CHAPTER V.
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR.
The Chinese conquest of Jungaria and Eastern Turkestan having become an
accomplished fact, what did the new rulers do to justify their forcible
interference in Central Asia? What measures did they adopt to conciliate the
subject peoples, and what to increase the prosperity of a vast region,
naturally fertile, but impoverished by centuries of improvident government and
of civil anarchy and war? Did they follow the precedent that had been set them
by every past ruler of those countries, and leave the people to their own
devices, to starve or to exist as best they might, so long as the tribute money
was forthcoming? Did the Chinese Viceroys of Ili, or their lieutenants in
Kashgar, Yarkand, Aksu, or Kucha adopt a policy of inaction, and pursue a line
of conduct of unprincipled selfishness in advancing their own personal
fortunes, and thus prove that they were of the same stamp as all other Asiatic
despots, careless of the day and utterly regardless of the morrow? The best way
to see how they acted, what they did, and what they did not that was possible,
is to follow their rule in Kashgar with some attention. In itself this may be
found to be no uninstructive lesson for us, who are also a great governing
people; and from the perusal of what the Chinese administrators did in Central
Asia we may arise willing to accord them high praise, because we are better
able than other nations to appreciate the difficulties of their task.
After the fall of Amursana, the Chinese,
in the first place, organized their administrative
system upon the following basis:—The supreme authority was vested in the hands of the Viceroy of Ili.
Under him an amban, or lieutenant-governor, administered affairs in Kashgar.
His place of abode was Yarkand. In internal matters the Yarkand Amban was
without a superior south of the Tian Shan, but in external affairs he only
acted in subordination to the Viceroy of Ili, who alone was in communication
with Pekin. Under each of these potentates there were the usual deputy-ambans
and Tay Dalays, or military commanders. All the cities had Gulbaghs
constructed outside of them, and these forts were held by Chinese troops—that
is, by a mixture of Khitay and Tungani. It is computed that 20,000 troops used
to garrison Kashgar and the neighborhood alone. The military posts were
restricted to Chinamen, and the higher judicial and administrative offices were
also withheld from the subjected race. But these were the only privileges
retained by the Chinese.
The Khan, or chief Amban, who resided in
Yarkand, made all the appointments to the minor offices, which were filled
almost exclusively by Mahomedans. The only precaution the Chinese seem to have
taken was to refuse employment to a Kashgari in his native town, so that a
Yarkandi would have to go to Aksu, or some other place away from his home, if
he desired to participate in the government of his country. But beyond this
there was no restriction, and nominally the Hakim Beg, the highest Mussulman
officer, ranked on an equality with the Chinese amban. His subordinates were
all Mahomedans, with the exception of his personal guard of Khitay troops. In
the hands of these natives of the country lay all the administration of justice
among their co-religionists, the collection of the revenue, and the levying of
customs dues on the frontier and of trade taxes in the cities. It was only when
cause for litigation arose between a Buddhist and a Mussulman that the amban interfered.
We have therefore the instructive spectacle before
us of a Buddhist conquest becoming harmonized with Mussulman institutions, and
Chinese arrogance not content with tolerating, but absolutely fostering, a
regime to which its hostility was scarcely concealed. This is the only instance
of the Chinese exhibiting such more than Asiatic restraint towards Mahomedans;
for their dealings with Tibet, a country of peculiar sanctity and Buddhist as
well, is not a case in point. The scheme worked well, however. Chinese strength
was husbanded by being employed only when absolutely necessary to be called
into play, and the people, to a great degree their own masters, did not realise
the fact of their being a subjected nation. Their first anxiety was the payment
of their taxes—far from
exorbitant, as it had been under their own rulers; but that task accomplished,
they could free their minds from care.
Very often their own countryman, the Hakim
Beg, was a greater tyrant than the Chinese amban in the fort outside their
gates; but against his exactions they could obtain speedy redress. When their
Hakims, or Wangs as the Chinese called them, became unpopular in a district,
the amban promptly removed them; even if he considered they were not much to
blame, he always transferred them to some other district. The first object in
the eyes of the amban was the maintenance of order, and he knew well enough
that order could not be maintained, unless he resorted to force, which he studiously
avoided, if the people were discontented. The people therefore could repose
implicit trust in the Chinese amban securing a fair hearing and justice for
them in their disagreements with their own leaders; and the Mussulman
Wangs, who were the old ruling class, saw the unfortunate tax-payer at
last secure from their tyranny through the clemency of a Buddhist conqueror. We
are justified in assuming that the population saw the force of these patent
facts, and that, if not perfectly to be relied on in any emergency, the Chinese
had no danger to expect from the tax-producing
and patient Kashgari.
