II

1515-7] The Peace of Noyon

After Marignano (1515) and the Peace of Noyon (1516), which professed to shelve all outstanding questions and secure perpetual friendship between Spain and France, Europe had peace for a while. It was arranged at Noyon that Charles should take Louise, the daughter of the King of France, to wife, and that the rights over the kingdom of Naples should go with her. Until this babe-in-arms should become his wife, Charles was to pay 100,000 crowns a year as rent for Naples, and 50,000 until she bore him a son. If Louise died, some daughter of a later birth was to be substituted as his affianced bride, and this clause actually took effect. Charles promised satisfaction with regard to Spanish Navarre, conquered by Ferdinand in 1512; perhaps he even secretly engaged himself to restore it to Catharine, its lawful Queen, within six months. The treaty was concluded under the influence of Flemish counselors, who had surrounded Charles, since he had taken up the government of the Netherlands in the previous year. It was inspired by a desire for peace with France in interests exclusively Burgundian. But it had also its value for Spain, for it gave Charles a breathing space in which to settle the affairs of his new kingdoms. Maximilian, now in isolation, was forced to come to terms with France and Venice, and surrender Verona; and peace was secured in Italy for a while. At a subsequent conference at Cambray in 1517 the partition of Italy between Habsburg and Valois was discussed, but nothing was definitely settled. English diplomatists looked on askance at the apparent reconciliation, but their hopes of fishing in troubled waters were soon revived.

Charles utilized the respite for his visit to Spain in 1517. While here he was not only occupied with the troublesome affairs of his new kingdoms, but with the question of the Empire. Maximilian, who, although not yet sixty years of age, was worn out by his tumultuous life, was anxious to secure the succession to his grandson. At the Diet of Augsburg, 1518, he received the promise of the Electors of Mainz, Cologne, the Palatinate, Brandenburg, and Bohemia for the election of Charles as Roman King. The French King was already in the field, but the promises and influence of Maximilian, and the money which Charles was able to supply, overbore for the moment this powerful antagonism. On the receipt of this news Pope Leo X, who had already been attracted to the side of France, was seriously alarmed. The union of the imperial power with the throne of Naples was contrary to the time-honored doctrines of papal policy. Thenceforward he declared himself more openly a supporter of the French claims. Meanwhile, if Charles was to be elected before Maximilian’s death, the latter must first receive from the Pope the imperial crown. This Leo refused to facilitate. In all this the Pope showed himself as ever more mindful of the temporal interests of the Roman See and of his own dynastic profit, than of the good of Europe or religion. Both in the coming struggle with victorious Islam, and against the impending religious danger, an intimate alliance with Charles was of far more value than the support of France. But the meaner motives prevailed.

On January 19, 1519, Maximilian died, and the struggle broke out in a new form. The promises of the Electors proved to be of no account. All had to be done over again. The zeal of his agents, his more abundant supplies of ready cash, the support of the Pope, at first gave Francis the advantage. Troubles broke out in the Austrian dominions. Things looked black in Spain. Even the wise Margaret of Savoy lost hope, and recommended that Ferdinand should be put forward in place of Charles. Charles showed himself more resolute and a better judge of the situation. He had friends in Germany, Germans, who understood German politics better than the emissaries of Francis. The influence of England on either side was discounted by Henry VIII’s own candidature. German opinion was decidedly in favor of a German election, and although Charles was by birth, education, and sympathy a Netherlander, yet the interests of his House in Germany were important, and it may not have been generally known how little German were his predilections. The great house of Fugger came courageously to his aid and advanced no less than 500,000 florins. The advantage of this support lay not only in the sum supplied, but in the preference of the Electors for Augsburg bills. The Elector of Mainz refused to accept any paper other than the obligations of well-known German merchants. At the critical moment Francis could not get credit. The Swabian League forbade the merchants of Augsburg to accept his bills. He endeavored in vain to raise money in Genoa and in Lyons.

It is needless to pursue the base intrigues and tergiversations of the several Electors. The Elector of Saxony played the most honorable part, for he refused to be a candidate himself, and declined all personal gratification. The Elector of Mainz showed himself perhaps the most greedy and unfaithful. He received 100,000 florins from Charles alone and the promise of a pension of 10,000, which it is satisfactory to note was not regularly paid. Money on the one hand, and popular pressure on the other decided the issue. The Rhinelands, where the possessions of four Electors lay and where the election was to take place, were enthusiastic for the Habsburg candidature. It was here that the national idea was strongest, and the humanists were eloquent in their support of Maximilian’s grandson. The army of the Swabian League, under Franz von Sickingen, the great German condottiere, was ready to act on behalf of Charles; it had been recently engaged in evicting the Duke Ulrich of Württemberg from his dominions, and was now secured by Charles for three months for his own service. Here also money had its value. Sickingen and the Swabian League received 171,000 florins. At the end the Pope gave way and withdrew his opposition. On June 28, 1519, the Electors at Frankfort voted unanimously for the election of Charles. The election cost him 850,000 florins.

It is a commonplace of historians to exclaim at the fruitless waste of energy involved in this electoral struggle, and to point out that Charles was not richer or more powerful as Emperor than he was before; while on the other hand his obligations and anxieties were considerably increased. But so long as prestige plays its part in human affairs, so long a reasonable judgment will justify the ambition of Charles. He was still perhaps in the youthful frame of mind which willingly and ignorantly courts responsibility and faces risks, the frame of mind in which he entered on his first war with Francis, saying: “Soon he will be a poor King or I shall be a poor Emperor”. But the imperial’s Crown was in some sort hereditary in his race. Had he pusillanimously refused it, his prestige must have suffered severely. As a German prince he could not brook the interference of a foreign and a hostile power in the affairs of Germany. The imperial contest was inevitable, and was in fact the peaceful overture to another contest, equally inevitable, and more enduring, waged over half a continent, through nearly forty years.

War was in fact inevitable, and Charles was ill-prepared to meet it. His affairs in Spain went slowly, and it was not until May, 1520, that Charles was able to sail for the north, leaving open revolt at Valencia, and discontent in his other dominions. The fortunate issue of these  complications has been related in the first volume of this History. Diplomacy had already paved the way for an understanding with Henry VIII, which took more promising shape at Gravelines, after a visit to Henry at Dover and Canterbury, and the famous interview of Henry VIII and Francis I at the Field of the Cloth of Gold. Wolsey’s skilful diplomacy had brought it about that both the greatest monarchs of Europe were bidding eagerly for his and his master’s favor. A pension and a bishopric for the Cardinal, a renewal for England of the commercial treaty with the Netherlands were the preliminary price. At Gravelines it was agreed that Charles and Henry should have the same friends and the same enemies; and that neither Power should conclude an alliance with any other without the consent of both. If war broke out between Charles and Francis, Henry was to act against the aggressor. For two years the agreements for the marriage of the Dauphin with the English Princess Mary, and of Charles with Charlotte the daughter of Francis (Louise having died) were to receive no further confirmation. Towards the end of this period another meeting was to take place at which another agreement should be concluded. Each Power was to maintain a regular ambassador at the Court of the other. The pains taken by Wolsey to reassure Francis and to show that Henry had rejected propositions from Charles for a joint attack on France prove that he was still anxious to prevent the Roman King from drawing near to France; but the nett result of the interviews was to guarantee Charles against any immediate adhesion of England to his rival.