INTRODUCTION

OF THE CONCEPTION, METHOD, AND GENERAL SOURCES OF THE HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY, TOGETHER WITH THE LITERARY HELPS.

 

Philosophy as a conception, historically, is an advance upon, as it is an outgrowth from, the conception of mental development in general and that of scientific culture in particular. The conception is ordinarily modified in the various systems of philosophy, according to the peculiar character of each; yet in all of them philosophy is included under the generic notion of science, and, as a rule, is distinguished from the remaining sciences by the specific difference, that it is not occupied, like each of them, with any special, limited province of things, nor yet with the sum of these provinces taken in their full extent, but with the nature, laws, and connection of whatever actually is. With this common and fundamental characteristic of the various historical conceptions of philosophy corresponds our definition: Philosophy is the science of principles.

 

The word philosophy (love of wisdom) and its cognates do not occur in Homer and Hesiod. Homer uses sophy, the second word in the compound with reference to the carpenter's art. Later writers use sophy also for excellence in music and poetry. With Herodotus any one is sopher who is distinguished from the mass of men by any kind of art or skill. The so-called seven wise men are termed by him "sophists", and the same designation is given by him to Pythagoras.

Pythagoras is cited as the first to designate by the word philosophy as science. The modest disclaimer of Socrates in regard to the possession of wisdom, and the preference given by Plato and Aristotle to pure theory above all praxis and even above all ethico-political activity, are scarcely in accord with the unbroken confidence of Pythagoreanism in the power of scientific investigation and with the undivided unity of the theoretical and practical tendencies of that philosophy.

The natural philosophers who call the universe cosmos are called "wise men", without the least intimation that the Pythagoreans would themselves have desired to be named, not wise, but lovers of wisdom. It is also noticeable, though without demonstrative force, that in the preserved fragments of the probably spurious work ascribed to Philolaus the Pythagorean and devoted to the description of the astronomical and philosophical knowledge of the order which reigns in the universe, sophy, not philosophy.

Socrates calls himself in the Banquet of Xenophon a laborer in philosophy in contrast to Callias, a disciple of the Sophists. According to Xenophon sophy is synonymous with science.

Human wisdom is patchwork; “the gods have reserved what is greatest to themselves”. We may ascribe this thought with all the more confidence to the historical Socrates, since it reappears in the Apologia of Plato, where Socrates says, he may perhaps be wise in human wisdom, but this is very little, and in truth only God can be called wise.

In the Platonic Apologia Socrates interprets the declaration of the oracle in reply to Chaerephon, that "no one was wiser than Socrates," as teaching that he among men was wisest who, like Socrates, disclaimed the possession of any wisdom of his own; he calls that examination of himself and others by which he broke up the shameful self-deceptionof those who, without knowing, supposed themselves to know, his "philosophizing," and sees in it the mission of his life. Since the wisdom of Socrates was the consciousness of not knowing, and not the consciousness of a positive, gradual approximation to the knowledge of truth, it was impossible that philosophy, in distinction from sophy, should become fixed in his terminology as a technical term; so far as wisdom seemed to him attainable, he could make use as well of the words sopher and sophy to express it. With the disciples of Socrates philosophy appears already as a technical designation.

Plato expresses in various places  the sentiment ascribed by Heraclides of Pontus to Pythagoras, that wisdom belongs only to God, while it belongs to man to be rather a lover of wisdom. In the Convivium (and the Lysis) this thought is developed to the effect that neither he who is already wise, nor he who is unlearned, is a philosopher, but he who stands between the two. The terminology becomes most distinct and definite in two dialogues of late origin, probably composed by one of Plato's disciples, namely, in the Sophistes and the Politicus, where the Sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher are named in the preceding order, as the advancing order of their rank. Wisdom itself, according to Plato, is identical with true knowledge, while philosophy is termed in the dialogue Euthydemus the acquisition of such knowledge. Knowledge respects the ideal, as that which truly is, while opinion or representation is concerned with the sensuous, as with that which is subject to change and generation. Accordingly Plato defines those as philosophers, "who set their affections on that, which in each case really exists", or who "are able to apprehend the eternal and immutable". In a wider sense Plato uses the term philosophy so as to include under it the positive sciences also.