So long as the Chinese rule remained
vigorous—that is,
for about the first fifty years—the Ambans worked in perfect concord with the
Wangs, and through them with the people. But the internal relations between
these various personages became more complicated and less cordial through the
importation, about the beginning of this century, of a fresh factor into the
question. The Chinese had granted the cities west of, and including, Aksu very
considerable privileges in carrying on trade with Khokand; and in the course of
commercial intercourse a Khokandian element was slowly imported into these
cities, when it became a people within a people, enjoying the prosperity to be
derived from the Chinese Empire, but not experiencing any sentiment of
gratitude towards those by whom the favors were conferred.
After some years,
when these Khokandian immigrants had become numerous, the Chinese acquiesced
in their selecting a responsible head for each community, and this head, or
Aksakal, was nominated by the Khan of Khokand, the only temporal sovereign
these people recognized. The creation of this third power in the state, which
was first sanctioned as a matter of convenience, was to be fraught with the
direst consequences for the Chinese. The Khitay would be justified in saying
that the Aksakals were "the cause of all their woe", in Kashgar at
all events. The Aksakals were far too prudent to challenge the supremacy of the
Chinese officials, and their first object was rather to make themselves
independent of the Wangs than to compete with the Ambans. In this they were
successful, for the Chinese neglected to take into account the dangers that might arise from
these same bustling, intriguing, and alien Aksakals. The Wangs had always been
obedient vassals, but the plausibility of the Aksakals put them on a par with
their rivals. The Chinese washed their hands of the quarrel, and may have imagined that their rule was made more
assured by divisions among the Mussulmans. In this they were mistaken.
The
Aksakals, who after a time repudiated their obligations to the Wangs, became
the center of all the intrigue that marked the last half-century of Chinese
rule, and, puffed up by their triumph over the Wangs, did not hesitate to
challenge the right of the Ambans to exercise jurisdiction over them. But of
this more later on.
While the Chinese adopted these liberal
measures in their dealings with the Mussulman population, they did not neglect
those other duties which belong to the government by right. The greatest
benefit they could confer was of course the preservation of order, and to
maintain the balance impartially between the numerous litigants was the first
article in the creed of the Chinese viceroys. As tranquillity settled down over
these distracted regions, trade revived. The native industries, which had
greatly fallen off, became once more active; and foreign enterprise was
attracted to this quarter, which Chinese power soon made the most favoured
region in Central Asia. But the rulers did not rest content with the mere
preservation of good order. They did not leave it to the inclination of an
indolent people to progress at as tortoise-like a speed as they would wish; but
they themselves set the example which the rest felt bound to imitate. Not only
did the enterprising Khitay merchant from Kansuh and Szchuen visit the marts
of Hamil and Turfan, but many of this class penetrated into Kashgar proper,
where they became permanent settlers. These invaluable agents supplied the
deficiency that had never before been filled up in the life of the state, for
they brought the highest qualities of enterprise and practical sagacity,
together with capital, as their special characteristics. In the train of these
Khitay merchants came wealth and increased prosperity. Yarkand, Kashgar, Aksu,
and Khoten became cities of the first rank, and the population of the country in the year 1800 was
greater than it had ever been before.
There was perfect equality too between all
the various races in respect to trade. The Chinese did not demand special
immunities for their own countrymen, as might have been expected. The Khitay,
who came all the way from Lanchefoo in search of a fortune, must be prepared to
compete in an equal race with the Khokandi, the Kashgari, or the Afghan. His
nationality would obtain for him no immunity from being taxed, or could give
him no advantage over the foreign or native traders. The main portion of the
trade of the country remained in the old hands. Khokand benefited as much as
Kashgar by the trade, and China, in a direct manner, least of the three.
The Chinese have at all times been justly
famous for their admirable measures for irrigating their provinces. The
wonderful canals which cut their way, where there are no great rivers, in China
proper are reproduced even in this outlying dependency. Eastern Turkestan is
one of the worst-watered regions in the world. In fact there is only a belt of
fertile country round the Yarkand river, stretching away eastward along the
slopes of the Tian Shan as far as Hamil. The few small rivers which are traced
here and there across the map are during many months of the year dried up, and
even the Yarkand then becomes an insignificant stream. To remedy this, and to
husband the supply as much as possible, the Chinese sank dykes in all
directions. By this means the cultivated country was slowly but surely spread
over a greater extent of territory, and the vicinity of the three cities of
Kashgar, Yangy Hissar, and Yarkand became known as the garden of Asia. Corn and
fruit grew in abundance, and from Yarkand to the south of the Tian Shan the
traveller could pass through one endless orchard. On all sides he saw nothing
but plenty and content, peaceful hamlets and smiling inhabitants. These were the outcome of a Chinese domination.
