III

THE SARMATAE AND PARTHIANS

III. 

PARTHIA: FOREIGN POLICY

 

The Parthian Empire, as created by Mithridates II was surrounded by strong, warlike and ambitious rivals. To the west were Roman provinces and client-states and the independent Arab tribes of the Syrian desert. On the north to the west of the Caspian beyond the Armenians, Iberians and Albanians, who were all more or less under Parthian protectorate or influence, lay the powerful well-organized, well-armed and warlike Sarmatians, especially the Alani, who since their settlement in the Northern Caucasus took every opportunity to invade the Parthian lands through one of the two Caucasian Gates (Darial and Derbend), while to the east of the Caspian Parthia faced the many nomadic Iranian tribes known to the Western world under the general name of Scythians. Farther to the east lay the successors of the Bactrian Greeks, the growing kingdom of the Yueh-chih and Tokharians, which separated Parthia from the great Chinese Empire of the later Han, and finally, towards the south-east and south, the borderlands of India.

Of the struggles of the Parthians against their enemies in the north, the east and the south comparatively little is known. Where evidence is more ample is on the relations of Parthia and Rome, and this comes from Roman sources and represents the Roman point of view. Roman policy towards Parthia is the topic of other chapters, but at the cost of some repetition, it is worthwhile to attempt a reconstruction of the course of Parthian policy in its turn. When Parthia and Rome first faced each other it was as claimants to the heritage of the Seleucid monarchy. The prestige won by Pompey in the East was dimmed by the defeat of Crassus, Caesar's plans were cut short by his death, and Antony failed to avenge Crassus. His disastrous retreat, and the Parthian offensive into Syria that preceded it, convinced Augustus that Parthia was a serious enemy and inspired the Roman public at large with a lasting fear and respect for the Parthians. But both Augustus and the Parthian king realized that, as defeat to either would be fatal, victory would not be without danger and would lead nowhere. An expansion of the Roman Empire into Central Asia and India, though not impossible, meant a complete new orientation of the Roman Empire and its hellenization and orientalization. This was against the leading political Western ideas of Augustus. Equally the King Phraates was well aware that it was idle to dream of the conquest of Syria with the forces and organization of an Empire whose main task and main strength lay in the East and whose structure was perforce feudal and half-nomadic. On the other hand a modus vivendi promised good returns both for Parthia and Rome: regular caravan trade well-organized and well-protected was a source of income for both powers, inasmuch as it yielded large custom duties to their treasuries and brought prosperity both to Syria and Mesopotamia. Thus the modus Vivendi came into being: the Euphrates as frontier, the development of the buffer-state of Palmyra as a centre of Partho-Roman exchange and perhaps a kind of commercial agreement between Parthia and Rome. The Parthians agreed to satisfy Roman honor by delivering up the standards and captives of Crassus and Antony, and Augustus in return ceased to support the pretender Tiridates and insured Parthia against future pretenders by keeping the dan­gerous princes of the Arsacid house in Rome. This understanding, reinforced by a later demonstration of Roman power, was kept and carried out by Tiberius. Especially successful was the mission of Germanicus, who probably made Roman influence in Palmyra stronger than before and regulated Palmyra's relations to Parthia and Rome. At the same time he entered, perhaps in the name of Palmyra, into diplomatic relations with some of those petty vassal dynasts of Parthia who held the keys to the great caravan roads leading to Syria and Asia Minor.

However, there remained one question which urgently re­quired regulation, the question of Armenia. It is unnecessary to point out the strategical importance of Armenia. An independent Armenia was unacceptable alike to the Romans and the Parthians, neither of whom had forgotten the power of Tigranes fifty years before. Armenia in the hands of the Romans meant for Parthia a constant threat to Mesopotamia and its flourishing caravan cities, and Mesopotamia was the key to Babylonia: to lose it was equivalent to the potential surrender of all the western satrapies of Parthia. On the other hand, Rome was not willing to leave Armenia to the Parthians, since it opened to them an easy access to the Black Sea, secured for them a supremacy over Iberia and Albania and thus the command of an important trade-route to the East, connected the Parthian Empire with the half-Iranian countries of Cappadocia, Pontus and Commagene, and made possible an alliance between the Parthians and their cousins the Sarmatians, the great rivals of Rome in the north-east. Thus the Armenian question became the chief obstacle to a lasting peace between the two Empires and led repeatedly to wars and diplo­matic conflicts.

