THE LIFE OF SALADIN AND THE FALL OF THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM

CHAPTER VII.

VIZIER OF EGYPT.

1169-1171.

“I MEANT Amr; but God meant Kharija”, is the Arab version of l’homme propose et Dieu dispose. Saladin had been dragged to Egypt against his will, foreseeing nothing but misery; and now the very step he had tried to avoid was to lead him to the pinnacle of fame. The Prophet indeed said truly, “God will make men wonder when they see folk hauled to Paradise in chains”. In such happy bonds was Saladin led to the throne. The Fatimid Caliph chose him from among all the Syrian captains to be the successor of his uncle, and on the 26th of March, 1169, three days after Shirkuh’s death, he was invested with the mantle of vizier and decorated with the title al-Melik al-Nasir, “The King Strong to aid”. His comrades in arms, many of whom were older and more experienced than himself, were not easily reconciled to the promotion of the young man of thirty over their heads. They thought him a well-behaved and intelligent subaltern, too quiet and unambitious for high command;— it was indeed this opinion of Saladin’s docility that had procured him an office where a tractable tool was wanted: — but to raise him above the war-worn captains of Nur-al-Din’s campaigns was more than they could stomach. It needed all Saladin’s tact and diplomacy, supported by the specious arguments of el-Hakkary the lawyer, and a liberal opening of treasury coffers, to induce the jealous warriors to submit; and several of them returned to Syria rather than serve under their junior.

On his side, Saladin began to order his life more rigorously. Devout as he had always shown himself, he became even more strict and austere. He put aside the thought of pleasure and the love of ease, adopted a Spartan rule, and set it as an example to his troops. He devoted all his energies henceforth to one great object—to found a Moslem empire strong enough to drive the infidels out of the land. “When God gave me the land of Egypt”, said he, “I was sure that He meant Palestine for me also”. It may well be that natural selfish ambition quickened his zeal; but the result was the same: thenceforward his career was one long championship of Islam. He had vowed himself to the Holy War.

The new vizier’s position was curiously anomalous: He was at once the prime-minister of an heretical (Shiite) Caliph, and the lieutenant of an orthodox (Sunnite) King. With admirable inconsistency, the two names were duly prayed for every Friday at the mosque. The anomaly would have to be abolished, but only by degrees: violent changes might be fatal so long as the people of Egypt retained the affection for the (Shiite) doctrines which two centuries of Fatimid rule had instilled, and which was fostered by the very nature of the tenets. Saladin’s relations with Nur-al-Din were also delicate. The King of Syria congratulated him, indeed, on his appointment, and confirmed him in his command of the Syrian army in Egypt, but was clearly resolved to keep him in his place. His dispatches from Damascus were addressed merely “To the Emir Salah-al-Din, Commander-in-chief, and the other Emirs”, to show him that he was but primus inter pares, liable to be recalled or degraded at his sovereign’s pleasure. To gradually strengthen his own position without awakening the distrust of the people of Egypt or the jealousy of Nur-al-Din, was the prudent policy which Saladin must necessarily pursue.

His first step was to surround himself by his family. Like another Joseph, also vizier of Egypt, but under a Pharaoh instead of a Caliph, he sent for his father and brethren from Syria, and made them share his splendor. He even offered to surrender his high office to his father, but Ayyub refused the honor. “My son”, said he, “God had not chosen thee for this great position hadst thou not been fitted for it; it is not well to play with one's luck”. Ayyub, however, took upon himself the duties of treasurer, and his other sons loyally supported their brother in his difficult situation. They had their reward, for Saladin gave them the fiefs of obnoxious Egyptians, whom he banished to places where they could do no hurt. His plan was to weaken the Caliph’s party, and he did not care how much he was hated by the Egyptian courtiers and officers, so long as he gained the confidence of the people. This he set himself seriously to win, and his Arab biographer says that the folk came from all parts of Egypt to see him, and seldom went away empty-handed: there was ever a petitioner at his ear, and none appealed to him in vain.

1169] Revolt of the Blacks

He needed all his popularity among the people; for the palace, with its numerous troops and dependents, was openly hostile. The Caliph had discovered that he was mistaken in Saladin’s character,— that he had adopted not a slave but a master; and intrigues were soon a-foot to destroy the new vizier. Nejah, the chief black eunuch and majordomo, headed a conspiracy among the upholders of the Fatimid dynasty. They planned an understanding with the Franks, who were to invade Egypt and entice Saladin from Cairo, when the conspirators would take him in rear, and thus attacked on both sides he and his Turkmans would perish. An accident revealed the plot to Saladin, and he had the chief eunuch watched, until at length he succeeded in catching him at his country house, outside the protection of the palace, and the unlucky Black was quickly beheaded (July, 1 169). This summary execution of their countryman and leader aroused the fury of the Caliph's troops, then (as in modern Egypt) composed largely of Sudanis; and fifty thousand, it is stated, of these Blacks rose up to avenge him. A bloody struggle ensued in the wide quadrangle that divided the palaces (Beyn el-Kas-reyn), and many houses and streets were set on fire; but at last the Blacks were overcome, their quarter, al-Mansuriya, was burnt, and they were compelled to beg for mercy. They were sent over the Nile, to Giza, and thence away to Upper Egypt, where rebellion smoldered for several years. In the winter of 1171-2, Saladin’s eldest brother, Turan Shah, reduced them to temporary submission, but in the following winter he had to fight them again, and even pursued them into Nubia, where he took the city of Ibrim (Primis), near Korosko, pillaged the church of the monophysite Christians, tortured the bishop, and slew seven hundred of the pigs which were found there in great abundance, to the proper disgust of all pious Moslems.