We find also the same double sense in Aristotle. Philosophy in the wider signification -for which sophy but rarely occurs- is science in general and includes mathematics and physics, and ethics and poetics. But “first philosophy”, which Aristotle also calls sophy, and which he indicates as pre-eminently the science of the philosopher, is in his system that which we now term metaphysics, namely, the science of being as such, and not of any single department of being—the science, therefore, which considers the ultimate grounds or principles of everything that exists (in particular, the matter, form, efficient cause, and end of everything. In contrast with this “first philosophy”, the special sciences are termed partial sciences.

The plural philosophies is used by Aristotle sometimes in the sense of "philosophical sciences" where mathematics, physics, and theology are named as the three “theoretical philosophies”; where from ethics another branch of philosophy is distinguished, which from the context must be metaphysics, and sometimes in the sense of “philosophical directions, systems, or ways of philosophizing”

The Stoics (according to Plutarch) defined wisdom as the science of divine and human things, and philosophy as the striving after virtue (proficiency, theoretical and practical), in the three departments of physics, ethics, and logic.  The Stoic definition of philosophy removes the boundary which in Plato separates ideology, in Aristotle first philosophy, from the other branches of philosophy, and covers the case of all scientific knowledge, together with its relations to practical morality. Still, positive sciences (as, notably, grammar, mathematics, and astronomy) begin with the Stoics already to assume an independent rank.

Epicurus declared philosophy to be the rational pursuit of happiness.

Since all subsequent definitions of philosophy until the modern period were more or less exact repetitions of those above cited and hence may here be omitted, we pass on to the definition which was received in the school of Leibnitz and Wolff.

Christian Wolff presents  the following as a definition originating with himself: philosophia est scientia possibilium, quatenus esse possunt. This definition is obviously cognate with the Platonic and Aristotelian definitions, in so far as it makes philosophy conversant with the rational grounds (ratio) and the causes, through which existing objects and changes become possible. It does not contain the restriction to first causes, and hence Wolff's conception of philosophy is the wider one; but it fails, on the other hand to mark the boundaries between philosophy and the positive (in particular, the mathematical) sciences. In this latter particular Kant seeks to reach a more accurate determination.

Kant divides knowledge in general, as to its form, into historical (cognitio ex datis), and rational (cognitio ex principiis), and the latter again into mathematical (rational cognition through the construction of concepts), and philosophical (rational cognition through concepts as such). Philosophy, in its scholastic signification, is defined by him as the system of all the branches of philosophical knowledge, but in its cosmical signification, as the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (teleologia rationis humanae).

Herbart defines philosophy as the elaboration of conceptions. This elaboration comprehends the three processes of the analysis, the correction and the completion of the conceptions, the latter process depending on the determination of their rank and value. This gives, as the leading branches of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, and aesthetics. (Under aesthetics Herbart includes ethics, as well as aesthetics in the narrower and popular signification of the word).

According to Hegel, for whose doctrine Fichte, in respect of form, and Schelling, in respect of matter, prepared the way, philosophy is the science of the absolute in the form of dialectical development, or the science of the self-comprehending reason.

The definition of philosophy given by us above meets the case even of those schools which declare the principles of things to be unknowable, since the inquiry into the cognoscibility of principles evidently belongs to the science of principles, and this science accordingly survives, even when its object is reduced to the attempt to demonstrate the incognoscibility of principles.

Such definitions as limit philosophy to a definite province (as, in particular, the definition often put forward in recent times, that philosophy is ''the science of spirit"), fail at least to correspond with the universal character of the great systems of philosophy up to the present time, and can hardly be assumed as the basis of an historical exposition.

 

History in the objective sense is the process by which nature and spirit are developed. History in the subjective sense is the investigation and statement of this objective development.