THE JULIO-CLAUDIANS AND PARTHIA        

Augustus and Tiberius insisted upon solving the Armenian problem in the traditional Roman way, by making Armenia a Roman vassal-state under the rule of a hellenized client-king. Phraates accepted this solution and undermined by this his position in Parthia, since the leading aristocratic clans were bitterly opposed to it. This led to the elimination of Phraates' successor Phraataces and to the downfall of the Arsacids of the Mithridatic line in Parthia. The short rule of Vonones opened the eyes of the Parthians to the danger of becoming a hellenizing vassal-kingdom of Rome and led to a national Iranian reaction which gave the throne to Artabanus, a member of a collateral branch of the Arsacids connected with the homeland of the Parthians and with Hyrcania and Atropatene. It is characteristic of Artabanus' aspirations that he at once insisted on his own solution of the Armenian problem: the ruler of Armenia must be a member of the ruling house of Parthia, an Arsacid. Since, however, Vonones, the former king of Parthia, the rival of Artabanus, who once won a splendid victory over him, was now the actual king of Armenia, Artabanus, in order to eliminate this danger and to deprive Vonones of Roman support, was ready to accept for a while a compromise which was suggested by Germanicus. A neutral hellenized king ruled again over Armenia. But this compromise was not lasting. As soon as Artabanus, whose hands were for a while tied up by important wars in the East, felt free and strong again, he renewed his claim to rule over Armenia through a member of his house. He failed, however, a second time and in the same way. Instead of Vonones Tiberius used romanized Arsacids, first Phraates and then Tiridates, as his tools, and after this diversion Artabanus was forced again to give up his plan. The interview between Artabanus and Vitellius was one of the greatest diplomatic victories of Tiberius. Armenia was in the hands of a prince of the neighboring Iberian dynasty, vassals of Rome.

However, no lasting peace could be established on such a basis. The Armenian question remained acute.   It is characteristic of the urgency of this problem that Vardanes in his short rule was ready to raise it again and it is very probable that the episode of Meherdates whom Claudius put up as a pretender was in one way or another connected with similar plans and aspirations of the Hyrcanian Gotarzes. No wonder, therefore, if Vologases I, in agreement with his brothers, raised the question again and did not shrink from long and bloody wars to gain a solution acceptable both to Rome and to Parthia. The solution, though a compromise, satisfied the vital interests of the Parthians. The brother of Vologases, Tiridates, became king of Armenia but he received his crown from the hands of Nero in Rome. Thus a modus vivendi was established for a while and lasted until the end of the Flavian dynasty.

With Trajan the question became acute once more. The origin of the conflict between Trajan and Pacorus first and Osroes afterwards is unknown. But it is certain that it involved the ques­tion who was to be king of Armenia. Whether or not the trouble was complicated by an invasion of the Parthians into Syria is a matter of controversy and does not concern us here. Suffice it to say that Trajan decided to solve the Armenian problem in his own radical way: Armenia was to become a Roman province protected by Mesopotamia and Adiabene occupied by Roman garrisons, and Parthia was to be ruled by a Roman nominee, a client-king of Rome.

The conquest of Mesopotamia by Trajan and his capture of the royal capital Ctesiphon produced a tremendous impression on the Parthians and certainly aroused a strong national reaction: witness the revolt of Mesopotamia and Adiabene under the leadership of members of the house of the Arsacids while Trajan was at Ctesiphon. The invasion of Trajan is mentioned as a kind of era by the chronicle of Arbela and as late as AD 572, according to John of Ephesus, the Romans reminded the Sassanian Persians of Trajan and emphasized the fact that statues of him were still standing in Persia and the Persians were afraid of riding by them.