In 1174 there was a formidable rising of the Blacks at Aswan, led by Kenz-al-daula; and it needed some hard fighting before he was defeated and killed in September by Seyf-ed-din (el-Adil), another of Saladin’s brothers.

Yet another insurrection, at Koptos, had to be suppressed by the same general in 1176. After this we read no more of risings among the Blacks, but, as the Arab historian piously concludes, “God made an end of their villainy”.  It is evident that the struggle was obstinate, and that Upper Egypt was for six years in a state of intermittent rebellion; and there can be little doubt that the Blacks who repeatedly revolted were stirred up by the fugitive Sudany slaves and other partisans of the Fatimids.

1169] Siege of Damietta.

Hardly had Saladin expelled the mutinous Blacks from Cairo, when a still more urgent danger arose. The Crusaders were not slow to grasp the significance of the political change in Egypt. The possession of the Nile by Nur-al-Din’s general placed the Kingdom of Jerusalem as it were in a cleft stick, squeezed on both sides by armies controlled by the same power.

The harbors of Damietta and Alexandria gave the Moslems the command of a fleet, and enabled them to cut off the communications of the Crusaders with Europe, stop the annual pilgrim ships, and seize their supplies. Every effort must be made to break this fatal chain, which threatened the very existence of the Latin power in Palestine. Accordingly the most formidable attack that Saladin ever had to meet in Egypt was organized, probably in connection with conspirators in Cairo. Amalric joined hands with the Eastern Emperor, and a Greek fleet of 220 sail co-operated with a strong land force of Crusaders in  besieging Damietta. Fortunately for the defenders, contrary winds delayed the fleet on its way from the Golden Horn, and Saladin availed himself of this respite to strengthen the garrison and prepare for the attack. At the same time he sent messengers to Nur-al-Din to report the state of affairs, and especially to point out the risk of leaving a hostile faction behind him at Cairo whilst he went himself to the assistance of Damietta. In response, the King of Syria poured troops into Egypt, battalion on battalion, and began to distract the attention of the enemy by a demonstration against Palestine.

The siege of Damietta was begun in November, 1169. Amalric took up a position between the sea and the town, and awaited the arrival of the Greek fleet. In three days it appeared, but an iron chain guarded by an impregnable tower prevented its entering the harbor, and it was unable to render the aid that had been expected. Nocuit differre paratis: the chances of success were weakened by delay; and when at last, led in person by their gallant king, the Franks attacked with all their elaborate machinery of mangonels and fighting towers, the garrison was more than equal to repelling them, and sallying forth burnt their siege engines and even set fire to part of the fleet. Saladin meanwhile had brought up his troops, with ample stores and munitions of war, and a million gold pieces in his chest, and perpetually harassed the besiegers. The garrison was easily kept supplied, since the arm of the Nile was open and protected by the troops from Cairo; but the Franks ran short of bread; a diet of fruit disordered their unaccustomed stomachs, and disease and famine thinned their ranks. The Greeks on the ships were starving, and the Latins ashore could spare them nothing.

1169] Discomfiture of the Franks

The very elements seemed to conspire with the improvidence of the commanders to complete their discomfiture. Heavy rains swelled the Nile, flooded the plain, and saturated the camp. The storm upset their tents and siege-scaffolds, and the garrison took advantage of their plight to pelt them with stones slung by powerful catapults. Murmurs arose in the ranks; the wretched soldiers, half starved and half drowned, begged to go home; and after fifty days of fruitless efforts, Amalric was forced to give up the siege. Peace was made, and the generous and businesslike Alexandrians opened their markets to the famished invaders, who, when they had well eaten, set out in great dejection on their return to Palestine (19 December). To crown the disaster, a tempest wrecked nearly the whole fleet, and the dead bodies of the Greeks were cast up on the coast which they had come to conquer. As the proverb says, “The ostrich set out to find itself horns, and came back without ears”.  Henceforward, instead of going forth to attack, the Latin Kingdom was on its defense.

Encouraged by the failure of the Franks at Damietta, Saladin took the field in the following year —a year memorable for the earthquake which devastated Syria and laid low many of its ancient cities, — and began the series of attacks which continued until his treaty with Richard of England, twenty-two years later. His first raid was against Gaza, the frontier city of the Latin Kingdom. On his way he laid siege to the small castle of Darum, the southern outpost of Christianity, which had been recently fortified by Amalric, and was held by the Knights Templars. Their commander, Ansel de Pass, made a vigorous defense, and gave time for Amalric to come up with 250 knights of both the military orders, and 2000 foot-soldiers, who speedily dislodged the Saracens from their positions. Saladin did not wait for a pitched battle: at dead of night he slipped away, and almost before they were awake the inhabitants of Gaza found their town taken. The citadel, however, a strong fortress built by Baldwin II, held out, and its warden, Milo de Planci, sternly refused to admit the fugitive citizens, who were thus forced to stand outside the gates and fight to the death.