 

The Greek words History signify not history in the objective sense, but the subjective activity involved in the investigation of facts. German word Geschichte involves a reference to that which has come to pass, and has therefore primarily the objective signification. Yet, not all that has actually taken place falls within the province of history, but only that which is of essential significance for the common development.

Development may be defined as the gradual realization, in a succession of phenomena, of the essence of the subject of development. As to its form, development generally begins through the evolution of contraries or oppositions, and ends in the disappearance and reconciliation of these contraries in a higher unity (as sufficiently illustrated, for example, in the progressive development which shows itself in Socrates, his so-called "one-sided disciples," and Plato).

Through the study of history the whole life of the race is, in a manner, renewed on a reduced scale in the individual. The intellectual possessions of the present, like its material possessions, repose in all cases on the acquisitions of the past; every one participates, to a degree, in this common property, even without having a comprehensive knowledge of history, but each one's gain becomes all the more extensive and substantial the more this knowledge is expanded and deepened. Only that productive activity which follows upon a self-appropriating reproduction of the mental labor of the past, lays the foundation for true progress to higher stages.

 

The methods of treating history (divided by Hegel into the naïve, the reflecting, and the speculative) may be classed as the empirical, the critical, and the philosophical, according as the simple collocation of materials, the examination of the credibility of tradition, or the endeavor to reach an understanding of the causes and significance of events, is made the predominant feature. The philosophical method proceeds by explaining the connection and endeavoring to estimate the relative worth of the phenomena of history. The genetic method investigates the causal connection of phenomena. The standard by which to estimate the relative worth or importance of phenomena may he found either immediately in the mental state and opinions of the individual student, or in the peculiar nature and tendency of the phenomena themselves, or, finally, by reference to the joint development in which both the historical object and the judging subject, each at its peculiar stage, are involved; hence may be distinguished the material, the formal, and the specula­tive estimate of systems. A perfect historical exposition depends on the union of all the methodical elements now mentioned.

 

The later historians of philosophy in ancient times, as also the earliest modern historians, contented themselves, for the most part, with the method which consists in merely empirical compilation. The critical sifting of materials has been introduced chiefly in modern times, by philologists and philosophers. From the first, and before any attempts were made at a detailed and general historical delineation, philosophers sought to acquire an insight into the causal connection and the value of the different systems, and for the earliest philosophies the foundation for such insight was already laid by Plato and Aristotle; but the completion of the work thus begun, the widening and deepening of this insight, is a work, to the accomplishment of which every age has sought to furnish its contribution and to which each age will always be obliged to contribute, even after the great advances made by modern philosophers, who have sought to make the history of philosophy intelligible as a history of development. The subjective estimate of systems, by the application of the philosophical (and theological) doctrine of the historian as the norm of judgment, has, in modern times, been especially common among the Leibnitzians (Brucker and others) and Kantians (Tennemann, notably). The method of formal criticism, which tries the special doctrines of a system by its own assumed principle, and this principle itself by its capacity of development and application, has been employed by Schleiermacher (particularly in his "Critique of Previous Ethics") and his successors (especially by Brandis; less by Ritter, who is more given to "material" criticism). Last of all the speculative method has been adopted by Hegel (in his "History of Philosophy and Philosophy of History") and by his school.

To the oft-treated question, whether the history of philosophy is to be understood from the stand-point of our own philosophical consciousness, or whether, on the contrary, the latter is to be formed, enlarged, and corrected through historical study, the answer is, that the case in question, of the relation of the mind to the historical object of its attention, is a case of natural action and reaction, and that consequently each form of that relation indicated in the question has its natural time and place; the one must follow the other, each in its time. The stage of philosophical culture, which the individual, before his acquaintance (or at least before his more exact familiarity) with the history of philosophy, has already reached, should facilitate his understanding of that history, while it is at the same time elevated and refined by his historical studies. On the other hand, the philosophic consciousness of the student, when perfected by historical and systematic discipline, must afterward show itself fruitful in a deeper and truer understanding of history.