The Chinese, besides possessing a dual
line of communication with their own country, one north and the other south of
the Tian Shan, had also a caravan route from Khoten to Lhasa, the capital of
Tibet. There was also some intercourse with Cashmere by this way. The jade, for
which Khoten was justly, and is still, famous, was exported in immense
quantities, both to Tibet and to China, through Maralbashi. This mineral was
held in high esteem by Chinese ladies, and alone sufficed to make the
prosperity of Khoten assured. Gold, silk, and musk, were other articles
included in the commerce of this flourishing city. There was also, in the
Chinese time, a very extensive manufacture of carpets and cotton goods. The
gold mines, which, with two exceptions, have not been worked since the same time,
are believed to be scarcely touched, and only await a fostering hand to be put
in working order once more.
The Chinese also devoted great attention
to the coal mines in the vicinity of Aksu, and these were worked both by
private enterprise and the Government. Coal was an article of common use in
that city, but it does not appear to have been exported beyond the neighborhood.
It is known that the Chinese took greater interest in the development of the
internal means of wealth of the country than in inducing foreigners to enter
it. Thus, we see that mines, in a special degree, received state approval and
support. The gold mines of Khoten, the coal of Aksu, and the zinc of Kucha, are
all conspicuous instances of this; as, under all past, and the recent Mahomedan,
rule, they have been most foolishly, but consistently neglected.
Nor were those special trades for which
Kashgar had in prosperous moments been renowned, neglected. The
leather-dressers of Yarkand and Aksu, the silk-mercers of Kashgar and Khoten,
were never so busy as in the warlike days of Keen-Lung, and the great mass of
the people, the agricultural class in the
villages, was equally prosperous and well governed. Trade was fostered on all sides, and the
conquering power was content to stand aside and witness the steady progress of
its subjects towards hitherto unattained and unattainable prosperity. Lastly,
the Chinese directed their attention to
the improvement of the means of
communication between one part of the
province and another. It was
absolutely necessary to the security of their rule that there should
be an easy and always open road between Ili and Kashgar. Therefore, a way was cut, at great expense, through
the Tian Shan, north of Aksu, and this pass was known as the Muzart, or
Glacier. So difficult was the country
through which it passed, and such the danger from ice-drifts and snow-storms, that relays of men had
to be kept constantly at work in order to prevent it getting out of repair for
a day. The construction of this road was, in the first place, most expensive, but,
perhaps, the cost of repairing was much more. This, the most striking engineering achievement of the Chinese, has
become practically useless, through fifteen years of neglect. If China is to regain Ili, it will, no doubt,
be restored. The passes west of this,
by the Narym River to Vernoe, and through Terek to Khokand, were those selected
by Yakoob Beg to supply its place.
The next object to which the Chinese
specially paid attention was the preservation of their road home to China. Thus
the road in Tian Shan Pe Lu, and the other in Tian Shan Nan Lu, were kept in
the most effective state possible. The former, north of the mountains, passed
through Manas and Urumtsi to Hamil; the latter, south of them, through Aksu
and Kucha to the same place. The alternative route from Kucha to Kashgar and
Yarkand, through Maralbashi, was also much used, more especially, however, by
those who desired to break off at that outpost in the desert to reach Khoten
and Sanju. In each city there was
appointed a committee to superintend the roads in the district,
and this Eoad Board was a highly important and useful corporation. It was by
such measures as these that the Chinese made their rule a blessing to Kashgar
and Jungaria for more than fifty years. Of course, there was the fiscal side of
these schemes of public utility. Roads could not be opened up and maintained in
order, canals could not be dug, the state could not administer justice, promote
trade, and make itself respected abroad, without an assured revenue, and this
revenue, after the first ten years, was very productive.
The principal taxes were the tithe on the
produce of the land, called ushr, and the zakat (fortieth),
on merchandise and cattle. Then, in the cities, there was a house tax, which
was essentially, like our own income tax, a war tax, fluctuating in accordance
with the military necessities, caused by foreign or civil war. From the mines,
too, the state derived a large annual sum, which was generally devoted to some
object of public utility. There was also the tribute money from the Kirghiz
nomads, whose flocks and horses were numbered and taxed at a low rate, in
return for which they were taken under the protection of China. In addition to
these great taxes there were several smaller ones, such as a fee on fuel sold
in the market, and another levy on milch-kine kept in cities. A writer on
Kashgar has said that these "proved a ready means of oppression, and a
prolific source of that discontent which left the rulers without a single
helping hand, or sympathising heart, in the hour of their distress and
destruction". But this assumption of cause and effect is scarcely just.