1170] Raids upon Gaza and Elat

Saladin had no mind for a long siege, and after plundering the town left the castle alone, and returned to Egypt with the spoils. On his way he passed close to Amalric, who got his men under arms, but was relieved to see him depart without offering battle. The year's successes ended in December, 1170, with the taking of Elat at the head of the gulf of Akaba, — the same Elat whence Solomon’s fleet sailed to Ophir, — the key of the Red Sea route for pilgrims to Mecca. In order to rescue this important post from the Crusaders, Saladin had ships built in sections at Cairo, carried the parts on camels to the Red Sea, where he put them together, and took the fort after a combined attack by sea and land.

These successes against the “infidels”  brought Saladin much renown among the Egyptians, who were ready enough to forget their jealousies and religious differences when a campaign was on foot and booty within sight. As their champion against the common enemy, Sunnites and Shiites, Egyptians and Turkmans, eagerly followed the banners of the young leader, against whom they had no less willingly plotted when no Holy War was at stake.

Saladin's valor and generalship convinced the army of his right to command, and the mass of the people, so far as they understood at all, recognized in him a powerful protector. His authority was now so firmly established that he could venture upon a momentous step. The anomalous situation of a Sunnite vizier holding office under a Fatimid Caliph was peculiarly distasteful to a man of Saladin’s orthodox views.   

For some time the King of Syria and the Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad had pressed him to do away with this political and theological inconsistency by introducing the name of the true instead of the false Caliph in the public Friday prayer (khutba) — the recognized form of allegiance. Hitherto Saladin, despite his religious tenets, had combated this proposal on the ground that the change might cause a revolution in Egypt. Another reason, which he did not mention, was that his popularity among the heterodox Egyptians might prove a valuable support in the very probable event of a rupture with Nur-al-Din.

In 1171, however, his position had become much stronger, and he could afford to run some risk. The Fatimid Caliph was no longer personally a factor in politics. Since the assassination of his black chamberlain, he and his palace had been placed under the vigilant control of the white eunuch Karakush, Saladin’s right-hand man, whose name, curiously enough, instead of being associated with acts of fidelity and severity, has become in the Turkish empire the designation of the ridiculous puppet. Punch.

The seclusion and impotence of the Caliph had lowered the influence of Shiite doctrine in Cairo, and Saladin had provided sound religious instruction according to y the Sunnite rules by founding colleges and establishing approved teachers of orthodoxy in the capital and the chief provincial towns.

The ground was thus prepared, and advantage was taken of the illness of the helpless captive who still called himself Imam, or God-directed leader, to carry out the long-determined change in the Caliphate. On the first Friday in the sacred month Moharram, the first month of the year of the Flight 567 (the 10th of September, 1171), a bold divine from Mosul, anticipating the regular preacher in the chief mosque, recited the bidding-prayer for the preservation and prosperity of the orthodox Caliph of Baghdad:

“O God, assist him and assist his armies; O Thou Lord of the Faith and of the world present and the world to come, O Lord of the beings of the whole world. O God, assist the forces of the Moslems and the armies of the worshippers of Thee Only. O God, frustrate the infidels and polytheists, Thine enemies, enemies of the Faith”.

1171] End of the Fatimid Caliphate.

This ecclesiastical revolution took place without a sign of opposition, —there was not so much as the butting of two goats, says the chronicler; nothing worse than surprise was shown by the crowded congregation. The Caliph at Baghdad was overjoyed, illuminated his capital, and sent Nur-al-Din and Saladin robes of honor and the famous black flags borne by the Abbasid legions. To Nur-al-Din he sent, besides, two swords, one for the dominion of Syria, the other for Egypt, and hailed him Sultan.

Meanwhile the person most affected lay dying in his great palace at Cairo. Al-Adid, the last of the Fatimid Caliphs, never heard of his supersession in the public prayers; Saladin had forbidden his servants to tell him, saying, “if he recover, he will learn the truth soon enough, but if not, let him die in peace”.

He died three days later, not quite twenty-one years old. On his deathbed he had asked to see Saladin, but the vizier suspected a plot, and excused himself. Afterwards, when he found the wish was sincere, he repented his neglect, and spoke highly of the young Caliph's many virtues, his gentle character, his good qualities, and friendly advances.

Thus ended in feebleness and neglect the Fatimid dynasty, which had been the greatest Mohammedan power on the shores of the Mediterranean for nearly three centuries. The family indeed survived for two generations, but they could do nothing against the assured authority of Saladin. Al-Adid left eleven sons, four sisters, four wives, and other relations, to the number altogether of one hundred and fifty-two; but Karakush, the major domo, shut them up under strict guard, the men in one place, the women in another, according them the luxuries and respect to which they were accustomed. The great palace of the Fatimids owned a new master.