 

The most trustworthy and productive sources for our knowledge of the history of philosophy are those philosophical works which have come down to us in their original form and completeness, and, next to these, the fragments of such works which have been preserved under conditions that render it impossible to doubt their genuineness. In the case of philosophical doctrines which are no longer before us in the original language of their authors, those "reports" are to be held most authentic which are based immediately on the writings of the philosophers, or in which the oral deliverances of the latter are communicated by immediate disciples. If the tendency of the author (or so-called "reporter"), whose statements serve us as authorities, is less historical than philosophical, inclining him rather to inquire into the truth of the doctrines mentioned by him than simply to report them, it is indispensable, as a condition precedent to the employment of his statements as historical material, that we carefully ascertain the line of thought generally followed by the author of whom he treats, and that in its light we test the sense of each of the reporter's statements. Next to the sources whence the "reporter" drew, and the tendency of his work, his own philosophical culture and his capacity to appreciate the doctrines he reports, furnish the most essential criteria of his credibility. The value of the various histories of philosophy as aids to the attainment of a knowledge and understanding of that history, is measured partly by the degree of exactness shown by each historian in the communication of the original material and his acuteness in their appreciation, and partly by the degree of intelligence with which he sifts the essential from the non-essential in each philosopher's teachings, and exhibits the inner connection of single systems and the order of development of the different philosophical stand-points.

 

The writings of the early Greek philosophers of the pre-Socratic period exist now only in fragments. The complete works of Plato are still extant; so also are the most important works of Aristotle, and certain others, which belong to the Stoic, Epicurean, Skeptic, and Neo-Platonic schools. We possess the principal works of most of the philosophers of the Christian period in sufficient completeness.

At the commencement of modern times the disappearance of respect for many species of authority, which had previously been accepted, gave special occasion for historical inquiry. Lord Bacon, who was unsatisfied by the Aristotelianism of the Scholastics and was disposed to favor the pre-Socratic philosophy, speaks of an expose of the placita philosophorum as one of the desiderata of his times. Of the numerous general histories of philosophy, the following may here be mentioned:

The History of Philosophy, by Thorn. Stanley; Stanley treats only of the history of philosophy before Christ, which is in his view the only philosophy; for philosophy seeks for truth, which Christian theology possesses, so that with the latter the former becomes superfluous. Stanley follows in his exposition of Greek philosophy pretty closely the historical work of Diogenes Laertius.

Origines Hist. Philos. Ecclesiast., by Christian Thomasius. Thomasius first recommended disputed questions in the history of philosophy as themes for dissertations.

Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique. This very comprehensive work deserves to be mentioned here on account of the articles it contains on the history of philosophy. Bayle contributed essentially to the awakening of the spirit of investigation in this department of study. Yet, as a critic, he deals rather in a philosophical criticism of transmitted doctrines from his skeptical stand-point, than in an historical criticism of the fidelity of the accounts on which our knowledge of those doctrines is founded.

Brucker's presentation, especially in his chief work, the Historia Crit. Philos., is clear and easily followed, though somewhat diffuse, and often interspersed with anecdotes, after the manner of Diogenes Laertius, and too rarely portraying the connection of ideas. Brucker wrote in the infancy of historical criticism; still he often gives proof of a sound and sober insight in his treatment of the historical controversies current in his times; least, it is true, in what relates to the earlier periods, far more in his exposition of the later. His philosophical judgment is imperfect, from the absence with him of the conceptions of successive development and relative truth. Truth, he argues, is one, but error is manifold, and the majority of systems are erroneous. The history of philosophy shows "infinita falsae philosophiae exempla." Neo-Platonism, for example, Brucker does not understand as a certain blending of Hellenism and Orientalism, with a predominance of the form of Hellenism, and still leas as a progress from skepticism to mysticism made relatively necessary by the nature of things, but as the product of a conspiracy of bad men against Christianity;—and in like manner he sees in Christian Gnosticism, not a similar blending, with a prevalence of the form of Orientalism, but the result of pride and willfulness, etc. Truth is, for him, identical with Protestant orthodoxy, and next to that with the Leibnitzian philosophy; according to the measure of its material accordance with this norm every doctrine is judged either true or false.