This national reaction was probably the chief reason why Hadrian restored the legitimate kings in Parthia and gave Mesopotamia back to them, controlling Armenia indirectly through vassal-kings. Our scanty information on the time of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius does not reveal the conditions on which an under­standing between Parthia and Rome was reached. It is not improbable, however, that in return for restoring the status quo Hadrian received important concessions. We hear that he did not exact tribute from Mesopotamia, which may mean that his right to do so was acknowledged, i.e. that the status of Mesopotamia was not exactly the same as before the war. The appointment of Parthamaspates as king of Edessa shows that the status of Armenia was to a certain extent extended to some minor kingdoms of Mesopotamia. This led to complications, and a new arrangement was achieved in 123 when the former dynasty was restored. It is also significant that, though King Osroes received back from Hadrian his daughter whom Trajan had captured, the royal throne was never sent back to Ctesiphon either by Hadrian or by Antoninus, as Hadrian had promised. This was probably regarded by the Parthians as a humiliating symbol of inferiority. The merchants of Palmyra never felt more at home in the great commercial cities of Parthia than in the times of Hadrian and Antoninus and statues of Roman emperors may even have stood in the Palmyrene quarter of the royal Parthian caravan-city of Vologasia. In the time of Hadrian and later, Pal­myra had detachments of her own desert police (mounted archers) kin all the important towns of the Euphrates frontier with Parthia. Doura was one of these and Anath (Anah) another. A strong Parthia was bound to resent Roman predominance, and more than once in the reigns of Hadrian and Antoninus the Roman Empire Was threatened by a war on the eastern frontier.

The break came with Vologases III. Conditions were troubled in the Parthian Empire in the last years of Osroes and during the rule of Vologases II. Rival rulers contested the throne of both of them. Vologases III probably yielded to the pressure of public opinion and decided to put an end to the conditions created by Trajan's expedition. It was again the question of Armenia which led to the war, which started with the appointment of an Armenian king by Vologases and with two crushing defeats of the Roman governors of Cappadocia and Syria who tried to save the prestige of Rome in Armenia. The expeditions of Lucius Verus against Parthia began with the reconquest of Armenia in 163—4, followed by the occupation of Mesopotamia and an expedition against Ctesiphon—an exact repetition of Trajan's campaign. The results of the three campaigns of Lucius were, however, not decisive. The war ended in a compromise. Armenia remained a vassal-kingdom garrisoned by Rome; the most important Mesopotamian cities were also held by Roman forces kid the Euphrates limes (or defence-system) was extended from Sura to points south of Doura, which last became a strong Roman fortress. But Vologases remained king at Ctesiphon, and it was plain that another war could not be long delayed.

The next war began in the troubled time after the death of Commodus. The Parthians never became reconciled to the loss of Mesopotamia, and it was a revolt in Mesopotamia (Osrhoene and Adiabene) that was the beginning of Septimius Severus’ operations against Parthia which ended in the capture of Ctesiphon. This capture, however, was no more than a military demonstration intended to frighten Parthia and make Mesopotamia safe for Rome, for Severus never thought of extending the Roman province to include lower Mesopotamia. This new humiliation exasperated the Iranians and led to the first serious rising of vassal-kingdoms against the Arsacids. Persia and Media revolted, a fact which was unknown until the discovery of a local chronicle of Arbela.

The last phase of what was now the question for Rome and Parthia, the rival claim to Mesopotamia, was a new war that began in 215 under Caracalla, who sought to profit by the dynastic dissensions of Armenia and of Parthia. But fortune was not with Rome. Though Caracalla once captured the Armenian king Tiridates by treachery and once apparently secured his extradition from the Parthian king Vologases V, a less pliant rival of Vologases, Artabanus V, took his place on the throne of Parthia. The Roman general Theocritus was sent against Armenia but was defeated. Caracalla invaded Adiabene and part of Media but was then assassinated, and Artabanus inflicted two defeats on the new Emperor Macrinus. The Romans were compelled to save their province in Mesopotamia by paying a heavy indemnity and to see Tiridates king of Armenia even though, like his namesake of the time of Nero, he received his diadem from the Emperor.

It was a pitiful end to the efforts of the Roman Empire to reduce the Parthians to vassaldom. Parthia emerged victorious, and the recapture of Mesopotamia was a matter of time. Fate decided that it was to be carried out not by the Arsacids but by the descendants of Sasan the Persian. A new revolt in Persis led by Ardashir put an end to the rule of the Arsacids in the Iranian lands and to the life of the last great Arsacid, Artabanus V, AD 227.