Of course, all taxes can be made a ready
means of oppression by the tax-gatherer, who, in this case, was a Mussulman and
fellow-countryman. But taxes are absolutely necessary to all good government,
and when we consider what China did with her revenue, with what public spirit
her representatives laid it out in plans for the advantage of the state, can we
pronounce an opinion that she imposed unfair burdens on
the subjected race? Moreover, no one denies the prosperity general throughout
Kashgar in those days, a period looked back to with regret by the inhabitants
during the most favored years of Yakoob Beg's rule. It is not in accordance
with facts, then, to imply that the Chinese ground Kashgar under them by severe
taxation, and whatever petty tyranny there was, was carried on not by the
Khitay Ambans, but by the Mahomedan Wangs.
In the hour of distress and destruction
the people, indeed, proved traitorous to their best friends, or, more
generally, apathetic; leaving to the energetic Andijani element within their
gates the task of crossing swords with Buddhist rule, to which the hostility of
these immigrants had always been declared.
The short-sightedness of the Kashgari
played the game of the more fanatical and ambitious people of Khokand; but the
rule of China did not pass out of Eastern Turkestan until the disturbances of
forty years had generated ill-feeling that formerly was not, and had so
embittered the relations of governing and governed, that what had come to be
considered a lenient and impersonal government, assumed all the darker hues of
a military and foreign despotism. Even then China did not fall until there was
dissension within herself, when, split into three hostile camps, her sword dropped
nerveless from her hand in Central Asia, 2,000 miles away from her natural
border. To follow Chinese rule in Kashgar down to 1820, is to observe the
monotonous course of never varying prosperity. From that year to 1860, the tale
is of a different complexion, less monotonous but also less satisfactory.
In 1758 and 1760 Chinese armies entered
Khokand. Tashkent fell in the former year, and the capital in the latter. The
Chinese then withdrew, after imposing a tribute upon Khokand. During the long
reign of Keen-Lung—that is, down to 1795—the tribute was
regularly paid. After that year, however,
the payment became irregular, and border warfare of frequent occurrence
between the two neighbors. At last, in 1812, Khokand, then under an able prince,
refused to pay tribute any longer, and the Chinese acquiesced in the repudiation.
Nor did the change in the relations between China and Khokand stop here; for, a
few years afterwards, the Chinese found it expedient to pay Khokand an annual
sum to keep the Khoja family, whose representatives were residing in Khokand,
from intriguing against them. The amount of the subsidy was £3,500 of our money. In
addition to this, the Khan of Khokand was permitted to levy a tax on all
Mahomedan merchandise sold in Kashgar through Andijan merchants. This tax was
collected by the Aksakals before mentioned, and was a very profitable source of
income for the impecunious khans. But even these concessions and perquisites
did not satisfy the Mussulmans of Central Asia, who saw in Chinese moderation
an evidence of weakness and decline. The Aksakals, in these years of Mahomedan
revival, became political agents of the greatest importance. It was they who
gave a point to all the discontent there might be in Kashgar; it was they who
attributed to the Chinese the blame for whatever evils this world is never
wholly free from; and it was they who agitated for the return of the old Khoja
kings, who were always destined, in their eyes, to bring the most perfect
happiness. With such causes at work both within and without their position,
the Chinese had not to wait long before their authority was more openly
challenged.
Sarimsak, the only member of the Khoja
family surviving the massacre by the Chinese, had fled, as a child, into the
impenetrable recesses of Wakhan. From thence, in later years, he had gone to
settle in Khokand, where he married. This prince had three sons—Yusuf, Bahanuddin, and
Jehangir, the youngest and best known. In 1810, the first outbreak against
Chinese authority occurred, when a small
rising took place in Tash Balik, a town to the west of Kashgar. This was
speedily put down, and its leaders executed. It was but the forerunner of the
storm.