Dietr. Tiedemann, Geisl der speculaliven Philosophic. By "speculative" Tiedemann means theoretical philosophy. The speculative element in the newer sense of this word is unknown to him. His work extends from Thales to Berkeley. Tiedemann belongs to the ablest thinkers among the opponents of the Kantian philosophy. His stand-point is the stand-point of Leibnitz and Wolff, modified by elements from that of Locke. In his interpretation and judgment of the various systems of philosophy, he seeks to avoid unfairness and partisanship. But his understanding of them has, occasionally, its limits. His principal merit consists in his application of the principle of judging systems according to their relative perfection. Tiedemann declares his intention not to make any one system the standard by which all others should be judged, since no one is universally admitted, but "to consider chiefly, whether a philosopher has said anything new and has displayed acuteness in the support of his assertions, whether his line of thought is marked by inner harmony and close connection, and, finally, whether considerable objections have been or can be urged in opposition to his assertions."

G. W. Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie. The stand-point here is the speculative, characterized above. Yet Hegel, as matter of fact, has not in detail always maintained the idea of development in its purity, but has sometimes unhistorically represented the doctrines of philosophers, whom he esteemed, as approximating to his own (interpreted, e. g., many philosophemes of Plato agreeably to his own doctrine of immanence), and, ignoring their scientific motives, has misinterpreted those of philosophers whom he did not esteem (e. g. Locke); still further, he unjustifiably exaggerates in principle the legitimate and fundamental idea of a gradual development, observable in the progress of events in general, and particularly in the succession of philosophical systems, through the following assumptions:—

a. That every form of historical reality within its historic limits, and hence, in particular, every philosophical system, viewed as a determinate link in the complete evolution of philosophy, is to be considered in its place as wholly natural and legitimate; while, nevertheless, side by side with the historically justified imperfection of individual forms, error and perversity, as not relatively legitimate elements, are found, and occasion aberrations in point of historic fact from the ideal norms of development (in particular, many temporary reactions, and, on the other hand, many false anticipations);

b. That with the Hegelian system the development-process of philosophy has found an absolute terminus, beyond which thought has no essential advance to make;

c. That the nature of things is such that the historical sequence of the various philosophical stand-points must, without essential variation, accord with the systematic sequence of the different categories, whether it be with those of logic alone,  or with those of logic—and the philosophy of nature?—and mental philosophy, as is taught.

Robert Blakey, History of the Philosophy of Mind, from the earliest period to the present time.

George Henry Lowes, A Biographical History of Philosophy, from its origin in Greece down to the present day.

The History of Philosophy from Thales to the present day, by George Henry Lewes.

Ed. Zeller, Vortrage und Abhandlungen geschichtlichen Inhalts, containing: 1. The development of monotheism among the Greeks; 2. Pythagoras and the legends concerning him; 3. A plea for Xanthippe; 4. The Platonic state in its significance for the succeeding time; 5. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus; 6. Wolff's banishment from Halle, the struggle of pietism with philosophy; 7. Joh. Gottlieb Fichte as a political philosopher; 8. Friedr. Schleiermacher; 9. Primitive Christianity; 10. The historical school of Tubingen; 11, Ferdinand Christian Baur; 12. Strauss and Renan.

Of works on the history of single philosophical disciplines and tendencies (from ancient till modern times), the following are specially worthy of mention:

On Religious Philosophy: Karl Friedr. Staudlin.

On the History of Psychology : Friedr. Aug. Carus.

On the History of Ethical and Political Theories: Christoph. Meiners.

James Mackintosh, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy

W. Whewell, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy

On the History of Esthetics : Robert Zimmermann.