Closely connected with the Armenian and Caucasian problem was the problem of dealing with the various Sarmatian tribes which, probably early in the first century AD, formed a powerful kingdom under the rule of the Alani in the Northern Caucasus. There are many episodes in Parthian history which were connected with the existence of this strong nomadic State in the eastern part of the steppes of South Russia. Thus Vonones, the rival of Artabanus III, tried to escape from his confinement in Cilicia to the Caucasus and then to “consanguineum sibi regem Scytharum”, probably one of the Sarmatian kings. Then both Orodes, son of Artabanus, and Mithridates the Iberian used in their struggle for Armenia the help of Sarmatian chiefs. Again in AD 75 during the rule of Vologases I the Alani invaded Media and Armenia. The danger was great, and Vologases asked Vespasian for help which, however, was refused. Finally there was a great invasion in AD. 134 which affected Albania, Gordyene, Media and even Cappadocia and was checked by the joint efforts of the historian Arrian, the governor of Cappadocia, and King Vologases II. The chronicle of Arbela gives a dramatic account of the struggle of Vologases and the Alani of which the hero is the pious satrap of Adiabene, Rakbakt, a convert to Christianity.

The other frontiers of Parthia were, no doubt, of little less importance than those on the west and north-west, but the tradi­tion that has survived is almost silent about the wars and diplomatic exchanges of the Arsacids with the northern Scythians and Massagetae, the Bactrian Kushans and the Indian neighbors of Parthia. We hear incidentally that a Phraates fled to the Scythians when Tiridates entered Ctesiphon in AD 36. Those Scythians may be the Sacae, who at that time became masters of Sacastene (Drangiane) and of a part of the Punjab. Then under Artabanus III, after his victory over Vonones and before his clash with Tiberius, we are told of Parthian victories against his neighbors. What these are we cannot tell. They may be connected with the great events which happened about this time in Sacastene, the substitution of the dynasty of Gundofarr, who may have belonged to the powerful Parthian clan of the Suren, for the former Sacian kings who were already masters of large parts of the Punjab. After Gundofarr his immediate successors, Orthagnes, Abdagaeses and Pakores, may have kept the kingdom intact for some time. It is, however, certain that soon (though how soon is in doubt) the kingdom of Gundofarr fell to pieces, the Punjab being gradually conquered by the Bactrian Kushans while the southern parts of it down to Barbarikon and Minnagara on the Indus were ruled by Parthian satraps, who were busy fighting each other, until the last remnants of Parthian rule were swept away by the Kushans. In the descrip­tion of the West as it was between AD 25 and 125 which is contained in the Chinese Annals of the later Han it is stated that the Kushan king Kozulokadphises, who was the first to create a united kingdom out of the principalities of the Yueh-chih in Bactria, “invaded Parthia and took hold of the territory of Kao-fu (Kabul)”. The date of this event is disputed, but it must be later than the reign of Gundofarr.

The Kushan kingdom separated Parthia from China. But though they had no common frontier, commercial relations between the two countries were of such importance to both of them that diplomatic interchanges were frequent and regular. Embas­sies with presents and messages went to and fro, but China learnt little from them: at least the description of Parthia (An-hsi) in the Annals of the Later Han is short, vague and almost meaningless.

It is impossible to say how often the peace of the Parthian Empire was disturbed by foreign invasions of its eastern borders. But it can hardly have been a rare event in the life of Parthia, and we may conjecture that the Arsacids had to devote as much attention to the East as they did to the West. For example, the conflict between Izates, the pious Jewish proselyte of Adiabene, and Vologases I, as told by Josephus can hardly be historical fact. The sudden retreat of Vologases after he received the alarming news of an invasion of the Dahae and Sacae into Parthyene savours of a miracle. The hand of God is seen in it. Yet the setting of the story must be regarded as probable, so that an invasion of the northern Scythians was a phenomenon familiar to all the readers of Izates' history in the Parthian Empire.

Of much concern to the Parthian kings were their relations with the large nominally vassal kingdoms on the borders of Parthia. One of them was Sacastene, another Persis. There is no doubt that wars against such stubborn and powerful vassals happened frequently. The same is true of Hyrcania. We hear that in AD 58 a Hyrcanian king sent an embassy to Corbulo and offered his help. What was the status of Hyrcania later we do not know.

All told, it cannot be denied that the Arsacids were on the whole successful in their endeavor to defend the integrity and the independence of their empire. The Sassanians were more successful than their predecessors—their neighbors were not so strong—but their general policy was exactly the same as that of the Arsacids.