In 1822, Jehangir resolved to reassert his
claims over Kashgar, and, while his eldest brother continued to reside in
retirement at Bokhara, he joined the Kara Kirghiz. With a party of these, under
the command of their chief, Suranchi Beg, Jehangir raided up to the city of
Kashgar. He was there repulsed in the suburbs, and compelled to flee. He then
joined the Kirghiz of Bolor round Narym, who were nominally feudatories of
China, and, with their aid, commenced a petty sort of border war. A small
Chinese force was despatched against him, and drove the Kirghiz up as far as
Fort Kurtka. On their return from this successful attack, they were, however,
surprised in one of the defiles, and almost all were destroyed. This was the
first reverse the Chinese had ever met with in the field, and it was at once
bruited about through all parts of Central Asia. It gave a life to the Khoja
cause which it had hitherto lacked, and adventurers from all parts flocked to
the standard Jehangir now raised on the borders of Kashgar. The Khan of
Khokand so far assisted him as to send him a skilled general, Isa Dadkhwah, and
extended over his cause that protection and sanction which Khokand has ever
since thrown over the Khoja family.
In the spring of 1826, Jehangir advanced
in force against Kashgar, and the Chinese, despising their assailant, left
their fortifications to encounter him in the open. A battle then ensued, of
which the particulars have not come down to us, but which resulted in the
defeat of the Chinese. Jehangir entered Kashgar in triumph, was received with
acclamations by the people, urged on by the Aksakals, and proclaimed himself
sovereign of the country, under the style of Seyyid Jehangir Sultan. His first
act—the most
significant exposure of the true sentiment of the Kashgarian people there well could be—was to order the execution of
the Mahomedan Wang of Kashgar, by name Mahomed Seyyid.
The fall of Kashgar was the signal to the
Aksakals throughout Altyshahr to begin that work for which they had been long
preparing. In Yangy Hissar, Yarkand, and Khoten risings at once took place.
The Chinese, surprised and unarmed, were butchered in the streets, and the
Gulbaghs, as the visible token of the foreign rule, were razed with the ground.
The Gulbagh of Kashgar itself alone held
out, but it at last fell, after sustaining a long siege, into the hands of
Jehangir. His triumph completed, he had to concern himself more with his
relations with Khokand than about the Chinese, who were mysteriously quiet.
Mahomed Ali Khan, of Khokand, who thought that Jehangir's success was solely
due to him, laid claim to a certain historical superiority over his vassal of
Kashgar, to which the Khoja prince was not willing to assent. A large
Khokandian army which had been sent to Kashgar returned, after losing 1,000 men
before the walls of the Gulbagh, and its withdrawal was the signal for plots
and counterplots to break out in the palace of the new ruler. These he promptly
repressed, reduced the intriguing general, Isa Dadkhwah, in rank, and had
emancipated himself from his thraldom to Khokand, when the news came that the
Chinese were at last returning.
Although the western portion of Altyshahr
had fallen away from the Chinese, Aksu and Maralbashi remained true to their allegiance. The Chinese still possessed the military keys of the country. Moreover, their possession of Ili gave them an enormous
strategical advantage, and in the Tungan population they possessed an almost
inexhaustible supply for recruiting "revindicating" armies.It is apropos here to state that China retained both
of these advantages down to the time of Buzurg Khan and Yakoob Beg, and that,
so long as she possessed them, the utmost Mussulman fanaticism and Khokandian patronage of the
Khojas could do was futile against the arrest of fate.
During six months
Jehangir ruled in Kashgar, and during six months the Chinese viceroy made his
preparations at Ili for a thorough revenge. An army of more than 100,000 men,
raised from the Tungani, the Calmucks, and the Khitay garrison, was despatched
from Ili, and in January, 1827, entered Aksu. Here all the brigades were
concentrated, and the Viceroy, in conjunction with the general under him, by
name Chang-Lung, drew up the plan of campaign, which was as follows:—A small army of 12,000 men
was sent against Khoten across the desert through Cay Yoli, while the remainder
of the host advanced on Maralbashi. Here another detachment of 7,000 strong
was directed against Yarkand, while the main body marched on Kashgar by the
banks of the Kizil Su.
Their advance was unopposed until they
reached Yangabad, or Yangiawat, where Jehangir had concentrated an army
computed at 50,000 men, but probably considerably less. When the armies sighted
each other they pitched their camps in preparation for the decisive contest
that was at hand. In accordance with immemorial custom, each side put forward
on the following day its champion. On the part of the Chinese a gigantic Calmuck
archer opposed on the part of Jehangir an equally formidable Khokandi. The
former was armed with his proper weapons, the latter with a gun of some clumsy
and ancient design, and while the Khokandi was busily engaged with his
intricate apparatus, the Chinese archer shot him dead with an arrow through the
breast. Of course, neither army would have acquiesced in the decree of the God
of Battles as shown by the fate of its champion, but, in this case, it was true
that—"
Who spills the foremost foeman's life,
His party conquers in the strife."
