which had since become the popular one.) Can we form any reasonable opinion as to their real attitude at the time? What seems clear is that on the 18th of Elaphebolion it appeared likely that a Peace would be made which would leave the door open to the Phocians and the people of Halus, and to other Greek States, if they decided within three months to join in an alliance; and this proposition both Eschines and Demosthenes supported. It is also tolerably clear that between the debates of the 18th and the 19th something happened which convinced certain of the politicians that such a Peace was impossible—Philocrates had probably known this before—and this can only have been the discovery that Philip was absolutely resolved not to agree to such terms. This must have been intimated to them by Philip's envoys. That being so, what course was open to one who, like Demosthenes, believed peace to be necessary for the time? What but to attempt to convince the People that they must give up the proposal of the allies, and accept peace on Philip's own terms, viz., the making of a Peace and an alliance at once, without waiting three months? The most obvious way of doing this was that which, according to Eschines' account, Demosthenes adopted, viz., putting the question publicly to Antipater in the Assembly; and it is highly probable that, as Amyntor told Eschines, Demosthenes had a consequential motion drafted and ready. But even when they heard Antipater's reply, the Assembly were not ready to give up the plan which they had approved of on the previous day; and it is probable that before they consented they were led in some way or other to believe that they were not really sacrificing the Phocians to Philip and the Thebans by making the alliance at once. How was this managed? The Phocians and Halus were passed over in silence; Philocrates' motion was introduced, but they were not mentioned by name; and the explanation was given, so Demosthenes says, by Eschines and his friends that Philip could not receive the Phocians openly as allies, owing to his own existing relations with the Thessalians and Thebans; but that when the Peace was made he would act in such a way as to satisfy the Athenians. If this was so, Eschines also had changed his mind in the night, and that is perhaps the most probable account of the matter; though Eschines may have sincerely believed that Philip would act in the manner described. Nor do we find any statement that Demosthenes on this occasion expressed any other belief.

But even with these assurances before them, the People were not induced to agree to the proposal of Philocrates, until Eubulus told them bluntly that unless they accepted it (of course in its new form, without any express mention of the Phocians or Halus) they must prepare for immediate war, pay a war-tax, and devote the festival-fund to military purposes. This of course was the plain truth. Philip held all the cards; and unless peace were made on his terms, there must be a war, and the People must make those very sacrifices which they had so steadily refused to make. The threat was sufficient. It was resolved that the Athenian People and their allies should make peace and alliance with Philip and his allies, and none were specially mentioned or excluded. Further, it was agreed that each of the two parties to the Peace should retain what it possessed at the time when the Peace was made; and the treaty also contained various provisions in reference to freedom of trading and the suppression of piracy. The same ten ambassadors were appointed to receive the oaths of Philip and his allies in confirmation of the treaty.

But who were the "allies" on either side? The advocates of peace, in order to get their proposal carried at all, had left this point indefinite; and it was this that was a principal cause of the troubles and misunderstandings of the next few years. The politicians themselves can hardly have misunderstood the situation. The allies and possessions of Philip included all whom he had conquered, and his possession of Amphipolis and Poteidma could not be questioned. The allies of Athens were those who were actually members of her confederacy, and were represented in the Synod of the confederacy. Philip evidently did not intend, and could not be expected, to recognize her right to make peace in the name of any others. It was no small thing that the possession of the Chersonese, with the exception of Cardia, was now guaranteed to her.

But obviously a less precise interpretation of the term "allies" was also current in popular language, and there was no science of international law to lay down definitions. Consequently not only orators at Athens, but even diplomatists sent to Philip's court, could make a show of arguing that the allies of Athens included any people or persons with whom she had a treaty of friendship, or to whom she had promised support—the Phocians, Halus, and even Cersobleptes. (This prince, though he had been forced to give hostages to Philip, was no doubt still formally on terms of friendship with Athens). It was even argued at a later date that Amphipolis still belonged to Athens by right.

Difficulties arose from this cause almost immediately. For, a few days after the decision had been made, the Athenians and the allies represented in the Synod, in pursuance of a motion proposed by Philocrates, took the oath to maintain the Peace, in the presence of Philip's envoys. No representative either of the Phocians or of Cersobleptes took the oath; but a representative of Cersobleptes claimed to do so; and at a later time, Demosthenes and Eschines each tried to blame the other for his exclusion. Probably both were agreed at the time that Cersobleptes' envoy could not legitimately be included, and it fell to Demosthenes, as president of the Assembly held on the 25th of Elaphebolion, to give a formal ruling to that effect.

When the tangled evidence is carefully studied, there can be little doubt that up to the point at which the Athenians swore to the treaty, Demosthenes had not changed his mind as to the necessity of making peace, and although on the first day of the debate he had made an effort to confine the treaty to a Peace, without an immediate alliance, and so to save the Phocians and Halus, he had immediately seen the necessity of giving way upon these points, and had acted accordingly. If this is so, it is impossible to relieve him of the responsibility (which he shared with his colleagues) for the consequences of the Peace, however vehemently he may have wished to repudiate it afterwards. Not that the responsibility really involves any blame, for he was fully justified in carrying into effect his conviction of the necessity of peace at the time; he was acting as the interests of his country demanded; and there is no sign, up to this point, of any serious division of opinion among the leading politicians in Athens. It is only in their respective records or falsifications of the facts, and in their comments upon them in the light of their subsequent dissensions, that differences appear. If Demosthenes is to be blamed, it is not so much for helping to make the Peace, as for trying afterwards to disown his action.

For from this point onwards the friction, which seems to have arisen from comparatively trivial and personal causes, between Demosthenes and the other ambassadors, became rapidly transformed into definite opposition, accompanied by ill will which neither he nor they took any pains to conceal. To him, the Peace was no more than an armistice, rendered absolutely necessary by circumstances, but only tolerable because it might be turned to good account, if the opportunity were taken of preparing for a resumption of the struggle. They, on the other hand, desired a lasting Peace, such as was inconsistent with Demosthenes' ideal of national honour. No sooner, therefore, was the Peace made, than he began to think about the means of preventing Philip from gaining fresh power or extending his influence farther southward. From this point of view, every action of his colleagues which seemed to further Philip's plans, or to offer any prospect of permanence to the Peace, presented itself to his mind as treason; and this attitude of mind developed so rapidly, that (if what he declared three years later was true) he was very unwilling to serve upon the Second Embassy, and would not have done so, but for the fact that, on his previous visit to Macedonia, he had promised to take ransom-money to some of the Athenian prisoners there.