After a sharp, but brief, skirmish, the
Kashgarian army withdrew in confusion, and the following
day the Chinese surrounded Kashgar on three sides. During the night the heart
of Jehangir misgave him, and he fled to the Karatakka mountains. But here the
snow had rendered the passes impracticable, and, after hiding for a few days in
that difficult region, he was captured by the Chinese. His fate was that
usually met with by traitors to that empire, for, being sent to Pekin, he was
executed after torture. In this war Ishac Wang, of Ush Turfan, played a great
part against the Khoja prince, and was rewarded for his good service by being
appointed Wang of Kashgar. The Chinese constructed a fresh fort, Yangyshahr, in
the place of the destroyed Gulbagh, and left a large Khitay garrison under Jah
Darin. But Ishac Wang, who was given some such title as Prince of Kashgar, was
soon afterwards deposed and recalled to China.
The Chinese authority was re-established
without difficulty in the three cities, and peace settled down over Eastern
Turkestan. But the repressive and punitive measures that the Chinese felt
compelled to adopt raised a bitterer sentiment in the minds of the people than
had previously existed. The Chinese were, indeed, only employing the same
weapons that had been used against themselves, but none the less did these
reciprocal atrocities dissipate whatever friendship there had been. Among other
acts the Chinese removed 12,000 Mahomedan families from Kashgar to Ili, and
these, destined to play an important part in the history of that province,
became known as Tarantchis, or Toilers.
The Chinese resolved to punish Khokand as
well. They broke off all trade with that state, and happy would it have been
for them if they could have continued to preserve a closed frontier. But the
Khan of that time was Mahomed Ali Khan, the most ambitious, as he was the
ablest, of the princes of that country. He had just annexed Karategin, and had
acquired some of the outlying provinces of Badakshan,
which Mourad Beg, of Kundus, had absorbed about the same time. It was not
probable that he would put up with the Chinese defiance. He was prudent enough
to delay his advance until the main body of their army had been withdrawn. But,
as soon as he was informed that the Chinese had gone back to Ili, Mahomed Ali,
calling Yusuf, Sarimsak's eldest son, from his retirement in Bokhara, placed
him at the head of an army, under the charge of his own brother-in-law, Hacc
Kuli Beg. The Chinese were worsted at Mingyol, and all the cities west of Aksu
turned against the Chinese, as before, and proclaimed for Yusuf Khoja. Then the
massacres were repeated, and the invasion of Yusuf was that of Jehangir over
again in exact detail. But Yusuf's triumph was still more brief. Whereas
Jehangir had ruled for nine months, Yusuf only swayed the scepter for three.
The Chinese movements were delayed by
small Mussulman revolts in Barkul and Shensi until the spring of 1831, but
then, when they returned, they found that Yusuf and the Khokandian army had
retreated some months before. The facts were that the moment Khokand invaded
Kashgar, Bokhara attacked Khokand, and Hacc Kuli Beg had to be recalled to cope
with matters more pressing than Khoja rights. With the general had gone Yusuf,
far from anxious to encounter the Chinese alone. The return of the Khokandian
army sufficed to dispel all danger from Bokhara, and, a few months after,
Mahomed Ali Khan recommenced opertions—in the east this
time—against the Kirghiz under Chinese protection. The Chinese were thoroughly
sick of these petty disputes, and made a treaty with Khokand, by which that
state acquired fresh commercial privileges, in addition to the old ones, and by
which the importance of the Aksakals rather increased than waned. Mahomed Ali
Khan had acquired all he wanted, and discouraged the Khoja party, as, indeed,
the terms of this treaty compelled him to do.
The risings under Jehangir and Yusuf were undoubtedly a
great blow to Chinese prestige. To all appearance each had nearly been
successful, and the Chinese, whose prestige was enormous in Central Asia—quite as great as that of
Russia is now—had been, on one or two occasions, openly defeated. But, after
all, this was a little matter compared to the shock the sentiments, called into
being by sixty happy years, had received. Between Buddhist and Mussulman,
between Chinaman and Central Asiatic, all the old antipathy was revived in the
butcheries of Yarkand and Kashgar. The Kashgari showed that they could not
appreciate the benefits they had received from China, and the Chinese, enraged
at the slaughter of their countrymen, and, perhaps, also at the ingratitude
evinced towards them, retaliated in kind. They did not appreciate that
moderation, which Europeans have not always shown under similar circumstances,
and wrought out their revenge in their own ancient fashion. It is absolutely
necessary that the reader should remember that the two rapidly succeeding
invasions of Jehangir and Yusuf form a turning-point in the history of the
Chinese rule in Kashgar. Up to that epoch it is difficult to find words
sufficient to do justice to China's beneficent government there; after that
year it would be absurd to employ the same language. For the change the chief
blame must fall upon the fickle and ungrateful Kashgari themselves, and then on
the intriguing Andijanis. The Chinese are justified, at least, in saying that,
having for more than half a century ruled this people with justice, they only
relaxed in their efforts to promote its well-being when their unarmed
countrymen and soldiers had been surprised and butchered by thousands.
Strange, and almost contradictory, as it
may appear, there was a brief respite during which things seemed to have got
into their old groove of happy prosperity; and the chief credit for this must
be given to a Mahomedan sub-governor of the Chinese viceroy. Zuhuruddin, such was his name, had raised himself
to the high post of Amban in Kashgar, a post never before held by any other
than a Khitay. By birth he was of Kashgar, but he always represented himself as
having been born and brought up in Khokand, where he had been imprisoned for a
political offence. For seven or eight years he governed Kashgar to the perfect
satisfaction both of the people and of the Chinese, and among some of his
public acts may be mentioned the reconstruction of new forts outside the
cities, in the place of those destroyed in the recent revolts. These were known
now as Yangyshahr instead of Gulbagh. But in 1846 Zuhuruddin's rule was
disturbed by hostilities on the part of Khokand and the Khojas.
In 1845 Khudayar Khan had been called to
the throne after the death of Mahomed Ali, but his authority was not without
its rivals. In the state of confusion that then ensued, Khokandian adventurers
urged the Khoj a princes, who were now represented by the sons of Jehangir, to
renew their old attacks against the Chinese. To these advisers the Khojas
turned a willing ear, and preparations were accordingly made for the
enterprise. At that time Khokand was full of adventurers to whom Mahomed Ali
had been able to give constant employment, but who now under the more peaceful
rule of Khudayar idled their time in the cities of that khanate. Among these
and the ever willing Kirghiz, it was not difficult for the princes of Kashgar
to raise an army, formidable in numbers, if not remarkable for cohesion. At
that time there were seven prominent Khoja princes in Khokand, of whom we may
here mention Eshan Khan, usually called Katti Torah, Buzurg Khan, and Wali
Khan. This inroad did not take its name from any one of these, but from them
all combined; thus it was distinguished as Haft Khojagan, or that of the Seven
Khojas.
With his brothers and relations and a
considerable following, Katti Torah advanced upon Kashgar, always
the first object of these invaders, which
fell after a siege of thirteen days through treachery. This was the only
success they achieved; the other cities would have nothing to do with them;
and after two months' indulgence in unbridled licence the Chinese beat them in
a fight at Kok Robat, and drove them out of the country. For the first time
there was an air of ridicule thrown over these Khoja invasions in the eyes of
the Kashgari, while the outrages they had committed during their brief stay had
raised bitterer feelings still. Zuhuruddin, who fell under the displeasure of
the Chinese, was removed from his post, and fresh Ambans, once more Khitay,
were appointed.
For nine years the Khojas remained passive, but in 1855 Wali
Khan and his brother Kichik Khan, began to bustle once more on the Kashgarian
frontier. It was not until 1857 that Wali Khan succeeded in forcing the
advanced guard of pickets maintained in the passes by the Chinese, but having
accomplished that his triumph was rapid. Kashgar fell into his possession by a coup
de main, and once more a Khoja prince was seated in the orda at
Kashgar. Artosh and Yangy Hissar fell into his possession, and he threatened
Yarkand. But everywhere the Chinese garrisons remained unconquered in the
forts, biding the exhaustion of their foe and the arrival of reinforcements.
After a rule of nearly four months the armies of Wali Khan having been then
defeated by the Chinese, the Khoja fled to the remote state of Darwas, where he
was surrendered to Khokand by its chief Ismail Shah. This ruler, the most
tyrannical, bloodthirsty, and licentious of all the Khojas, met the fate which
he deserved long afterwards at the hands of Yakoob Beg. His temporary tenure of
power is still remembered with dread by the people, who consider him to have
been the most incarnate monster who ever held the destinies of their country in
his hand. The Chinese were more severe in their punitive measures after this
campaign than they had been after any other, but, notwithstanding the part Khudayar and
his people had played in Wali Khan's affair, the old relations between
"these incompatible people", as Dr. Bellew aptly calls them, were
restored. After this event there was but one minor disturbance caused by an
inroad of Kirghiz nomads, headed by the sons of one of the principal victims of
Chinese vengeance, but this had no political importance.
The invasion of Wali Khan was the last of
those Khoja expeditions which took place prior to the Tungan revolt. In the
thirty-two years that elapsed from the date of Jehangir's attempt to that of
his son, there had in all been four of them. That of Jehangir himself being
the first; of his elder brother Yusuf, the second; of Yusuf's eldest son, Katti
Torah, the third; and of Jehangir's second son, Wali, the fourth. Not one of
these is in any sense noteworthy, except for the crimes with which it was
attended, and none of them did more than inflict an untold amount of misery and
suffering on their own followers, as well as on the people they claimed to
represent by right divine. It may also be noticed that with each enterprise
there was a decline in moral character. Thus Jehangir was infinitely the best
of them in every sense, and ruled fairly according to his lights. His brother
Yusuf was of a more timid mind, but evidently not less imbued with some notion
as to the sanctity of his mission. But from these to Katti Torah is a long
descent. That prince seemed to aspire to securing his personal comfort and
enjoyment alone, and disregarded all his subjects' complaints at the arbitrary
rule of his deputies. But Wali Khan, the next of these Khoja kings from "over the mountains", excelled his cousin in vice, and tyranny, and utter
want of purpose, not to speak of honour, quite as much as Katti Torah surpassed
their sires. Nor can there be much hesitation in saying, from what Buzurg Khan
did during the few months he held power, that, had not Yakoob Beg clipped his
flight,
he would have surpassed Wali Khan in his
own peculiar vices. The reader will scarcely be disposed to take much interest
in this irredeemable family, mad with the insanity of wickedness. But in
justice to the Chinese, and to Yakoob Beg, it is only right that the rivals of
the former should be made to appear in their true colors. All the sanctity
that a peculiarly venerable descent from Hazrat Afak could give; all the
stories told of the good deeds of some of their ancestors; all the affection
that naturally attaches to a native rule, and all the dislike that must
undermine a foreign, be it never so beneficent; all these things were
destroyed by the weakness and ill success that attended the first two Khojas,
and by the cruelty, indifference, and licentiousness that marked the last two.
When Buzurg Khan came he found loyalty to the Khoja the heirloom of a few
families, not of a people.
Had the Chinese restrained their
vindictive feelings after the war with Jehangir, and proclaimed a free pardon
to every one save the Khokandis, and then devoted their attention with the old
vigour to peaceful pursuits, we believe that the Chinese rule would have been
permanently secured. At that moment the Chinese were strong enough to have
defied Khokand, and to have broken off all intercourse witli that state. By
dismissing the Aksakals, and severing the connection between the two states,
the Chinese would have dispelled a danger that was for forty years to be ever
before them, and, in the end, when the Tungani also rose, was to overcome them.
Even clemency after Yusufs inroad, which was really caused by the Chinese
repressions, might not have been wholly in vain, and would have consolidated
their position, when reinvigorated by Zuhuruddin's tenure of power. But the
Chinese did not appreciate the quality of mercy. They could be just and
impartial in the ordinary avocations of life, but to those who revolted against
their authority they showed no trace of human feeling.
For a man to rebel
against them was certain death; for a
people, history tells us, the fate was not far different. Nor in dealing with
such did they hesitate to supplement their military strength by the most
despicable of artifices. Garrisons, accorded honorable terms, ruthlessly
butchered; princes, who threw themselves on their mercy, deported to Pekin to
be hanged or tortured out of life: these are frequent occurrences in the
history of China, and of her career in Central Asia the tale is identical. Yet,
while drawing a veil over these blots on an otherwise brilliant surface, should
we not desire to conceal them wholly from the view. It is necessary that they
should be stated to understand what Chinese domination means as a whole; of
its great benefits there can be no doubt, if the people will remain quiescent.
For fifty years, or for five hundred, China will rule an unmurmuring people with
justice, and lead them into the paths of prosperity and peace; but if they
rebel, if they openly defy authority, if they invite a hostile stranger within
their borders, the punishment will be as sweeping, as cruel, and, in one and a
higher sense, as wrongfully foolish, whether the association of the races may
have been for fifty years or five centuries, as it was in the case of Kashgar.
There is not much reason for hoping that China will deviate from her ancient
custom, on the occasion now transpiring, of demanding "an eye for an
eye" and "a tooth for a tooth."